



# Berenschot

## Evaluation Coordination Committee Netherlands

Final report

# Management summary

## Background (chapter 1)

The EU Slot Regulation stipulates that at coordinated airports the responsible Member State must ensure the presence of a coordination committee. In the Netherlands, this is the Coordination Committee Netherlands (CCN).

The main tasks of the CCN are making proposals and/or advising the coordinator and/or the Member State on:

1. the coordination parameters to be determined;
2. local guidelines for the allocation of slots;
3. the methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots.

The CCN also mediates between all parties concerned with respect to complaints on the allocation of slots.

Recently, various stakeholders highlighted a need to optimise the functioning of the CCN. Hence, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (Ministry) decided to start an evaluation with the following research question:

*How is the CCN functioning and, if necessary, how can it be optimised?*

## Functioning of the CCN (chapters 2 and 3)

Our main conclusion is that there are differing views on the functioning of the CCN and that there seems to be a consensus about the need to improve the functioning of the CCN. One of the main reasons is that a majority of airlines have expressed their concerns about the ability of the CCN to fulfil its future advisory role in the capacity declaration process. The current lack of clear procedures for the main tasks and not having an independent board produces a lot of discussion, which has a negative impact on the functioning of the CCN.

## Ways to optimise the functioning of the CCN (chapter 4)

The CCN will be more effective when there is more clarity and consensus about the way it operates. This leads to our four main recommendations:

1. Align expectations between the CCN and its receiving partners: ACNL and the Ministry
2. Develop clear procedures for each main task
3. Appoint an independent chairman
4. Minimise the use of the voting procedure and reconsider the voting system

# Managementsamenvatting

## Aanleiding en achtergrond (hoofdstuk 1)

De EU-Slotverordening verplicht iedere lidstaat tot het instellen van een coördinatiecomité voor gecoördineerde luchthavens. In Nederland is hiervoor het Coordination Committee Netherlands (CCN) ingericht.

Het CCN doet voorstellen en/of adviseert de coördinator en/of de lidstaat met name over:

1. de te bepalen coördinatieparameters;
2. lokale richtsnoeren voor de toewijzing van slots;
3. methodes om het gebruik van de toegewezen slots te controleren.

Daarnaast bemiddelt het CCN tussen partijen die betrokken zijn bij conflicten over de allocatie van slots.

Recent hebben diverse stakeholders aangegeven dat het functioneren van het CCN verbetering behoeft. Daarom heeft het Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat (Ministerie) opdracht gegeven voor deze evaluatie. Centrale vraag is:

*Hoe functioneert het CCN en, indien nodig, hoe kan het functioneren worden verbeterd?*

## Functioneren van het CCN (hoofdstuk 2 en 3)

Onze hoofdconclusie luidt dat er uiteenlopende meningen zijn over het functioneren van het CCN, maar dat er consensus lijkt te bestaan om het functioneren van het CCN te verbeteren. Een belangrijk zorgpunt bij veel luchtvaartmaatschappijen betreft de mate waarin het CCN in staat is haar toekomstige adviesrol in het capaciteitsdeclaratieproces te vervullen. Daarbij leidt het gebrek aan heldere procedures en het niet hebben van een onafhankelijk bestuur tot veel discussie. Dit heeft negatieve gevolgen voor het functioneren van het CCN.

## Optimaliseren van het functioneren van het CCN (hoofdstuk 4)

Wij verwachten dat het CCN beter functioneert wanneer er meer helderheid en consensus bestaat over de wijze waarop ze haar taken vervult. Dit leidt tot de volgende vier aanbevelingen:

1. Stem de wederzijdse verwachtingen af tussen het CCN en de ontvangende partijen: ACNL en het Ministerie
2. Ontwikkel meer heldere procedures voor alle hoofdtaken
3. Stel een onafhankelijke voorzitter aan
4. Minimaliseer het gebruik van de stemprocedure en heroverweeg de stemprocedure

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# Berenschot

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Background

## Why this evaluation?

The regulation 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (*EU Slot Regulation*) stipulates that at coordinated airports the responsible Member State must ensure the presence of a coordination committee.

In the Netherlands, the Coordination Committee Netherlands (CCN) has been set up for three coordinated airports: Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (Schiphol), Rotterdam The Hague Airport and Eindhoven Airport. Members of the CCN include air carriers and airports.

The main tasks of the CCN are making proposals and/or advising the coordinator and/or the Member State on:

1. the coordination parameters to be determined;
2. local guidelines for the allocation of slots;
3. the methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots;

The CCN also mediates between all parties concerned with respect to complaints on the allocation of slots.

In the Netherlands, the EU Slot Regulation is described in the “Besluit slotallocatie”. That operating decree states, among other things, that the coordination parameter for Rotterdam

The Hague Airport and Eindhoven Airport are determined by the airport operator. For Schiphol, the coordination parameters must be determined in mutual consensus. Due to the increasing scarcity of slots at Schiphol, the members of the “Operational Schiphol Overleg” have recently been struggling to reach consensus. Mainly for this reason, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (*Ministry*) recently proposed a change to the “Besluit Slotallocatie”. During the Internet consultation of the draft version (spring 2018), various airlines pointed out a need to optimize the functioning of the CCN. Because the Ministry is responsible for the presence of a coordination committee, it also feels responsible for the proper functioning of the CCN. Hence the Ministry decided to launch an evaluation on the functioning of the CCN.

This report is the result of that evaluation. The report examines the functioning of the CCN, including recommendations for optimisations. The outcome was presented in the CCN meeting on 11 April.

# Research question and research design

## Research question

Berenschot was commissioned by the Ministry to conduct the evaluation. The central question for this research is: *How is the CCN functioning and, if necessary, how can it be optimised?*

This research question has the following sub questions:

- Which parties have a seat in the CCN? What are their interests and how do they relate to each other?
- How is the CCN organised by constitution?
- How are similar committees organised?
- How does the CCN function in practice?
- How do stakeholders assess the functioning of the CCN in general? Is there room for improvement?
- What optimisations could be made?
- How can optimisation of the CCN be achieved?

## Research design

The research was conducted between January 2019 and May 2019 and consisted of the following steps:

**1. Comparison of constitutions.** We studied the constitutions of the CCN and three similar committees in Europe.

**2. Survey among CCN members.** We conducted a survey among CCN members to select respondents for both the interview round (step 3) and the interactive workshop (step 4). Appendix A contains a brief overview of the outcomes.

**3. Interview round.** We conducted 13 interviews with the board members of the CCN and a representative selection of CCN members (see Appendix B for an overview of respondents and Appendix E for the interview guideline we used).

**4. Interactive workshop on optimising the CCN.** On 29 March, we organised a workshop with a selection of CCN members (see Appendix B). The aim of the workshop was to present our draft findings and to discuss ways to optimise the functioning of the CCN.

**5. Presentation of findings in CCN meeting.** On 11 April, we presented our findings during a CCN meeting. The presentation led to a discussion on how to implement the recommendations.

# Berenschot

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## The CCN in theory

Constitution and main purpose of the CCN



# Introduction

In this chapter, we describe the functioning of the CCN in theory. How is the CCN organised according to its constitution? We focus on the following topics:

- main purpose of the CCN (article 3 of the constitution)
- members of the CCN (articles 4 and 5)
- board and meetings (articles 6 and 9)
- voting and decision making (article 10)
- procedures for changing the constitution and dissolution (articles 11 and 12)

We also compared the constitution of the CCN and those of similar committees in Europe:

- Heathrow Coordination Committee
- Comité de coordination des aéroports français (CCAF)
- Koordinierungsausschusses für den Flughafen Frankfurt

Finally, we draw conclusions on the main differences between the CCN and similar committees.

The main references for this chapter are the EU Slot Regulation and the constitutions of the CCN and the above mentioned coordination committees.



# Purpose of the CCN

A coordination committee may be designated for more than one airport (EU Slot Regulation).

The CCN was set up for the three coordinated airports in the Netherlands: Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Rotterdam The Hague Airport and Eindhoven Airport.

The purpose of the CCN follows directly from the EU Slot Regulation. According to its constitution, the purpose of the CCN is to make proposals concerning and/or advise the coordinator and/or the Member State on the following topics:

- The possibilities for increasing the capacity of the airport concerned or for improving its usage
- The coordination parameters to be determined
- The methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots
- Local guidelines for the allocation of slots or the monitoring of the use of allocated slots, taking into account possible environmental concerns, for example
- Improvements to traffic conditions prevailing at the airport concerned

- Serious problems encountered by new entrants
- All questions relating to the capacity of the airport.
- To mediate between all parties concerned on complaints on the allocation of slots

## Members of the CCN

According to the EU Slot Regulation, the membership of a coordination committee shall be open at least to the air carriers that use the airport(s) concerned regularly and their representative organisations, the managing body of the airport concerned, the relevant air traffic control authorities and the representatives of general aviation that use the airport regularly.

The EU Slot Regulation also stipulates that Member State representatives and the coordinator shall be invited to the meetings of the coordination committee as observers.

Current members of the CCN are numerous air carriers (e.g. KLM, easyJet, Corendon, AirBridgeCargo), representative organisations (e.g. Barin, IATA), three airport operators (the coordinated airports) and the air traffic control (Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland). In addition there are two observers: the Ministry and Airport Coordination Netherlands (ACNL).

The next page contains a list of the members and observers of the CCN.



# Members of the CCN

Air carriers		Representative organisations	Airport operators	Air Traffic Control	Observers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AerLingus</li> <li>• Aeroflot</li> <li>• Air Baltic</li> <li>• Air France</li> <li>• AirBridgeCargo</li> <li>• Alitalia</li> <li>• Australian Airlines</li> <li>• British Airways</li> <li>• China Southern</li> <li>• Corendon</li> <li>• Delta Air Lines</li> <li>• easyJet</li> <li>• Emirates</li> <li>• Eurowings</li> <li>• Flybe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jet Airways</li> <li>• KLM</li> <li>• LOT Polish Airlines</li> <li>• Lufthansa</li> <li>• Norwegian</li> <li>• Pegasus</li> <li>• Ryanair</li> <li>• SAS</li> <li>• Swiss</li> <li>• TAP Portugal</li> <li>• Transavia</li> <li>• TUIfly</li> <li>• Turkish Airlines</li> <li>• United Airlines</li> <li>• Vueling</li> <li>• e.g.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IATA</li> <li>• IACA</li> <li>• Barin</li> <li>• Representative of General Aviation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amsterdam Airport Schiphol</li> <li>• Rotterdam The Hague Airport</li> <li>• Eindhoven Airport</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (Ministry)</li> <li>• Airport Coordination Netherlands (ACNL)</li> </ul>

# Board and meetings

The EU Slot Regulation stipulates that coordination committees must draw up written rules of procedures covering participation, elections, the frequency of meetings, and language(s) used. However, the Slot Regulation does not provide instructions for these procedures.

The procedures are part of the constitution of the CCN. Below we elaborate on the board, meetings, voting and decision-making of the CCN.

## Board

The board of the CCN consists of the chairman, a deputy chairman and a secretary. The constitution of the CCN does not elaborate on the roles and responsibilities of the board. The chairman and the deputy chairman are elected by the members at the annual general meeting for a period of 3 years and their position is eligible for re-election. The deputy chairman acts as chairman in case of absence of the chairman. The secretary is always an employee of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, but cannot be the Airport's authorised representative.

## Meetings

According to the constitution of the CCN, a general meeting shall be held at least once in each calendar year. In general there are two CCN meetings, which take place at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The meetings are prepared by the board. The secretary of CCN distributes the agenda and relevant documents in advance. The board is responsible for making records of all proceedings, resolutions, the persons present and the capacity in which they attended the meeting.

This is in line with the EU Slot Regulation that requires a report of the discussion in the coordination committee to be submitted to the Member State concerned with an indication of the respective positions stated within the committee.

# Voting and decision making

According to the constitution of the CCN, all questions that arise during a meeting must be decided by a majority of the members present or represented with voting rights at the meeting. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman has a casting vote. There is only one exception: the CCN shall not vote about advice on remedying problems for new entrants. The voting rights are distributed among the CCN members. In the event of a vote:

- the air carriers have a maximum of 900 votes together
- representatives of general aviation have 10 votes together
- Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS) has 40 votes
- Other coordinated airports have 10 votes each
- Air traffic control (LVNL) has 20 votes
- IATA and IACA each have 20 votes.

The secretary of the CCN distributes the 900 votes among the air carriers in proportion to the number of slots. On 1 April of each year, the coordinator calculates the total number of slots allocated in the previous winter season and current summer

season at each coordinated airport of each carrier that is a member of the committee.

The number of votes that each individual air carrier can cast is calculated as follows: if a carrier receives more than 40% of the votes of the airlines, its share of the votes is limited to 40% of the votes of the carriers. In that case, the secretary will redistribute the difference over the other carriers.

In practice, every participant of a CCN meeting has to sign the attendance list in case a vote is to take place. In the event of voting, ballot-papers are used to cast votes. After all votes are casted, the votes will be calculated as described above.

# Procedures for changing the constitution and dissolution of the CCN

## Changing the constitution

Any change to the constitution must be approved by at least two thirds of the votes, cast at a meeting specially called for that purpose.

A special meeting should be requested a least three weeks before the meeting at which the proposed changes of the constitution are to be considered. In addition, two weeks before such a meeting, the proposed changes should be sent to each member.

## Dissolution procedure

The CCN cannot be dissolved as long as the EU Slot Regulation or any regulation replacing it which requires a Coordination Committee at coordinated airports is in force.

If the EU Slot Regulation (or follow-up) no longer requires a coordination committee, at least two thirds of those present and voting at a CCN meeting must agree on the dissolution of the CCN in order to dissolve the committee.

# Comparison of constitutions (1)

We have compared the CCN constitution with the constitutions of three similar coordinating committees (see below).

	CCN	Heathrow Airport coordination committee	Comité de coordination des aéroports français (CCAF)	Koordinierungsausschusses für den Flughafen Frankfurt
Airport(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amsterdam Airport Schiphol</li> <li>• Eindhoven Airport</li> <li>• Rotterdam The Hague Airport</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heathrow Airport</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All coordinated airports in France</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frankfurt Airport</li> </ul>
Voting and decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Majority of votes</li> <li>• Distribution of voting rights: Air Carriers (900), general aviation representatives (10), AAS (40), other coordinated airports (10), air traffic control (20), IATA, IACA (together 20)</li> <li>• The maximum number of votes for any given Air Carrier is capped at 40% of the Air Carrier allocation</li> <li>• In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman has a casting vote</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least 55% of votes</li> <li>• Distribution of voting rights: Air Carriers (800), airport operator (100), air traffic control (50), others (together 50)</li> <li>• The maximum number of votes for any given Air Carrier is capped at 40% of the Air Carrier allocation</li> <li>• In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman has a casting vote</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Majority of votes</li> <li>• Each member may be represented by no more than two people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>
Observers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and ACNL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Director General of Civil Aviation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>



## Comparison of constitutions (2)

	CCN	Heathrow Airport coordination committee	Comité de coordination des aéroports français (CCAF)	Koordinierungsausschusses für den Flughafen Frankfurt
Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chairman and deputy chairman are elected at the annual general meeting for a period of 3 years</li> <li>Both may be re-elected</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chairman is elected at the annual general meeting for a period of 1 year</li> <li>Chairman may be re-elected</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Representative of Director General of Civil Aviation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chairman is elected by members for a maximum of 4 consecutive flight plan periods</li> <li>Chairman may be re-elected</li> </ul>
Appointing Sub committees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Committee may appoint subcommittees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Committee may appoint subcommittees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Committee may appoint subcommittees for max. 3 years</li> <li>Chairman of the Committee chairs the subcommittee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>
Extraordinary meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The chairman or at least five members can request a meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The chairman or at least five members can request a meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Director General of Civil Aviation can set a meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Every member can request a meeting</li> </ul>
Amendment of constitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2/3 of the votes required in an extraordinary meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2/3 of the votes required in an extraordinary meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Must be voted on in general meeting of the Committee.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>
Dissolution procedure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only if the EU Regulation requires the dissolution of the Coordination Committee; then 2/3 majority is required for its dissolution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only if the EU Regulation requires the dissolution of the Coordination Committee; then 2/3 majority is required for its dissolution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not included in the constitution</li> </ul>

# Comparison of constitutions: most remarkable differences

## General findings

As the previous pages have shown, there are several differences and similarities between the constitutions. These are our general findings based on the comparison:

1. The CCN and Heathrow Airport Coordination Committee are quite similar.
2. In France, the central government plays a significant role in the coordination committee.
3. The constitution of the Koordinierungsausschusses für den Flughafen Frankfurt is quite concise. This suggests that little is arranged by statutes in Germany.
4. Coordination committees are sometimes in place for one airport and sometimes for several airports.

## Main differences

We conclude that the main differences between the constitution of the CCN and the other committees lie in the voting procedure and the appointment of the chairman:

- When it comes to voting, at the Heathrow Airport Coordination Committee a majority of 55% is needed, while the CCN and CCAF require more than 50% in event of voting.
- When it comes to changing the constitution, a majority 2/3 of the voting is required at the CCN and the Heathrow Airport Coordination Committee, while changes to the constitution of the CCAF require a simple majority (>50% of the votes).
- At the CCAF, the chairman is not elected by its members. An employee of the Director General of Civil Aviation chairs the committee. The chairman of the CCAF also chairs subcommittees.

# Berenschot

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## The CCN in practice

Functioning of the CCN

# Introduction

In this chapter, we first present our general findings on the functioning of the CCN. We then elaborate on the performance of the CCN with respect to its main tasks, as described before:

1. Advising on coordination parameters
2. Making proposals for local guidelines for the allocation of slots.
3. Advising and/or making proposals for methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots.
4. Mediating between all parties concerned on complaints in the allocation of slots.

Our findings are based on a literature study (records of CCN meetings in 2017 and 2018), the survey among CCN members and interviews with CCN members.

During the interviews, we noticed strong feelings about the functioning of the CCN, with different explanatory factors.

Our findings focus on the subjects requiring improvement and not on the things that are already going well. On the other hand, all interviewees agree that the evaluation is a good and timely initiative.

# Functioning of the CCN – general findings

## Roughly two points of view

The CCN embodies a wide range of interests. There are a range of business models among airlines, which creates different perspectives on slot allocation and the efficient use of slots. Based on both the interviews and the survey, we conclude that there are roughly two points of view on the functioning of the CCN.

On the one hand, there is the biggest carrier and its related parties which seem fairly satisfied with the functioning of the CCN. However, these parties do see room for improvement in the cooperation with the coordinator and the involvement of (smaller) airlines in CCN discussions.

On the other hand, there are the other airlines and members which are mostly dissatisfied with the functioning of the CCN. Dissatisfaction mainly concerns the voting procedure, the lack of an independent board and the lack of clear procedures for proposing local guidelines and mediation. According to smaller airlines, the current voting system is too much in favour of bigger airlines, whilst bigger airlines argue that the current system does justice to their greater interests.

## Consensus on need for improvement

All parties acknowledge that there is wide range of interests and that the effectiveness of the CCN could be improved. There are different opinions on how the CCN functions and – depending on the issue – parties have recently been struggling instead of cooperating. An example of struggling is the determination of the coordination parameters (see next pages)

Besides this, the dissatisfaction of some members is broadly recognised whilst there is a perceived increase in the importance of the CCN, due to the proposed change of the Besluit Slotallocatie. Some parties have shown concern about the ability of the CCN to perform its future role. There therefore seems to be consensus on the need to improve the functioning of the CCN.

# Functioning of the CCN – general findings

## Functioning of the board

Due to a lack of elaborated procedures, the chairman has a prominent role in setting the agenda of CCN meetings, distributing documents, procedures and so on.

During the interviews, some criticism was raised on the late distribution of documents, late changes to the agenda and a lack of transparency. At the same time, all parties agree that documents should be sent in good time and that the flexibility of the agenda should be limited.

We also noticed various interpretations of the role and responsibilities of the board in general and the chairman in particular. For example, there are no guidelines for appointing subcommittees, members or the chairman of subcommittees. For some people, it makes sense that the chairman of CCN also chairs a subcommittee, whilst for others this is not the case.

The lack of procedures and the non-independent role of the chairman makes the position of the chairman a vulnerable one. Every decision of the chairman is open to debate, which has a negative effect on the functioning of the CCN as a whole.

# 1. Advising on coordination parameters

Advising on coordination parameters is considered a formality

An important task of the CCN is advising on the coordination parameters. The capacity declaration process takes place twice a year (winter and summer) and the capacity declaration is discussed in the CCN.

At Rotterdam The Hague Airport and Eindhoven Airport, the airport operator determines the capacity declaration. At Schiphol, the capacity declaration must be determined in consensus. This is done by the Members of the “Operationeel Schiphol Overleg” (OSO). The OSO consists of carriers, LVNL, Barin and Schiphol. Schiphol chairs the OSO. Due to the growing scarcity of slots and wide range of interests the OSO hasn't been able to reach consensus on determining the capacity declaration. This is one of the reasons for the proposed change of the operating decree from the Ministry. In the new situation, the OSO will no longer be responsible for determining the capacity declaration. Instead, Schiphol will be responsible, with a more important advisory role for the CCN. Several respondents pointed out that, in the current situation,

the real discussion about the capacity declaration takes place in the OSO, in which parties – as mentioned before – no longer reached consensus.

One of the respondents notes that CCN meetings sometimes function as ‘an extended battlefield’. It was also mentioned that a serious discussion on the capacity declaration requires a high level of expertise, which is currently not broadly present at regular CCN meetings. Next to this, in the past few years relevant documents have been sent (too) close to CCN meeting. This has made it difficult for parties to prepare themselves well.

Finally, advising on coordination parameters within the CCN is currently considered a formality, while there are growing concerns about the ability of the CCN to fulfil its future advisory role. This creates a need to optimise the functioning of the CCN.

## 2. Proposing local guidelines

### Local guidelines: a troublesome process

Another important task of the CCN is proposing local guidelines for the allocation of slots or monitoring the use of allocated slots. A local guideline must be approved by the Ministry before it can be taken into account by the coordinator.

Proposing local guidelines is a fairly recent phenomenon. Until now, three local guidelines have been proposed. In 2017, the Ministry asked the CCN to develop a local guideline on cargo (see box). This was the first time that the CCN had started developing a local guideline and also the first time that the Ministry had to approve a local guideline. In 2018 the CCN also started developing a local guideline for cases of temporary, severely reduced capacity at Schiphol.

Developing local guidelines has proved to be a troublesome process:

- Several parties mentioned that their interests were not taken seriously in the proposed local guidelines. The voting system conceals different points of view.
- There is a lack of procedures for developing local guidelines.

This led to unclarity about the process and fundamental discussions about the legal scope of local guidelines. For example, some of the CCN members had withdrawn from voting on the local guideline in cases of temporary, severely reduced capacity during the CCN meeting.

- It is not clear what requirements the Ministry sets for proposals for local guidelines. Various respondents mentioned that the Ministry could be more transparent about the way they judge them.

### *Local guideline on cargo*

Two different local guidelines on cargo were discussed in the CCN meeting, before a vote was taken. Both KLM and Air Cargo Netherlands (ACN) had developed a local guideline on cargo. Several interviewees indicated that this was an inefficient use of the developing capacity of CCN members. The initial local guideline on cargo (local rule 1) was rejected by the Ministry, but an improved local guideline on cargo has recently been approved by the Ministry (local rule 2).



### 3. Slot monitoring committee

#### Slot monitoring committee not active

Another important task of the CCN is advising the coordinator on the methods of monitoring the use of allocated slots. For this task, there is a special committee: the Slot Performance subcommittee (SPSC).

The constitution of the CCN states that the SPSC consists of representatives from 3 air carriers based in the Netherlands, representatives from 3 air carriers based outside the Netherlands, 1 representative from the coordinated airports and 1 representative from LVNL. Members of the SPSC are elected by CCN members in the annual general meeting for a period of three years.

There is currently an elected SPSC, but the committee has recently been inactive. During the interviews, no clear explanation was given for this. Meanwhile, several respondents pointed out that the CCN should pay more attention to slot monitoring and slot performance issues.



## 4. Mediation

### Mediation is rarely used

Another important task of the CCN is mediation between all parties concerned with respect to complaints on, among others, the allocation of slots.

According to the EU Slot Regulation, within a period of one month following submission of the complaint, the committee should consider the matter and if possible make proposals to the coordinator in an attempt to resolve it. If the complaint cannot be settled, the Member State responsible may, within a further two month period, apply for mediation by an organisation representing air carriers or airports or other third party. These rules have not been elaborated in the constitution of the CCN.

In practice, mediation is rarely used. CCN members are reluctant to make use of mediation because of:

- The lack of procedures relating to the mediation process and avoiding (alleged) conflicts of interest. There is no procedure for mediation and the chairman plays an important role in the mediation process. This raises questions about a possible

conflict of interests when the chairman's employer (or related parties) is involved in the complaint.

- The time consuming nature of the current mediation process. In practice, there is no time limit for the mediation process. The parties involved do not want to risk historical slot rights, so they prefer other – faster - ways to resolve situations.

# Conclusion

In this chapter we covered the following research questions:

- How does the CCN function in practice?
- How do stakeholders assess the functioning of the CCN in general? Is there room for improvement?

Overall, we conclude that the effectiveness of the CCN could be improved. Several parties are dissatisfied with the functioning of the CCN (not every party feels heard, partly due to the voting system) and a majority of parties have expressed their concerns about the ability of the CCN to fulfil its future advisory role in the capacity declaration process.

Because of the increasing scarcity of slots, there is a growing conflict of interests between CCN members, which makes it vital that procedures are clear. The current lack of clear procedures for the main tasks of the CCN and not having an independent board produce too much discussion on the procedures, while discussions should focus the content of the proposals and the advice of CCN. Both factors also have a negative impact on the current effectiveness of the functioning of the CCN.

The CCN is an advisory board for the coordinator and the Ministry. In our opinion, it can therefore only be effective if the advice and proposals of the CCN are recognisably supported by the members and ready to be considered and implemented by its receiving partners (the Ministry and the coordinator). Vice versa, both the Ministry as the coordinator could be more transparent and clear about what they expect from CCN's advice and proposals and the way they handle these. Ultimately, the members of the CCN, the coordinator and the Ministry are jointly responsible for optimising the use of available slots at coordinated airports.

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## “Towards CCN 2.0”

Recommendations on optimising the CCN

# Towards a CCN 2.0

## Urge to optimise the functioning of CCN

The CCN is 'just an advisory board', but there are two important contextual changes that lead to an increased (perceived) importance of CCN.

Firstly, there is the lack of slot capacity in the Netherlands. This is particularly the case at Schiphol, where there is a cap of 500,000 flight movements up to 2020. The limits are in sight and there is an on-going 'battle for slots'. Secondly, the proposed change of the 'Besluit Slotallocatie'. In the perception of the respondents, the revision of this operating decree creates a bigger advisory role for CCN in the capacity declaration process for Schiphol.

Combined with our conclusion that the effectiveness of the CCN could be improved, this leads to the broadly recognised urge to optimise the functioning of CCN in order to make the committee more effective and future proof.

## Our main recommendations

In our professional opinion, the CCN will be more effective when there is more consensus about the way it operates.

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Members do not necessarily have to agree on the outcomes of discussions, but there should be no discussion about how to get there (the procedures). Hence, these are our four main recommendations:

1. **Align expectations between the CCN and its receiving partners (ACNL and the Ministry).**
2. **Develop more detailed procedures for each main task and the administrative support.**
3. **Appoint an independent chairman: an experienced facilitator with some expertise in the field of aviation.**
4. **Minimise the use of the voting procedure and reconsider the voting system.**

After presenting the results of this evaluation research (CCN meeting on 11 April), the CCN members already decided to plan a meeting to discuss the recommendations and how to implement them. We feel that this is a good starting point.

On the next pages, we will elaborate on our main recommendations, the underlying proposals for optimisation and how to implement them.


# Optimising the functioning the CCN

In both the interviews and the survey, the CCN members suggested various ways to optimise the functioning of CCN (see appendix C). These suggestions were discussed in an interactive workshop with a selection of CCN members on 29 March. In this workshop, we used a model that distinguishes optimisation proposals by:

- Whether they fit into the current legal framework
- Whether they can be implemented by the CCN itself or its receiving partners

By using the model, we were able to define:

- **Short term:** the optimisations that can be implemented in the short term (0 – 6 months), because they do not require a change to the legal frameworks.
- **Long term:** the optimisations that could be implemented in the longer term (6 – 12 months) because they do require a change of the legal frameworks.



## Short term (0 – 6 months)

### CCN

We recommend that the CCN hires an independent expert to lead a task force in order to prepare the CCN for upcoming changes and to implement our recommendations. The independent expert should ensure progress. The main tasks of the task force are:

- To start preparations for appointing an independent chairman: create a job profile, draw up financial agreements and start preparing the necessary change of the constitution
- To develop procedures (terms of references) for mediation, local guidelines and appointing subcommittees (at least one for slot monitoring and another for coordination parameters)

The task force should consist of a representative mix of CCN members and report to the CCN. It is possible that not every member of the CCN can take part in the task force. It is therefore important to ensure transparent communication with CCN members. Furthermore, we advise that the CCN works closely with its receiving parties (the coordinator and Ministry) in elaborating procedures for proposing local guidelines and for the capacity declaration process (mutual terms of references).

### Ministry and ACNL

Our main advice for the Ministry and the coordinator is to provide clear insight into and updates how advice and proposals are managed. For this, we would recommend developing guidelines for the various advice and proposals of the CCN. For example, the Ministry could require the following before taking a proposed local guideline into account:

- Legal quickscan: does the local guideline fit within the current legal framework?
- Impact analysis: how does the local guideline affect the various interests of CCN members?
- Extensive display of different points of view

The key question that needs to be answered by the Ministry ACNL: what do we expect from CCN in order to handle its proposals/advice properly?

We recommend working closely together with the CCN in developing the guidelines, because ultimately all parties are part of the very same processes.

## Long term (6 – 12 months)

### CCN

The first six months will be used to prepare more fundamental changes, changes that need more time and/or to adjust the constitution of the CCN. Bearing in mind the pending change to the operating decree, we advise making haste and using the next six months to implement the following:

- Adjust the constitution:
  - Make it possible to appoint an independent chairman (chosen by CCN members).
  - Minimise the events that are voted for: only vote for the appointment of the board, subcommittees and local guidelines.
  - Reconsider the voting system. For example by distributing voting rights over holdings of airlines instead of individual airlines or increasing the required majority.
  - Specify the role and responsibilities of the new board.
- Recruit and appoint an independent chairman
- Appoint or revive subcommittees for 1) capacity declaration and 2) slot monitoring and slot performance

### Ministry and ACNL

Our long term advice to the Ministry and ACNL are (1) to monitor the progress of the task force and (2) work closely with the task force. Furthermore, they must implement the developed guidelines for advice and proposals of the CCN. We recommend evaluating the effectiveness of these guidelines and the cooperation with the CCN on a regular basis.



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
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Appendix

# Appendix A: Survey - response

## Response

- Participation rate of 15% of all organisations
- A total of 29 respondents from 28 different organisations
- Requires careful interpretation of results.




## Invitations

- 75 opened (39.5%)
- 112 unopened (58.9%)
- 2 bounced (1.1%)

52 clicked through (27.4%)

1 opted out (0.5%)



## Responses


- 29 complete (64.4%)
- 16 partial (35.6%)



# Appendix A: Survey – results


Which airports are important for your organization? Multiple answers ...

Answered: 27 Skipped: 2



How many CCN meetings did you attend in 2017 and 2018?


Answered: 27 Skipped: 2



# Appendix A: Survey – results

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the performance of the CCN?


Answered: 25 Skipped: 4



# Appendix A: Survey – results

Looking back on the last two years, how satisfied are you with the performance of the CCN on the following tasks?


Answered: 25 Skipped: 4



# Appendix A: Survey – results

How familiar are you with the constitution of CCN?


Answered: 29 Skipped: 0



# Appendix A: Survey – results

How satisfied are you with the following aspects included in the CCN constitution?

Answered: 22 Skipped: 7



## Appendix B: Overview of respondents

### Interviewees

- TUI
- KLM
- LVNL
- AirBridgeCarco
- ACNL
- Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
- Corendon
- Transavia
- Rotterdam The Hague Airport
- easyJet
- Board of the CCN

### Participants interactive workshop

- Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management
- KLM
- AirBridgeCarco
- ACNL
- Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
- Corendon
- Transavia
- Rotterdam The Hague Airport
- easyJet
- Board of the CCN



## Appendix C: Overview of proposed optimisations (short term)

CCN	Ministry / ACNL / Airports
<p>Develop procedures (terms of references) for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Independent mediation process</li><li>• Proposing local guidelines</li><li>• Appointing subcommittees</li></ul>	<p>Develop guidelines for CCN advice/proposals</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Key question: what do we expect from CCN in order to handle its proposals/advice properly?</li></ul> <p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Required legal quickscan</li><li>• Required impact analysis</li><li>• Extensive display of different points of view</li></ul>
<p>Appoint or revive subcommittees for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Capacity declaration</li><li>• Slot monitoring and slot performance</li></ul>	<p>Provide clear insight into and updates on the way advice and proposals are handled.</p>
<p>Set a deadline for distributing documents and putting issues on the agenda (e.g. 2 weeks before a CCN meeting).</p>	

## Appendix C: Overview of proposed optimisations (long term)

CCN	Ministry / ACNL / Airports
<p>Appoint an independent board</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Specify the role and responsibilities of the (deputy) chairman and secretary</li></ul>	<p>Evaluate guidelines</p>
<p>Review voting procedure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Only vote for the appointment of the board and subcommittees</li><li>Examine the need for voting on local guidelines</li><li>Consider the adjustment of the voting ratios</li></ul>	

## Appendix D: Overview of references

- EU Airport Slot Regulation
- Besluit Slotallocatie (2009)
- Worldwide Slot Guidelines:
  - paragraph 11.4 Coordination Committee
  - paragraph 11.5 Slot Performance Committee)
- Constitution Coordination Committee Netherlands
- Constitution Heathrow Coordination Committee
- Geschäftsordnung des Koordinierungsausschusses für den Flughafen Frankfurt
- Constitution Comité de coordination des aéroports français (CCAF)
- Public views of airlines on the draft Besluit slotallocatie (2018)
- Minutes of CCN meetings in 2017 and 2018

# Appendix E: interview guideline

## Introduction

- What is your role and background?
- What is your position within / relation to the CCN?

## Reflection on the current functioning of the CCN

*Per main tasks of the CCN:*

- How does the CCN perform this task in practice?
- What are the good / bad points? Can you give an example?
- Who benefits more or less?
- What consequences does this have?

## Optimising the functioning of the CCN

*In general:*

- What would you like to improve? For example with respect to:
  - Governance and management
  - Voice ratio and voting procedure
  - Set up subcommittees

- What can the CCN learn from coordination committees in other countries?
- How can possible improvements be achieved?

*Per task:*

- What would you like to improve?
- How can possible improvements be achieved?
- To what extent does it change the constitution of the CCN?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?



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