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SECURITY COUNCIL
COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

REPORT OF THE RAWAHGEDEH OBSERVATION TEAM

I N T R O D U C T I O N

A. Organization of Mission

At its fiftieth meeting on 26 December 1947, the Committee of Good Offices instructed its assistants to enquire into the situation at Rawahgedeh, in the Krawang area, as requested by the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic in its letter dated 11 December (See Annex I). The assistants were also instructed to acquaint themselves with and report on the general conditions in the area concerned, in accordance with the Committee's general policy for such enquiries.

It is desired to record that, as a condition put by the Netherlands authorities to the conduct of this investigation, no representative of the Republic of Indonesia was allowed to accompany the Observation Team; in these circumstances, the Committee did not request the Netherlands authorities to appoint such a representative.

Pursuant to the Committee's decision, an observation team was constituted as follows:

Australia:	Brigadier E.M. Neylan, assisted at various times by Squadron Leader L. Kroll.
Belgium:	Major T.J. Deckers, assisted at various times by Capt. F. Abs
United States:	Lt.-Colonel O.G. Dixon, assisted at various times by Capt. J.A. MacNeil.
Secretariat:	Mr. George Kaminker, assisted at various times by Mr. J.F. Collins.

The team decided to conduct preliminary inquiries in Batavia and on 2 January met with the Chairman of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic and two of his military advisers. On 3 January the team interviewed Mista, the person mentioned in the communique dated 22 December concerning the occurrences in the Rawahgedeh area, issued by Netherlands Army Public Relations. On 4 January the team interviewed Major Wynen who was in charge of the operation of the Netherlands forces in Rawahgedeh on 9 December.

On 5 and 6 January, the team proceeded to the area and visited Krawang and Rawahgedeh, interviewing a number of persons, a list of whom appears in Annex II. Upon its return from the area concerned the team held several further meetings in the preparation of this report.

B. Schedule of Inquiry:

- 2 January (Batavia) : Meeting with Chairman and Military members of the Indonesian Special Committee.
- 3 January (Batavia) : Interview with Mista (See Section II, C-1)
- 4 January (Batavia) : Interview with Major Wynen, C.O. Netherlands Forces at Rawahgedeh (See Section III, B).
- 5 January (Krawang-Rawahgedeh) : Various interviews - visit to area (See Annex II).
- 6 January (Krawang) : Various interviews (See Annex II).

GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREAA. Civil Administration

The area concerned in the present report is situated in the District of Rengasdengklok, Department Regency of Krawang, Residency Afdeling of Batavia, Province of West Java. Krawang is about 70 kilometers by road almost due east of Batavia, along the main highway Batavia-Semarang.

The structure of the civil administration has remained unchanged since the days before World War II - through the Japanese occupation, the Republican administration and also after the Dutch "police action". It is again in the hands of Netherlands and Indonesian officials. The administrative division is clearly seen from the following table:

<u>Territories</u>	<u>Titles (Netherlands or Indonesian Officials)</u>	<u>Titles (Indonesian Officials only)</u>
Province	Recomba (Government Commissioner for Internal Affairs)	-
Residency (Afdeling)	Resident	-
Department (Regency)	Assistant-Resident	Regent (Assisted by a Pathi)
District	Controleur	Wedana (District-head)
Sub-District	-	Assistant Wedana
Dessa (community of Kampongs)	-	Loerah (dessa-head)
Kampung (village)	-	Ketoea Kampung (Village elder)

B. Economic Conditions:

The Krawang area, situated in the plains along the North coast of West Java, is famed for its exceptionally fine rice crops. The rice produced there is of such quality that for many years some unrest has existed among the population on account of the fact that the local rice was bought for export and inferior rice imported for consumption.

The main railway line, Batavia-Cheribon-Semarang, runs through the area. There is also a secondary railway line from Krawang to the district capital Rengasdengklok.

In the main, the land is government property, leased out in small plots to the peasants against a rental payable in currency and not in a percentage of the crops. The lease of such plots is inherited from father to son as an hereditary right. However, land may also be bought outright by any individual domiciled on it. Other tracts are reserved exclusively for lease to Indonesian peasants. Others again are unsaleable Government property reserved for public utility purposes (roads, railways, bridges, irrigation canals, and sluices, etc.).

The peasant remains the undisputed owner of his crops, to consume and sell to rice mills which normally exist in considerable numbers in the area and are mostly Chinese-owned.

Apart from the main highway, at present in very poor condition, there exists an intricate network of country roads now exclusively used by the bullock carts of the peasants. The population circulated between villages on foot, and therefore distances between villages are considered to be very

long, although in many cases they do not exceed a few miles. Bicycles do exist in fair numbers but are mostly out of use owing to lack of roads.

Rice growing is by far the main activity of the district.

C. Description of population

The overwhelming majority of the population is composed of peasants whose exclusive activity is the growing of rice. They live in kampongs formed of a cluster of houses or huts built of split bamboo and thatched with rice straw. A certain number of kampongs form a Dessa with a population varying from a few hundred to several thousands and scattered among endless rice fields. Houses are extremely primitive and very poorly furnished. Nothing is of the simplest and appears very scarce. There is no indication of a food shortage and the people seem in good health.

The population is highly heterogenous in character and is composed of Sundanese, Javanese and West Java Malays. As a consequence, the language is basically Sundanese but many Indonesian (Malay) and Javanese words are used.

It seems that part of the male population, generally younger men who hire their services to more settled peasant families, is very unstable, wandering from kampong to kampong. Consequently, the number of inhabitants in each village varies from day to day.

Each Dessa possesses a primary school, but there seems to be no compulsory education. Many children are often required to help in the rice fields and go to school when they can be spared. There is little doubt that in the main there is a complete lack of even elementary education. The people interviewed in Rawahgedeh seemed unable to indicate dates and hours with any degree of accuracy and their ideas about distances and numbers in general were extremely hazy. They pretended complete ignorance of the political situation in the country, but this may have been the result of their fear in the present unsettled circumstances and a consequence of recent incidents in the area. There is some evidence to show that they are not ignorant of the main lines at least of the present dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic.

When the team visited Rawahgedeh accompanied by Netherlands officers and soldiers, the few inhabitants in the village at that time did not show any fear or distrust. Their attitude was friendly. However, there is evidence to show that the proximity of gangs and the possibility of encounters between these gangs and Netherlands patrols, tales of violence and robbery in the area, and in general any kind of abnormal circumstances are sufficient to keep the population away from the rice fields. In Rawahgedeh itself the few people the team was able to interview appeared above all concerned with the fate of their own village, pretending total ignorance of the alleged subversive activities which led up to the incidents of 9 December.

From various sources evidence was obtained to show that for many years past the population of the area has shown a tendency to engage in unlawful activities on the part of individuals or small bands. A state of latent unrest has therefore existed in the area for a longtime, and the organization of larger bands and underground activities in general has thus been greatly facilitated.

BACKGROUND OF INCIDENTS IN THE AREANationalistic trends:

With the Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the Indonesian Republic proclaimed its independence (17 August 1945). To add stature to this Government, a Republican army (TRI) was organized for the most part from former Japanese trained Indonesian military organizations that served as home guard and security troops during the Japanese occupation. Many political parties and youth movements in their drive for membership and their maneuvering for more power in the Republican Government organized separate "irregular" forces to gain such objectives more promptly. At first, these forces were not opposed by the Government but condoned since all had one basic claim: i.e., to deny the return of the Netherlands Administration. After the Linggadjati Agreement was signed the political situation became so delicate that the Republican Government was forced to secure central control of all fighting forces, in order that the Government would not be put in a position of embarrassment by uncontrolled provocations by the "irregular" forces. By Presidential Decree the Nationalist Army of Indonesia (TNI) was established, allowing the "irregular" forces a chance to join the TNI or return to civilian pursuits. While some success was achieved, the Republican experienced considerable difficulty in early 1947, in the general area of Krawang, with "irregular" forces who did not wish to cooperate. Action between these forces and Republican troops was successful in disarming many of the fighting elements including lawless gangs; however, this area remained, generally speaking, a administratively unstable.

With the initiation of "police action" the Netherlands troops succeeded in dispensing the Republican military and civilian administration in the Krawang Area, and for two months thereafter little organized resistance against the Netherlands control was encountered. However, during the two months period prior to the Rawahgedeh Incident, 9 December 1947, lawlessness increased, with evidence that such activities were, for the most part, activities of a loosely organized military underground with inspiration and some direction emanating from Jogjakarta. Roving bands and individual looters were also prevalent in this area taking advantage of unstable conditions created by the underground movement. The aims of the underground movement appear twofold: (1) to isolate the people from Netherlands administrative control by "removing" village heads sympathetic to the return of this control; (2) to impair Netherlands motorized patrolling by removing bridges, constructing road blocks, etc. on secondary roads. The area assigned to the Netherlands company at Krawang, has an area of approximately 1,000 square kilometers, obviously too large for maintenance of law and order by foot patrols alone and this action, therefore, renders supervision more difficult.

Specific Incidents in the Krawang Area

Netherlands intelligence reports reveal many instances of "gang" activities and atrocities in the Krawang area in and near Rawahgedeh. Only the following incidents were investigated:

MISTA

This is the man mentioned in the communique issued by the Netherlands Army Public Relations on 22 December 1947. The following events are reconstructed from his statement.

Mista was a peasant working in the rice fields, who took no part in political activities. About 3 or 4 December 1947, a gang entered the village where he was working and ordered the male population to follow it, for the purpose of carrying out sabotage.

As the witness refused to do so, he was confined in a house and later at night, he was led to the river bank, his hands tied together behind his back, and an attempt was made to decapitate him. The blow he received was too low and only severed the upper muscles of his right shoulder. He fell into the river and was carried down stream with the current. He lost consciousness for some time and when he came to it was daylight and he was helped out of the stream by an Indonesian known to him. He made his way to Pasirpanjang, where he met a Netherlands Army party which arranged for him to be moved to a military hospital in Batavia. He recovered from his wound and left the hospital. He was seen by members of the Observation Team at Batavia on 3 January when the scar of his wound was observed.

2. LIE TEK GOAN (Chinese) and PA GOMPEL (Javanese)

The above-named were produced to the Observation Team at Krawang on 4 January by Inspector-of-Police Boretty and the following information was obtained from them.

Both men are peasants aged about 50. They were poorly dressed. They live in the same house in Kampong Gint'oeng.

On the night of Saturday, 6 December 1947, both men were kidnapped from their house by a party of six men, one of whom was known to them. Three men of the party carried rifles. The party said they were policemen from Tgikanpek and that they were going to kill them.

The peasants after being lead to a river bank were struck by knives and thrown into the river. As their wounds were not too severe they escaped by swimming away.

The Observation Team saw marks of injury, one on the neck of one peasant, the other had a head injury.

3. TANU (Son)

This is the man mentioned in the Republican report, as a spy, sent to Rawahgedeh by the Netherlands authorities.

He is the son of an Indonesian policeman (civil police in the Krawang district).

The interrogation of this man disclosed that he never had been sent to Rawahgedeh, neither by his father nor by the Netherlands authorities but that he had been kidnapped on 3 December 1947 at noon from his rice field at Kampong Kapoe, by six men who led him to Rawahgedeh (about 12 kilometers from the place where he was captured).

There he was confined in a house and beaten. He was told that he was going to be killed, because his father was in the Netherlands police and because they considered himself also a spy.

Tanu (Son) succeeded in escaping from Rawahgedeh on 4 December.

4. THIO GI LI, ASMAN, and SARTOER, Railroad Workers

These three men were on a train which was attacked by a party of about ten men (including one armed with a rifle, the others bearing knives) half a mile from Rawahgedeh-Station, early in December 1947.

Thio Gi Li was the fireman of the train. He escaped later with the engineer.

Asman and Sartoer were captured with twenty other railway workers and led to Rawahgedeh. There, during the night, they escaped with two other workers.

No further news has been heard of the eighteen railway workers who were at that time confined at Rawahgedeh.

S E C T I O N . I I I

THE RAWAHGEDEH INCIDENT - 9 DECEMBER 1947

A. Background of Operation

This incident, at the request of the Republic of Indonesia, was investigated by the Observation Team, acting under authority of the Committee of Good Offices. The investigation was carried out between 2 January and 6 January 1948, at BATAVIA, KRAWANG and RAWAHGEDEH. (See introduction)

All arrangements for transportation, safety and rationing were satisfactorily arranged through the Netherlands Liaison Staff.

The military operation at RAWAHGEDEH (population estimated at between 200 and 500) on 9 December 1947 was carried out by a force of approximately 90 men of Major Wynen's Company (H.Q. KRAWANG) which belongs to 3 Infantry Battalion, 9 Infantry Regiment, (H.Q. TJIKAMPEK), 2 Infantry Brigade (H.Q. POERWAKARTA) of 7 December Division (H.Q. DANDOENG). Major Wynen was the Commander of the Force.

The decision to undertake this operation, with the mission to "clean up" Rawahgedeh was reached after conferences between the Company and Battalion Commanders, the operation being of a greater magnitude than could be undertaken solely on the authority of the Company Commander. The Observation Team is of the opinion that the operation also aimed at serving as a severe deterrent for the future in the area. The Observation Team viewed a number of intelligence reports on which, inter alia, it was stated by Major Wynen, the decision for the operation was formulated. These reports, in direct relation to Rawahgedeh, were few in number dating back over a month prior to 9 December 1947.

B. Conduct of Operation

The operation was conducted in the following manner:

On the night 8/9 December 1947, the Force moved by M.T. (mechanical transport) from KRAWANG. The force was organized operationally into three parties, as under, in order to surround RAWAHGEDEH on three sides, North, East and South:-

No. (1)	North party	2 Sgts.	30 Men	Rifles & 1 Drengun
No. (2)	East Party	2 Officers	18/20 men Commander Major Wynen	Rifles, stenguns & 2/2" mortars.
No. (3)	South Party	1 Sgt. Major	30 Men	Rifles & 1 Drengun

The above parties proceeded as above indicated and were deployed in their positions before 0530 hours 9 December 1947, at which time the attack commenced. The two 2" mortars each fired 6 rounds into the kampong and Party No. 2 (East) moved West, entering the East side of the kampong. Movement was slow due to the very muddy, slippery condition of the ground and the absence of formed paths. During the whole action in the kampong no casualties were suffered by the attacking Force, indicating that resistance was minimal. No lethal weapons of any nature were captured or discovered, by the Netherlands Force, either during or after the action. A strong natural defensive position exists in the eastern half of the kampong, but no real use was made of it. The move through the kampong was completed at 1300 hours.

Information as to number of Indonesians killed varied from 150 (Netherlands count) to 433 (by Mohammedan Priest of RAWAHGEDEH). The Netherlands authorities stated that no women, children or older men were killed or wounded during this action. Indonesian witnesses confirmed this statement.

During this action a number of inhabitants ran out of the kampong to the North; fifteen of these were collected, without any resistance on their part, by the Sergeant in charge of a party of 15 Netherlands soldiers which had been deployed on the northern outskirts of the kampong. These 15 inhabitants (stated by Dutch Sergeant) remained in his charge until he handed them over to his Company Commander (Major Wynen) after the conclusion of the operation.

Treatment of Prisoners

Moekri bin Saitam, an Indonesian youth, was interviewed by the Military Observation Team at KRAWANG on 6 January 1948. This witness had previously given a written statement to Inspector of Police Beretty. This was produced to the Observation Team. The statement covered observations of the witness during the military operation of RAWAHGEDEH on 9 December 1947. In amplification of the written statement, this witness voluntarily gave information concerning the shooting of seven Indonesians at the village of DJAMANTRI by one Dutch soldier using an automatic weapon.

He stated that he had personally witnessed this occurrence and that there were about thirty other Netherlands soldiers present in close vicinity. He did not hear any order to fire given. The seven Indonesians were first interrogated, then lined up in front of some bamboo growth and shot. The bodies were left lying where they fell. He added that to his knowledge there were no other eye witnesses. The witness stated that the seven men above-mentioned had been captured in a pond near the railway station in the kampong RAWAHGEDEH where they were endeavoring to hide; he further stated that these men wore long hair and dark clothes, and, therefore, were TRI soldiers.

Major Wynen was informed of the statement given by Moekri bin Saitam as above recorded. As there was question of the kampong "Djamantri", Major Wynen asked to produce as a witness the sergeant who, with fifteen men, was deployed on the North side of RAWAHGEDEH, in the rice fields east of Djamantri. (Sergeant Windhouwer)

The Major stated that, after the order of reassembly had been given, the Party which had been operating at RAWAHGEDEH Station under his personal command, went straight to the West, along the village road, and did not proceed to Djamantri, which is out of its way to the reassembly point.

This party did not capture any prisoners.

The Sergeant stated that he, with his party, collected about twelve or thirteen men who had fled through the rice fields, and also an Indonesian spy, who had been badly maltreated by the gang, the night preceding the action (see statement of Moekri bin Saitam). This party, (including the prisoners) followed the irrigation canal toward Djamantri, then turned south in order to join the C.O. (Major Wynen) and his Party, at the western end of Rawahgedeh. Sergeant Windhouwer handed the prisoners to Major Wynen. At this moment, the above-mentioned spy started beating some of the prisoners. The Major, after interrogating all prisoners, ordered four to be shot because they were Indonesian soldiers. They were killed by the fire of one Stengun and their bodies were left lying at that place.

The Major further stated that he retained eight prisoners, whom he took to Krawang, from where they were forwarded to the Battalion H.Q. at Cikampok. These men were subsequently released by order of the Battalion Commander.

FINDINGS

The Observation Team, having considered all statements and documents placed before it and after having visited on two occasions the area concerned, submits the following findings:

1. Restlessness has been, at least since August 1945, a characteristic of this area which is situated approximately 55 kilometers East of Batavia in an agricultural area which produces the best rice quality grown in Java.

2. Early in 1947, the Republican Government attempted to restore central control by disarming "irregular" forces, but achieved only limited success.

3. Immediately following the Netherlands "police action", Republican Army and civilian control appeared to have completely disintegrated.

4. A loosely organized underground movement is now operating.

5. This underground movement aims to isolate the people by "removing" loerahs, assassins and terrorizing other Indonesians sympathetic to Netherlands control, and to render motorized patrolling ineffective by road obstructions, demolitions, etc.

6. Rawagedeh appears to have been a probable headquarters for this underground movement. The loerah of Rawagedeh, who disappeared since the action seems to have taken an active part in these activities.

7. The standard of living in Rawagedeh is most primitive by Western standards and must be considered as an important factor influencing the condition of this area.

8. The action taken by the Netherlands Army was deliberate and ruthless as evidenced by the following:

a. There were no Dutch casualties, either killed or wounded.

b. The Netherlands Army authorities reported 150 Indonesians killed and only 4 wounded.

c. Women, children and old men were waved aside and in this manner separated from those to be killed.

d. Not one weapon (firearm) was found on Indonesian prisoners or casualties (either dead or wounded).

e. A force of Indonesians armed with 40/60 rifles and one automatic weapon was reported by Netherlands authorities as the resisting force. This force, according to Major Wynen, opened fire on his Party when it was approaching the village. An Indonesian who had been maltreated and held prisoner in Rawagedeh by this Indonesian group reported a force of approximately 100 men armed with three rifles, twenty pistols, knives and hand grenades, assembled in the vicinity of the loerah's home at Rawagedeh on the evening prior to the action. He also reported that after firing two shots (immediately after the Dutch mortar fire) this group fled.

f. No medical facilities were left in the village for treatment of Indonesians possibly wounded and in hiding.

g. Four Indonesian soldiers were interrogated and ordered to be shot by the Commander of the Netherlands troops after their being properly delivered to him by one of the sergeants in his command. (Stated by Major Wynen).

h. According to a statement by an Indonesian, seven Indonesian soldiers (TRI) were shot at Djamantri by a Netherlands soldier with an automatic weapon. Major Wynen and his sergeant deny this statement.

Note: (No further investigation of the matters disclosed in 8 (g) and 8 (h) was made, as such action was considered, by the Observation Team to be outside its scope).

A N N E X I

DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE OBSERVATION TEAM

- (a) Memorandum dated 24 December 1947 from the Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia (see document S/AC.10/76).
- (b) Memorandum dated 3 January 1948 from the Netherlands delegation (see document S/AC.10/80).
- (c) Letter dated 3 January 1948 from the Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia:

Sir,

In answer to your request for information as to how events has led to the Rawahgedeh incident, I have the honour to forward an extract of the report, which has been drawn up in relation to this affair by A. K. The extract is as follows:

S and M.W. inhabitants of the Krawang area stated that on 3 December 1947 at 16.00 hours local time Dajat (M.I.D. agent i.e.: Dutch Military Intelligence agent) was ordered by his father corporal Tanu (M.I.D. agent in Krawang) to proceed to Rawahgedeh for investigation in this area.

Since the population of Rawahgedeh received notice of the subject of Dajat's visit when he arrived at this village they seized him and held him captive.

While being detained his captors tried to persuade him to abandon his object to hold an investigation, to convince him of his erring attitude, and to reconvert him into loyalty to the Republic, without avail however. One night Dajat succeeded to escape and reported his experiences at Rawahgedeh to his father and another M.I.D. agent Kalim. He told them that his captors had tortured him and that Rawahgedeh was a stronghold of popular resistance.

This information was forthwith relayed to the Dutch force of occupation at Rawahgedeh which on 9 December 1947 sent a fully armed unit to Rawahgedeh village.

The result of this action has been brought to your attention in my letter of 24 December 1947 (No. 32/P.I./K).

Personal data of Corporal Tanu and Kalim is as follows:

Tanu (age 45, originating from Krawang, address Kampong Bubulak (West of Krawang):

Before the war : Police corporal of Assistant-Wedana.

During the Japanese occupation : cabdriver.

After Japanese capitulation : passed his time with gambling.

Kalim (age 40, originating from Gombong, address Kampong Bubulak, Krawang Kubn.

Before the war : Police detective

During the Japanese occupation : Police detective

After Japanese capitulation : food peddler.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/

Dr. J. Leimana, Chairman.

Jakarta, 5 January 1948.

Sir,

I herewith have the honour to submit to you an extract of the story you requested to Dr. Leimena on 3 January 1948.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/

Capt. A. Zikir, 1st Secretary,

for the Chairman of the Special Committee
of the Republic of Indonesia.

Attachment:

1. Since the 17th century, since the Dutch East Indies Company settled in Jakarta, the Princedom of Mataram gradually lost its control over these areas until at the end they were separated from it to become a source of dispute between conflicting powers striving to gain authority over this territory. These controversies duly resulted in armed clashes which brought especially the areas around Jakarta i.e. the Krawang, Djatinegara and Tangerang area into a permanent state of war, confusion and misery. This state of affairs was caused by the trade policy of the Dutch.

2. Being in need of money to strenghten their control in this territory the Dutch sold the land they held to rich people (Chinese, Europeans, etc.). This land has since been known as privately-owned land. The ownership of such land did not only give the right to the land but also gave authority over the population of this area. Moreover, the owner was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in this land and had to see to it that public roads crossing his territory would be well kept.

In relation to these matters the population of privately-owned land the tenant farmers had to give one fifth of their crop to the landlord as rent. They also were obliged to carry out regular forced labour.

These landlords in general cared only for their own interest, and were entirely free to burden their tenants with whatever measures they liked, e.g.

a. forced labour: In carrying out his duty to look after the maintenance of public roads the landlord ordered every inhabitant of his land to forced labour, that is repairing and constructing roads. If someone was reported absent on duty whether with or without good reasons, this person was fined. The money to be paid was not claimed in one payment but in installments so as to have a means of coercion against the victim. This may be illustrated with the following:

b. Notification of harvesting paddy: Every tenant who intended to reap his paddy, must give notice of this fact to the landlord at least eight days in advance. Whenever a tenant was found neglecting this regulation, he was ordered first to meet the payment of his fine before being allowed to harvest his paddy. In this way the tenant who could not pay the rest of his fine was compelled to give part if not the whole of his harvest as down payment.

In case the farmer refused to do so he was forced to sell some of his property or let his paddy rot in the fields.

c. Notification of intended marriage: If a man living on this privately owned land would marry he was first to ask permission of and to introduce the bride to be to his landlord. This consent was often acquired in a way which should rather not be mentioned. It would suffice to draw attention to the great number of inhabitants of mixed blood in these areas.

d. For the purpose of maintaining law and order on his land the landlords had the right to create his own police force. It often happened that to safeguard his property, his person and his authority the landlord hired local ruffians, i.e. bandits, murderers, etc. to be his bodyguard. The character of this "preservation of peace" leaves no doubt as the ways and means to preserve the "peace".

With the shifting of Dutch control over these areas followed by the Japanese occupation the pressure upon the population of privately owned land was temporarily lifted to be returned in greater degree however in accordance with the duration of Japanese control.

These conditions and many other factors added with the Japanese occupation with its inhuman aspects like slave labour (romusha) etc. so that the people of these areas lost all security of living, as they expected any moment to be taken away no matter where they lived. This situation kindled within this oppressed population an overwhelming desire to be free, free from fear and from want. Evidence to this fact was given when thousands of people from these areas joined the mass meeting in Jakarta on the independence of Indonesia.

By lifting all oppressive regulations etc. peace returned to these areas and its people turned into loyal citizens of the Republic respecting their Government and loving their Army and ready to sacrifice life and property for the independence of their country.

A N N E X IILIST OF WITNESSES

The following people were interviewed by the Rawahgedeh Observation Team during the course of the investigation:

A. 3 January 1948 (Batavia)

1. Mista, mentioned in the Netherlands communiqué of 22 December 1947 as a presumed victim of terrorists in the Krawang area (See Section II).

B. 4 January 1948 (Batavia)

2. Major Wynen, (3d Bn. 9th Inf. Regt.) C.O. of the Inf. Co. at Krawang, who carried out the operation against Rawahgedeh on 9 December 1947.

C. 5 January 1948 (Rawahgedeh)

3. The Acting Loerah, the village moslem religious leader, and several residents of Rawahgedeh. They gave general testimony on the operation of 9 December which was considered to be mainly an attempt to divert attention from the village, and was therefore not given great weight.

D. 6 January 1948 (Krawang)

4. Civil authorities (Indonesians) of Krawang and Rengasdengklok who gave general information on administrative, social and political affairs in the Krawang area.

5. Major Wynen: C.O. of the Inf. Company stationed at Krawang was interviewed several times regarding the operation of 9 December 1947.

6. Commissioner Beretty: Inspector of Police of Krawang, who was interviewed with regard to intelligence reports preceding the action against Rawahgedeh.

7. Moekri bin Saitam, who had been led to Rawahgedeh by extremists the night before the action (8 December). He was in Rawahgedeh, as a prisoner of the gang, during the action. He gave a written statement to Commissioner Beretty and supplemented this statement by several declarations, concerning the shooting of prisoners by Netherlands troops immediately after the action.

8. Sergeant Windhouwer, who was in charge of the East flank of the North Party, during the operation. He was interviewed in connection with Moekri bin Saitam's statement regarding the treatment of prisoners at Kampong Djamantri.

9. Tanu (son) who had been mentioned in a Republican report as a spy sent to Rawahgedeh by Netherlands intelligence. He appeared to have been captured by a gang in the rice fields and brought to Rawahgedeh under threat of being killed but was able to escape.

10. Tanu (father) and Kelin, both policemen of the district Krawang whose testimony did not reveal any new element.

11. Saoekim, Loerah of Tandjong Poerah, who was cited in the Republican report as having established lists of people killed and wounded by the Netherlands Army in Rawahgedeh on 9 December. The witness denied knowing the slightest detail about the operation and stated that he had never been to Rawahgedeh.

12. Kunta, Chief irrigation official of the Krawang district, also cited in the Republican report. He had not been to Rawahgedoh and knew nothing of the operation on 9 December.
13. Lio Tek Teen, (Chinese) and Pa Gompel (Javanese), who were produced by Inspector of Police Beretty. Both claimed to have been victims of terrorist activities.
14. Tjo Gi Li, Aznan and Saphott, railway workers who were also produced by Inspector of Police Beretty. They were victims of an attack by the Rawahgedoh gang on a train at Rawahgedoh and succeeded in escaping with two other men. Seventeen other railway men, who were captured with them on the same train, were never seen again after this incident and are thought to have been killed by the gang.