

## **Vragenlijst 1 (algemeen)**

### **Uitgewerkte teksten in tekstblokken**

#### **Q1.1.**

Not only the quality for passengers is important but also efficiency (Costs for passengers and taxpayers), national infrastructural network, supplying transport and infrastructure.

#### **Q1.2a.**

It is not the task of the Ministry to give an opinion about quality. The quality of rail passenger services, main railway network, is monitored and published via performance indicators. In addition the quality can partly be measured by its impact on volumes transported.

#### **Q1.3.**

No open access services from single private operators exist in the Netherlands.

#### **Q1.4.**

Quality is one of the items impacting the development of the rail passenger and rail freight market, where other items are also important (i.a. frequencies, infrastructure conditions, pricing in all modes etc. Quality-items are fixed in KPI's).

#### **Q1.5a.**

Commuters are much less sensitive to price than leisure-travellers. It is possible to have profitable PSO's without competition on busy lines/networks.

#### **Q1.5b.**

Rail freight market, particular intermodal transport, shows to be sensitive to price competition with road and inland waterways.

#### **Q1.5c.**

Punctuality - reliability of rail passenger services important to remain attractive.

#### **Q2.1.**

Only relevant in case of market opening.

Both public tendering and awarding service contracts directly are successful. The results of the benchmark are good for the Netherlands

See also the Dutch report: Evaluation spoorwegwet 2009.

Reports:

Transport plan national Mainrailway network

Tendering regional railwayservices

#### **Q2.2.**

See also the report: Programma Hoogfrequent Spoor.

On a limited number of crucial locations infrastructure capacity will be increased

#### **Q2.2.b.**

A good cooperation between the infrastructure provider and the operator is necessary.

#### **Q2.2.c.**

Output steering as part of the public service contract in combination with criteria (i.e. price, information, quality) in the public service contract is the instrument for the national authority (ministry of infrastructure and environment). This instrument is working satisfactory.

#### **Q2.2.d.**

- Railway undertaking NS holds main network concession 2005- 2015 as result of a PSO compliant direct award.
- NS pays a concession fee of 20 mln per year to the State (in 2012, 30 mln in 2013 and 2014).
- No more direct subsidy flows (for some regional lines) from the State to NS in 2015 and further.
- NS is only allowed to increase fares on majority of trips (second class singles) with CPI each year, while NS costs each year increase with approx. CPI + 1%.
- This leads to an increase of efficiency within NS each year and a limited increase of fares.

- NS shows overall signs of strongly increased financial performance in 2005-2011.
- This is due to increased passenger volumes (13,5 bln passenger kilometers in 2005 and 16,1 bln passenger kilometers in 2011) against a limited increase of fares.
- NS pays from 2015 on a concession fee of 80 mln per year to the State. The State is pressing on NS to increase efficiency even further by forcing an extra obligation to reduce costs by 50 mln per year and increasing the traffic charge to be paid by NS to ProRail with 40 mln per year.

**Q2.4.**

The main use of railtransport is dependent of the growth of the economy. The other factors only have a local effect for the use of railtransport. See also the enclosed "pyramid" for railtransport.

**Q3.1.**

- Crossborder certification of new material/rolling stock is needed and usefull.
- Competitive award on PSO contracts can be positive on regional, more isolated lines. NL opinion is that Member State should be able to decide whether to tender or not main railway network.

**Q4.1.a.**

Till 2025 there it a PSO contract is foreseen with the national railway undertaking NS. A contract with the main issues, is already signed between the minister and the NS. In order to ensure a minimum level of quality, PSO's are needed. For public services transport PSO-contracts are obliged in the Netherlands.

**Q4.1.b.**

NL has a reservation against more open access services in case it affects in a negative way the use of existing capacity and the issue of cherry picking is not solved. NL is of the opinion that such a decision should be taken on a national level and not on a EU-level.

**Q4.2.a.**

NL's opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not their main railway network (subsidiarity/national discretion).

**Q4.2.b.**

NL's opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not their main railway network(subsidiarity/national discretion).

**Q4.3.a.**

NL has a strong reservation against more open access services because in case it affects in a negative way the use of existing capacity. Furthermore it will resulting in cherry picking and increasing costs for the government because the non-profitable lines need compensation.

**Q4.3.b.**

NL's has a reservation against more open access services in case it affects in a negative way the use of existing capacity and the issue of cherry picking is not solved.

**Q4.4.a.**

NL opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not their main railway network. For some regional rail passenger services tendering may be useful.

**Q4.4.b.**

NL's opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not their main railway network. For some regional rail passenger services tendering may be useful.

**Q4.5.a.**

A provision for a transfer exists in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands there is also experience with rolling stock.

No problems with this issue in the Netherlands, although issues with new OV Chipcard are still to be solved.

NL's opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not of their main railway network. For some regional rail passenger services tendering may be useful.

**Q4.5.b.**

The Netherlands are positive for the modals used in the case of tendering PSO-contracts. Provinces are free to include in the tendering procedure the transfer of existing rolling stock to the new railway undertaking.

Member States should be free to decide about regulatory measures regarding the ticketing issues between railway undertakings.

NL's opinion is that Member State should be free to decide about tendering or not their main railway network. For some regional rail passenger services tendering may be useful.

**Q5.2.**

Advantage is transparency.

Challenge is how to ensure sufficient operational coordination between railway undertaking(s) and infrastructure manager.

**Q5.3.**

NL infrastructure manager ProRail has set up an operational control centre (OCCR) to coordinate closely with the railway undertakings in case of disturbances on the network. This OCCR has been audited by the Ministry in 2012.

**Q5.5.**

NL has not yet an opinion whether infrastructure separation from providing railway services should be further strengthened in European legislation.

**Q5.6.**

NL has infrastructure separation from providing railway services.

**Q5.7.**

Structured consultation procedures between infrastructure managers and railway undertakings may be useful but should not be leading to excessive transaction costs.

## **Vragenlijst 2 (transport ministeries)**

### **Uitgewerkte teksten in tekstblokken**

**Q1.**

Passengers:

Main railway network public service contract directly awarded to NS, National railway company. NS is paying an annual price for the public service contract / concession to the State. Intention is to award for 2015-2025 period integrated concession for high speed - main railway network to NS.

NS main network represents 17bln passkm and is growing considerably since 2005.

Regional (local) railway networks tendered by public service contracts to 4 railway undertakings.

Freight: open access

Infrastructure and maintenance authority works for main railways, local railways and freight railways. Infrastructure charge levied by Infrastructure Manager. Financing of Infrastructure works and maintenance partly from Infrastructure charges, partly from multi-annual contract with the state.

Regulatory body is NMa as part of the general competition authority

**Q3.**

High speed services to Paris.

**Q4.**

Maritime (short sea) and inland waterways.

**Q7.1.**

NL has reservations regarding open access operations in case this could reduce the use of existing scarce capacity. Also the issue of cherry-picking has to be dealt with and the amounts for the State will be increasing. Other issue is the public interest in service level agreements regarding items like punctuality of services.

**Q7.2.**

Equal conditions for all players, organize level playing field regarding access to rolling stock and operational staff, stations, passenger information services and ticketing. The PSO-contract is also important.

**Q8.**

Rail related services: national ticketsystem gives problems by traveling from the main to the local railway undertakings. Throughticketing is guaranteed but additional charges in case of changing operators is an open issue. A commission is dealing with this problem now.

**Q11.**

No international new open access services are in service.

**Q12.1**

Positive, it reflects an increasing number of passengers. But for regional lines subsidies are paid by local governments to the railway undertaking.

**Q12.2.**

Slight increase of operational efficiency reflects lower operating costs, while operational quality aspects may also be changed.

**Q12.3.**

No structured data available regarding impact on investments.

**Q12.4.**

Railway services, not belonging to the main railway network which have been tendered, sometimes show an increasing use of passengers or the public local authority wants to change the infrastructure (more stations).

**Q12.5.**

The provinces have received a budget for the tendering of the regional rail services, there are no structured data on development of public expenditure from national government and service on the provinces. NS doesn't receive subsidy for their services on the main network, except for some regional lines (till 2014).

**Q12.6.**

Due to higher use of the infrastructure.

**Q12.10.**

Some railway companies with an tendered contract doesn't have conductors on the train.

**Q12.11.**

Administrative costs at provinces and railway undertakings for managing the PSO contracts and tendering procedures.

**Q14.**

In cases of competitive tendering the Member State (or the Member States in cases of international PSO contracts) has to ensure a level playing field between operators regarding access to rolling stock. This can be done in different ways like e.g. public ownership of rolling stock, facilitating a rolling stock leasing market, automatic transfer provisions or else. European legal situation should support those solutions, not enforce them.

**Q17.1.**

A letter has been sent to NL Parliament 4th April 2012 to clarify the NL position on tendering. I.a. it is stated that for the main railway network member state should be free to decide about competitive tendering of rail passenger services. In the Netherlands there exists a complex integrated network and timetables with Intercity-trains and regional/localtrains.

**Q17.2.**

A transitional period to respect existing and already awarded PSO contracts starting in the near future in line with 1370/2007/EC should be ensured. Also NL has positive experience with gradual introduction of tendering procedures.

**Q18.**

In the Netherlands the essential staff (not belong to the overhead) of the railway undertaking is protected by national law. The staff dealing with the operation of transport keeps their job on the new party.

**Q19.**

The answer to this question is dependent on the scope of the proposals (regional / national services / service networks etc.)

**Q20.**

NS, the operator of the main network, and all other Dutch rail operators.

**Q21.**

Enclosed are the following documents, regarding the main railway lines (HRN), excluded are the decentralised/ regional lines. All the main data are available by the annual reports of railcompanies.

Subsidy payments as notified to EC on annual basis

Evaluatie spoorwegwet

Concessiebeheer NS

**Q22.**

- Eindrapport Decentralisatie en Marktwerking in het Regionaal Spoor-, Stads- en Streekvervoer van MuConsult, 2004
- Evaluatie Wet personenvervoer 2000, Twijnstra Gudde en MuConsult, augustus 2005