

Index of Exhibits
 Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory strike, 02 June 2015

- Exhibit 1 - Target Pack (b)(1)1.4a
- Exhibit 2 - Strike 2 June 15 VBIED Factory Impact Video
- Exhibit 3 - OIR Daily BDA Update, 05 June 2015
- Exhibit 4 - Hawijah Intel Source Document
- Exhibit 5 - Intel Community Vetting Document
- Exhibit 6 - TDWG, 28 MAY 15, (b)(1)1.4a HAWIJAH VBIED FACTORY (b)(1)1.4a
- Exhibit 7 - JTCB, 29 MAY HAWIJAH IED
- Exhibit 8 - JTAB, 29 MAY 15
- Exhibit 9 - Email- More Hawijah questions (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
- Exhibit 10 - Email- ATC (b)(1)1.4a Paper JIPTL Nomination
- Exhibit 11 - CJTF_OIR_31_MAY_15_DAILY_FRAGO
- Exhibit 12 - Iraq Strike Package 02 (b)(1)1.4a Mass Brief
- Exhibit 13 - 01 Jun Fires and Effects Synch Board
- Exhibit 14 - 5Ws CFACC Deliberate Strike Package #1 - ATC (b)(1)1.4a 02 JUN 2015
- Exhibit 15 - CAOC CIVCAS Credibility Inquiry 2 June 2015
- Exhibit 16 (b)(1)1.4a PAPER JIPTL
- Exhibit 17 - Email- Al Hawijah (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) 14 Aug 15
- Exhibit 18 - VBIED BDA
- Exhibit 19 - Email- Al Hawijah (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) 18 Aug 15
- Exhibit 20 - Email- Hawijah questions (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) 07 Aug 15
- Exhibit 21 - Email- Questions (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) 06 Aug 15
- Exhibit 22 (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) JTCB briefing notes
- Exhibit 23 - Sworn Statement (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
- Exhibit 24 - Sworn Statement (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)



**AL HAWIYJAH ISIL VBIED
FACTORY (b)(1)1.4a, IZ**

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

AL HAWIYJAH ISIL VBIED FACTORY (b)(1)1.4a

- **Target Significance:**
 - ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~ (S//REL TO USA, IRKS) This facility provides a location for ISIL to produce VBIEDs in order to conduct attacks against ISF operating in Al Huwayjah. This facility also provides a centralized location for weapon and vehicle collection and distribution within Al Huwayjah.
- **CDE Concerns:**
 - ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~ NOT DUAL USE: (b)(1)1.4a
- **Strike Restrictions:**
 - ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~ (b)(1)1.4a

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

Exhibit 2 – Video – Full Denial under (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

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JTCB

29 May, 2015

This Briefing is

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

JTCB Agenda

- Target Development Status
- Target Validation
- BDA & Re-Attack Recommendations
- MAAP Brief ATO (12hrs)
- JIPTL Brief (36hrs)
- ISR Outlook
- Decisions
- Around the Components

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: RE: [S//REL TO USA, FVEY] More Hawijah questions
Date: Sunday, August 16, 2015 10:17:16 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sir-

Please see below.

-----Original Message-----

From: [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) (US)
Sent: Saturday, August 15, 2015 7:19 PM
To: [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) (US)
Subject: [S//REL TO USA, FVEY] More Hawijah questions

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Looking through the evidence I came up with a few more questions. Please answer the below - you can respond via email.

1. Who briefed the Hawijah target at the TDWG? I have no idea. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Maybe you want to check with [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) one. He may have a better idea because he may be able to look up the slides.

2. Who approved the Hawijah JTCB? Was it the DCOM-Air? Yes, the DCOM-A would have approved it. At that time, it would have been MG Miller I believe.

3. Why was the Hawijah target briefed at the JTCB and TAB on the same day? Is this normal? Yes.
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

4. What is the "paper" JIPTL process? That is best answered by J34. I am not sure. [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) would have been the ones to be involved in that process at the CAOC, but they are both gone now. [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) may be able to answer that now.

5. Was the Hawijah target directed as a paper target? By whom? Why? I remember that CG asking how quick it could get JIPTL nominated after I briefed it. I believe he wanted it to be struck at the earliest possible time because ISIL uses VBIED's as their weapon of choice for producing casualties.

R/

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Thanks,

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Deputy Director (Fwd)

USARCENT G32 Avn Division
CJTF-OIR CJ32

Camp Arifian, Kuwait

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S//REL TO USA, IRKS)~~ [S//REL TO USA, IRKS] (b)(1)1.4a Paper JIPTL Nomination
Date: Saturday, July 25, 2015 3:10:18 PM
Attachments: JIPTL BR (b)(1)1.4a PAPER JIPTL.pptx

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

As requested.

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 31, 2015 6:27 PM
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S//REL TO USA, IRKS)~~ [S//REL TO USA, IRKS] (b)(1)1.4a Paper JIPTL Nomination

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Please forward (b)(1)1.4c IZ to the DCOM-A or his delegate for JIPTL approval for strike on 2 Jun (b)(1)1.4a Thanks.

(b)(6) (CAN-ARMY)
CJTF-OIR CJ34 Fires
Lethal Fires Deputy
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, May 31, 2015 5:18 PM
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S//REL TO USA, IRKS)~~ [S//REL TO USA, IRKS] (b)(1)1.4a Paper JIPTL Nomination

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

Here's a copy of the paper JIPTL we submitted for approval to the DCFACC. He approved it, now forwarding it to you.

V/R,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
609 CAOC/CPD
Chief, Targeting Effects Team
(b)(6)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, May 30, 2015 2:43 PM

To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Subject: ~~[S//REL TO USA, IRKS]~~ (b)(1)1.4a Paper JIPTL Nomination

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Today, CJTF requested the addition of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c AL HAWIYJAH ISIL VBIED FACTOR (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c JIPTL nomination package is attached.

Please contact me with any questions.

V/R,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

609 AOC/CPD TET

Deputy TET Chief

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS~~

- (b)(1)1.4a
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(U) Package coordination card ch0

[Faint, illegible text from a document or map, possibly a coordination card, is visible in the background.]

(U) Comm plan & airspace

[Faint, illegible text from a document, possibly a communication plan, is visible in the background.]

IAW COMMCARD

(U) Airspace request

- (S//REL)

(b)(1)1.4a

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//SI//NF~~

CJTF-OIR

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE



FIRES AND EFFECTS SYNC BOARD

The overall classification of this briefing is: ~~SECRET//NOFORN//SI//NF~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN//SI//NF~~

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS/LIMDIS~~CAOC CIVCAS Credibility Inquiry 2 June 2015 (U)~~(S//REL USA, IRKS)~~ BLUF: After a review of all available mission materials, (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

the CAOC assesses that allegation of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) resulting from a secondary explosion from a coalition airstrike on 2 June, 2015 is credible. The number of civilian or ISIL casualties caused by the secondary explosions cannot be confirmed at this time.

(U) CIVCAS Allegation:

(U) Sources: Multiple open source reports have indicated up to 74 casualties from a strike against a known ISIL IED factory in the town of Al Hawija. The total numbers of reported casualties in each report indicate that the casualties include both ISIL militants and civilians but do not indicate the breakdown of each. The sources of this information reports are also not known.

- a. (U) Search criteria:
 - i. Al Hawija, Iraq
 - ii. Civilian casualties
 - iii. Bomb(ing)
- b. (U) Sources searched:
 - i. Reuters
 - ii. Ibodycount.org / IraqBodyCount.org
 - iii. Al Jazeera
 - iv. Twitter

(U) Reuters Report (4 June 2015)

An air strike by a U.S.-led coalition flattened an entire neighbourhood of a northern Iraqi town controlled by Islamic State militants, killing dozens of people including civilians, witnesses and security sources said.

The strike targeted an Islamic State bomb-making factory in Hawija overnight on Tuesday, triggering a series of secondary explosions that reduced the surrounding area in the industrial district to rubble.

Residents and security sources put the number of people killed at around 70.

Sixty-seven-year-old Hawija resident Hassan Mahmoud al-Jubbouri said he heard planes overhead for around 10 minutes before the initial explosion, which shattered the windows of his house. "I ran with my sons and wife and took cover under the staircase. Three to four powerful explosions followed the first blast and I felt the roof of my house was about to collapse over our heads," he said.

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRKS/LIMDIS~~

Jubbouri ventured out hours later, accompanying a neighbour to the area, which he compared to the site of a nuclear bomb, with flames and smoke still rising. "The gunmen were shouting and looked very confused," Jubbouri said. "I helped pull a family of six from the debris. Their bodies were mutilated. We brought a blanket and gathered all the body parts inside and took them to the cemetery," he said, adding they buried the remains in a single grave. Photographs circulated on social media purportedly taken at the site of the explosion showed a scene of devastation, with no building left standing.

In a statement on Wednesday, the coalition said an air strike targeted a "vehicle-borne improvised explosive device facility" in Hawija between 8 am on June 2 and 8 am the following day.

The coalition says it has killed 10,000 Islamic State militants across Iraq and Syria since launching air strikes against the group after it overran around one third of Iraq.

A senior military source in the coalition said he was not aware of the strike in question, but that every effort was made to ensure no civilians were killed: "Since we started air strikes in August last year in Iraq, I have difficulty thinking of any civilian casualties in Iraq, and for thousands of sorties that is good. One is clearly too many." Sarhat Qadir, a police chief in Kirkuk province where Hawija is located told Reuters "dozens of terrorists" had been killed in the strike, along with an unknown number of civilians.

A resident of the area in which the explosion took place said Islamic State had a strong presence there and was stockpiling ammunition as well as manufacturing bombs. The militants had two explosives-rigged tankers ready, he said, putting the number of people killed at 70, including both militants and civilians: "Many families were buried beneath their houses and are believed to have died". A security official in Kirkuk, Lieutenant Ibrahim Jawdat, said initial intelligence reports from sources inside Hawija suggested at least 74 people were killed, among them civilians.

Sheikh Anwar al-Asi al-Obeidi, who fled Hawija after Islamic State took over last June, said members of his tribe in the town told him a large number of civilians had been killed, and the industrial district resembled the site of an earthquake.

(U) Al Jazeera Published Photos (4 June 2015)




(U) Figure 1. Open Source Photos

1. (U) Coalition Strike Activity

- a. ~~(S//REL USA, IRKS)~~ The allegation date, location, and target description corresponds to a deliberate strike executed on 2 June, 2015. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a Figure 2 displays all coalition airstrikes in the Mosul area over a two day span beginning on 1 June. The next closest coalition air strike was on 1 June, approximately 18 miles to the northeast of the city of Al Hawija.



2. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) AL HAWIJAH ISIL VBIED FACTORY (b)(1)1.4a Mission Planning
- a. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) The target that matches the photos and descriptions in the open source reporting was assessed as a production location for VBIEDs. It also was used as a centralized location for weapon and vehicle collection in Al Hawijah. (b)(1)1.4c the target was a single-use facility that was a legitimate military objective and lawful object of attack. The target was validated and approved for deliberate targeting by CDR CJTF-OIR on 29 May 2015. Figure 3 shows the location, intelligence, target area outline (TAO) and imagery for the target area.



(b)(1)1.4a Based on the location of various collateral concerns relative to the JDPIs in addition to target construction, a mix of (b)(1)1.4a were planned using delayed fuzing to mitigate potential incidental damage. Multiple collateral concerns in the area resulted in a collateral damage estimate (CDE) level of 5 low. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a Per the CDE Methodology CJCSI, possible secondary explosions caused by the contents of the target buildings cannot be accurately considered for CDE calculations¹. Strike restrictions required a night attack only. Figure 4 shows the target area and closest collateral concerns.



¹ "The CDM does not account for secondary explosions. Collateral damage due to secondary explosions (i.e., weapons cache or fuel tanks for military equipment) cannot be consistently measured or predicted. Enclosure D, page D-5, CJCSI 3160.01A, 12 October 12

(b)(1)1.4a

3. (U) Strike Execution

a. ~~(S//REL USA, UKS)~~ (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a


(b)(1)1.4g review confirmed that at least two weapons impacted the intended targets. The first weapon, a (b)(1)1.4a but the weapon was a dud. Approximately two seconds later, another weapon impacted and functioned but the explosion in the (b)(1)1.4g makes it impossible to determine what JDPI was hit that caused the massive secondary explosion. Figure 5 shows (b)(1)1.4g pre-impact and immediately following impact. (b)(1)1.4b officials have reviewed and validated the plan and execution summary found in this report.

(b)(1)1.4g

b. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) The secondary explosion produced a visible shock wave extending beyond 750 feet from the target and an explosion that extended to 400 feet from the target, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g


(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g While it is expected that additional weapons impacted around that time, it cannot be confirmed based on video obscuration and post-impact damage. Based on (b)(1)1.4g review, the observed weapons impacted the intended targets and aircrew employment was not the cause of the secondary explosion. The explosion from the target was clearly not due to a (b)(1)1.4a alone. The

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Based on target composition, targeteers were able to mitigate effects to collateral buildings with increased delay settings on some JDPIs and by targeting at night with no anticipated or assessed civilian activity in the immediate vicinity. Figure 6 shows (b)(1)1.4a function against a building of similar construction. (b)(1)1.4a



4. (U) Collateral Damage/CIVCAS Possibilities

- a. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) Based on the size of the secondary explosion, caused by the explosive contents of the target building, (b)(1)1.4c significant damage to structures as far as 1250 feet from the target complex. Post-strike assessments indicate that in the area surrounding the blast, 111 buildings were confirmed destroyed, 75 buildings sustained severe damage, 86 buildings sustained moderate damage, and 160 buildings sustained light damage. Of note, a residential area located approximately 500 feet north of the target area, had 25 buildings confirmed destroyed, 52 buildings sustained severe damage, 68 buildings sustained moderate damage, and 103 buildings sustained light damage. Due to the substantial amount of damage in this area alone, it is credible that civilian casualties may have occurred. Figure 7 shows post-strike battle damage assessments of the target area and the residential area mentioned.



(~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) Figure 7. Post-strike damage assessments.

5. (U) Conclusions

- a. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) At this time there is sufficient information to find the allegation concerning a coalition strike causing civilian casualties in Al Hawijah to be credible. While no (b)(1)1.4 shows individual civilian casualties, the sheer size of the explosion in the vicinity of civilian structures and the post-strike damage assessment in the area, it is logical to conclude that civilian casualties may have occurred due to the secondary explosions. As there are no indications of employment errors or weapons malfunctions during this strike, if a CIVCAS investigation is

conducted, we recommend it consider the target development, intelligence, and approval.

Approved/Disapproved

ZOBRIST.SCOT

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

SCOTT J. ZOBRIST
Major General, USAF
Deputy, Combined Forces Air Component
Commander

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

From: [redacted]
To: [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Cc: AVAB CAOC ISRD TGTS SHIF
Subject: ~~[S//REL TO USA, FVEY]~~ Al Hawijah
Date: Friday, August 14, 2015 11:28:41 PM

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

I have not received your email. I received a note from one of my NCOs instructing me to email you instead. I've attached the CDE graphic from the Al Hawijah VBIED Factory. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

I don't know what your questions were, but I'll summarize what I stated over the phone:

With respect to the Al Hawijah VBIED Factory, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a my targeteers followed all of the procedures accurately. Their CDE graphic, which is attached, indicated a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c with the nearest collateral concern (NCC) being a shed. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a the estimate for a night strike was zero. This was a perfectly accurate CDE Call. However, all of these details were all completely irrelevant in the face of what actually happened afterwards. Based on CJCSI 3160.01A, p. D-6, Enclosure D, it states:

"The CDM does not account for secondary explosions. Collateral damage due to secondary explosions (i.e., weapons cache or fuel tanks for military equipment) cannot be consistently measured or predicted. Commanders should remain cognizant of any additional risk due to secondary explosions."

My targeteers actually spent hours working and reworking this target just to make the CDE "executable", which has been standard practice in this conflict. CDE concerns compete directly against the desired kinetic effects, so we are typically asked to destroy the target as much as possible within the restrictions of CDE. I remember thinking it seemed a bit foolish to re-weaponer the structure with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a which are not the right tool for the job. All of this work was to achieve a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a when there were several collateral objects in close proximity to the target...and the target was a VBIED facility. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a in the meantime, we need to provide an executable option so that a choice could be made either way. I did not find any fault with this logic, as ultimately the decision rests with the CC to make the decision. I do not think that anyone could have predicted the magnitude of the explosion and effects in the surrounding neighborhood. Secondary effects are nearly impossible to estimate with any level of accuracy, especially without knowing the quantity and type(s) of explosive material present at the site. That being said, I did not think it was a reasonable assumption to think that there would not be any collateral damage based on the knowledge that the target was a VBIED Factory with collateral structures so close to the site.

Hopefully, that sums up what you need. If you have any other questions, please call.

Respectfully,

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) USAF
Chief of Targets
609 AOC/ISRD Targets
[redacted] (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
 To: [Redacted]
 Cc: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
 Subject: [Redacted]
 Date: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 3:41:21 PM
 Attachments: (b)(1)1.4a Final v2 .potx

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, EYES~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Here are the responses to the questions you asked over the phone regarding the Hawiyjah ISIL VBIED Factory. (b)(1)1.4a cc'd my supervisor, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) the TET Chief, for their situational awareness.

1. What were your duties and responsibilities in the target development process?

My section is responsible for the advanced target development (ATD) in the target development process. ATD involves weaponeering, precise point mensuration, and collateral damage estimation.

2. What documents, publications, checklists were used during the weaponeering work?

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

3. In general, what are the weaponeering procedures to achieve the required effect for a target in populated areas?

The weaponeering software is used to give the user a probability of success based on the target model, the weapon type and number of weapons used, and all of the user defined parameters, variables, and assumptions. Weaponeering is focused on how to achieve the defined criteria for success, which is, in other words, the specific kinetic effect on the target. This has nothing to do with whether or not the area is populated. CDE Methodology, according to CJCSI 3160.01A, is designed to increase levels of mitigation to collateral damage as the risk increases. While the CDE Methodology does not account for transient patterns, it does account for known structures and outdoor facilities.

[Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
 [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
 [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a census data.

Often times, if our current solution yields a CDE 5 High, our targeteers will re-weaponeer using weapons with a smaller collateral effects radius in order to get a lower CDE call. However, the trade-off is that the targeteer will have to spend more time dropping more aimpoints, use more weapons, or possibly use a weapon that is not ideal to achieve the desired effects on the target. Throughout OIR, a common trend is that the customer wants complete structural destruction of buildings, but they also want a CDE Low call. This can cause the weaponeer to use an inordinate amount Small Diameter Bombs to satisfy both competing requirements.

4. What particular weaponeering was done to achieve the required effect?

The Hawiyjah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4a was weaponeered with (b)(1)1.4a
 [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

5. In general, what analysis is applied for weaponeering a target with known stored explosives with known collateral damage?

None. [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g The effects of secondary explosions are unpredictable. In some cases, secondary explosions are not even witnessed for some targets where one might expect to see them. When they are witnessed, the magnitude also varies substantially depending on chemical reactions and materials present at the time. (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

6. What particular weaponing was done for a target with probable/known stored explosives like Al Hawijah?

The Hawiyjah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4a was weaponed with (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a

7. What collateral damage considerations were used in the weaponing of the target?

The CDE Methodology accounts for all of the structures within the collateral effects radius of the weapon used. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a the shed was the only collateral structure that was estimated to be affected by any of the weapons. Other nearby collateral objects (CO) were depicted on the graphic but not estimated to be affected by weapons effects.

8. What weaponing methods were required to have an executable option for this target?

The specific desired effects have not typically been stated by the customer. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a To be "executable", the weaponing solution needs to be a CDE LOW call due to the noncombatant casualty cutoff value (NCV) of zero.

9. Was there any intelligence to indicate that the target met sensitive target criteria?

Yes and no. Sensitive target criteria involves chemical, biological, or radiological plume hazards or environmental hazards, CAT I No-Strike Entities, and other situations that drive a casualty count higher than the NCV. The target did not meet any of those criteria due to the fact that CDE Methodology does not account for secondary explosions. However, based on the fact that the intelligence stated that this was a VBIED facility and the significant amount of collateral structures in the area, one might have reasonably concluded that there might be civilian casualties as a result of the strike, (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a

10. What products were produced for the Al Hawijah VBIED Factory?

The TARPAC (attached) includes the weaponing, aimpoint, and CDE graphic.

11. To whom and when were the products provided?

It was provided to the Target Effects Team on 30 May.

12. Did you have any concerns with this target during weaponing?

Yes, I addressed my concerns in the previous email.

13. In general, can the intelligence collection, target development, weaponing process be improved to mitigate collateral damage?

This case, in my opinion, is not a failure of a process. I think the assumptions of the CDE methodology are clearly stated. In cases where intelligence indicates a greater potential for secondary explosions, more consideration may be given to seek additional analysis, to seek strike approval through the (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a or to not strike the target if it were not of proportionally significant value.

Respectfully,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) USAF

Chief of Targets
609 AOC/ISR Targets

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) USAF AFCENT ISR
Sent: Friday, August 14, 2015 8:28 PM
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Cc: AUAB CAOC ISR TGTS SHIFT
Subject: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~ Al Hawijah

~~CLASSIFICATION:SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

I have not received your email. I received a note from one of my NCOs instructing me to email you instead. I've attached the CDE graphic from the Al Hawijah VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4a

I don't know what your questions were, but I'll summarize what I stated over the phone:

With respect to the Al Hawijah VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4a my targeteers followed all of the procedures accurately. Their CDE graphic, which is attached, indicated a (b)(1)1.4a with the nearest collateral concern (NCC) being a shed. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c the estimate for a night strike was zero. This was a perfectly accurate CDE Call. However, all of these details were all completely irrelevant in the face of what actually happened afterwards. Based on CJCSI 3160.01A, p. D-6, Enclosure D, it states:

(b)(1)1.4c

My targeteers actually spent hours working and reworking this target just to make the CDE "executable", which has been standard practice in this conflict. CDE concerns compete directly against the desired kinetic effects, so we are typically asked to destroy the target as much as possible within the restrictions of CDE. I remember thinking it seemed a bit foolish to re-weaponer the structure with (b)(1)1.4a which are not the right tool for the job. All of this work was to achieve (b)(1)1.4a when there were several collateral objects in close proximity to the target...and the target was a VBIED facility. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a In the meantime, we need to provide an executable option so that a choice could be made either way. I did not find any fault with this logic, as ultimately the decision rests with the CC to make the decision. I do not think that anyone could have predicted the magnitude of the explosion and effects in the surrounding neighborhood. Secondary effects are nearly impossible to estimate with any level of accuracy, especially without knowing the quantity and type(s) of explosive material present at the site. That being said, I did not think it was a reasonable assumption to think that there would not be any collateral damage based on the knowledge that the target was a VBIED Factory with collateral structures so close to the site.

Hopefully, that sums up what you need. If you have any other questions, please call.

Respectfully,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) USAF
Chief of Targets
609 AOC/ISR Targets

(b)(6)

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

From: (b)(6)
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: RE: [S//REL TO USA, MESH] Hawijah questions
Date: Friday, August 07, 2015 8:34:03 PM

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sir,
Please see my answers in red below.

R/S,
(b)(6) USMC
HQ USCENTCOM
Target Development (CCJ2-JTED)

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2015 9:52 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: [S//REL TO USA, MESH] Hawijah questions

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MESH~~

(b)(6)

Thanks again for giving me a call. Below are the questions I mentioned. As I mentioned, my focus for the investigation is on the process, so whatever detail you can provide on that - and particularly the Hawijah target dev - will be greatly beneficial. If any of the questions are beyond the scope of your work, please indicate that and provide a POC, if known.

All of the enclosed questions are in reference to the 02 Jun 15 strike on Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED factory (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a.

1. What were your duties and/or responsibilities in this targeting process? I am Chief of Target Development for US CENTCOM. I oversee the development of deliberate target packages ISO OIR, other crisis operations and contingency/OPLANS in the CENTCOM AOR. My section also serves at the conduit to the larger IC for vetting and other targeting issues for subordinate component commands.

2. Which unit / office nominated the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory target? Development on this target was started at CJTF-OIR, and completed by DGS-1.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

4. Were any discriminating criteria or challenges applied for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory target? There were no additional criteria applied to this specific target.

5. What doctrinal references, publications, checklists, TTPs, etc. were used during your target analysis or development work? CJCSI 3370.01 Target Development Standards, CJCSI 3160.01A No Strike and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDM).

6. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target in populated areas? (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

7. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which was in a populated area? (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

8. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target with known stored explosives? If the quantity of explosives is known, coordination with JIEDDO to estimate the blast effects can be done.

9. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which had known stored explosives in a populated area? Without reporting suggesting the quantity of explosives stored at this location additional analysis to determine the size of any secondary explosions is not possible.

10. What collateral damage considerations were used or implemented in your analysis of the target? Collateral damage estimation was conducted IAW with CJCSI 3160.01A.

11. What products did you produce for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory target? (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

12. To whom did you provide those products and why? (E.g. are they the next step in the tgt dev process?) They were provided to CJTF-OIR, and the CAOC.

13. Is there anyone else who can provide additional information? (b)(6)

TSVOIP: (b)(6) (no SVOIP)

If there are any other details to add beyond these questions about the target development process in general or the Hawijah target in particular, please include those as well.

Requested suspense is NLT Tuesday, 11 Aug 15.

Thanks again,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
U.S. Army
Deputy Director (Fwd)

USARCENT G32 Avn Division
CJTF-OIR CJ32

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

(b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Derived From: IAW CENTCOM Classification Guide, CCR 380-14
Declassify On: 8/7/2040

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
To: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ~~(S//REL FVEY)~~ ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Questions (U)
Date: Thursday, August 06, 2015 5:45:55 PM

~~SECRET//REL TO FVEY~~

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Below is my response to your questions.

1. What are your duties and/or responsibilities in the targeting process?

The Langley Target Development Cell (TDC) supports CJTF/CAOC by producing Basic and Intermediate Target Development (ITD) nominations in accordance with CJCSI/M 3370.01A.

2. Who nominated the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4b target?

The Langley TDC does not nominate targets for strike. We perform basic and intermediate development to ensure the target can be vetted and validated. Our products are sent to the JTF. The JTF works with CENTCOM to ensure the target is vetted by the Intelligence Community. Once the target is vetted, the JTF nominates the target for JTL/RTL inclusion.

3. Which unit / office and from whom did you get the nomination products for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4b?

(b)(1)1.4g

4. In general, what discriminating criteria or challenges are applied at your level for target acceptance or rejection?

(b)(1)1.4c

5. Were any discriminating criteria or challenges applied for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4b target?

None identified at this time.

6. In general, what doctrinal references, publications, checklists, TTPs, etc. are used during your target analysis or development work?

The TDC performs target development in accordance CJCSI 3370.01A, Target Development Standards and CJCSM 3375.01, Target Intelligence Data Standards. TDC developers must complete formal Intermediate Target Develop Training before working in the TDC. (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c are produced in accordance with CJCSM 3370.01 (Target Graphics Standards).

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

7. What particular doctrinal references, publications, checklists, TTPs, etc. were used for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4c target?

See answer to question 6.

8. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target in populated areas?

(b)(1)1.4c

9. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which was in a populated area?

(b)(1)1.4c

10. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target with known stored explosives?

See answer to question 8.

11. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which had known stored explosives in a populated area?

See answer to question 8.

12. What products did you produce for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)1.4c target?

(b)(1)1.4c

13. To whom did you provide those products and why? (E.g. are they the next step in the tgt dev process?)

(b)(1)1.4c

14. Is there anyone else who can provide additional information?

(b)(6) is in charge of the Langley TDC. Any follow-up questions can be addressed to him.

If there are any other details to add beyond these questions about the target development process in general or the Hawijah target in particular, please include those as well. Also, please provide the products you received, developed, and distributed pertaining to the Hawijah target.

Thank you,

V/r

(b)(6)

Target Development Analyst

Langley Target Development Cell
Langley AFB, VA 23665

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 2015 9:31 AM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: [~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~] Questions

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, MESF~~

(b)(6)

Below are the questions I mentioned. My focus for the investigation is on the process, so whatever detail you can provide on that - and particularly the Hawijah target dev - will be beneficial to the investigation. If any of the questions are beyond the scope of your work, please indicate that and provide a POC, if known.

1. What are your duties and/or responsibilities in the targeting process?
2. Who nominated the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)14bZ target?
3. Which unit / office and from whom did you get the nomination products for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)14bZ?
4. In general, what discriminating criteria or challenges are applied at your level for target acceptance or rejection?
5. Were any discriminating criteria or challenges applied for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)14bZ target?
6. In general, what doctrinal references, publications, checklists, TTPs, etc. are used during your target analysis or development work?
7. What particular doctrinal references, publications, checklists, TTPs, etc. were used for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)14bZ target?
8. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target in populated areas?
9. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which was in a populated area?
10. In general, what analysis is applied to developing a target with known stored explosives?
11. What particular analysis was applied in developing the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory, which had known stored explosives in a populated area?
12. What products did you produce for the Al Hawijah ISIL VBIED Factory (b)(1)14bZ target?
13. To whom did you provide those products and why? (E.g. are they the next step in the tgt dev process?)
14. Is there anyone else who can provide additional information?

If there are any other details to add beyond these questions about the target development process in general or the Hawijah target in particular, please include those as well. Also, please provide the

products you received, developed, and distributed pertaining to the Hawijah target.

Thanks,

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
[Redacted]
U.S. Army
Deputy Director (Fwd)

USARCENT G32 Avn Division
CJTF-OIR CJ32

Camp Arifian, Kuwait

(b)(6)
[Redacted]
(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

This email was marked by [Redacted] (b)(6) on 20150806 at 10:45:51 AM.
~~SECRET//REL TO FVEY~~

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 130(b), (b)(6)

(b)(3) 50 U.S.C. 3024(i), (b)(6)

Approved for Release