



IM

To

Date 27 June 2007
Reference
Subject AAR concerning the events around CHORA (16 – 20 June)

1. Introduction

At the end of June a lot happened in and around Chora. After a long build up of OMF, they attacked the village and its surrounding villages and TFU units countered this threat. To ensure an open and transparent evaluation of the events that took place multiple inquiries were conducted. This inquiry will mainly be limited to the period of the 16th of June up and until the 20th of June.

2. Problem

Lay down the events that occurred in and around Chora and the decisions leading to this.

3. Dissertation

a. Situation

1) Operation Aramay

Operation ARAMAY is the baseline plan of Commander TFU with his intent and way of operating for the next 5 months. This operation plan covers the period of the 1st of May until the 1st of October 2007. The main focus within this plan lies on the Deh Rashan area north of Tarin Kowt. Another important objective of Commander TFU is the preservation of Chora and especially the District Center.

2) Operation Leonidas

Since the beginning of our tour at the end of January 2007 reports came in that OMF intends to attack the Chora District Center. By the end of April this threat becomes imminent and TFU units are tasked to deploy to Chora and preserve it (Operation Rabenhaupt). After a prolongation the operation Rabenhaupt ends the 2nd of June. Since the preservation of the Chora District Centre is still valid and Commander TFU wants to focus more on development and the hand over to ANSF Commander TFU issued a new fragmentation order: frago 019 (OP LEONIDAS) to OPORDER 03 (OP ARAMAY). This order gave guidelines on the intent and the concept of operations of the commander. Focus was on the build up of local governance and the AN(A)P to be able to preserve Chora themselves. After the outbreak of hostilities the 16th of June operation Troy is started to withstand the high OMF pressure on Chora. On the 21st of June operation Troy is recalled and the operation Leonidas is valid again.

3) Phasing

The period from the 16th until the 20th of June can be divided in five phases.

a) Phase 0

This is the period before the real outbreak of hostilities. It will only be summarily covered in the After Action Report. This period can be characterised by OMF conducting harassment attacks against the checkpoints around Chora and the build up of OMF troops.

b) Phase I (Prelude: 16 June 0400 hrs – 16 June 2000 hrs)

This is the build up of OMF pressure just prior their attack. OMF is moving forward, conquering the checkpoints around Chora.

c) Phase II (Defence: 16 June 2000 hrs – 17 June 0400 hrs)

In this phase OMF is really attacking the village of Chora and want to defeat TFU forces. TFU forces defend and stay in control of the District Centre.

d) Phase III (Status Quo: 17 June 0400 hrs – 19 June 1030 hrs)

In this phase TFU forces are still in control of the District Centre and are periodically engaged by OMF.

e) Phase IV (Attack: 19 June 1030 hrs – 19 June 1800 hrs)

In this phase TFU troops, with the Battle Group as supported commander, together with ANA, attack in western direction to push back the OMF in order to take control of the wider area around Chora (including the checkpoints that have been conquered by the OMF).

f) Phase V (Aftermath: 19 June 1800 hrs – 20 June 2400 hrs)

This is the phase direct after the attack. OMF resistance is only limited and the main focus of the TFU is investigate the events in the recent history and also countering left OMF resistance if necessary.

4) After Action Report

Attached you will find all the reports on the events that happened in the before mentioned period in and around Chora. The After Action Report (AAR) is the main document. All other documents are attached to this (AAR) and will contribute to the understanding of what happened in Chora.

4. Way ahead

- a. Operation Leonidas will be proceeded in order to be able to return to normal operations as they were being conducted prior to operation Rabenhaupt.
- b. Inquiry boards will be supported by all TFU personnel within their capabilities.
- c. Further inquiries to disclose information on the events in Chora will be conducted if required.

Commander Taskforce Uruzgan

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Colonel

Attachments:

1. After Action Report and annexes

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) on CHORA DC d.d. 16-06-07 till 20-06-07.

NR TIC: 06-410 /OP TROY / 06-495

DTG: 16-06-07 until 20-06-07

1) AREA OF OPERATION

CHORA, SARAB, NORTH DEH RASHAN

2) COMPOSITION OF UNIT

Supplement B: ISIS Snap-shots Force laydown 16th till 20th of June

During the five phases, several force compositions were present in the CHORA DC area. Units involved throughout the five phases were: three (3) Mechanized Inf platoons, two (2) Light armoured Inf platoons, one (1) Recce platoon (FENNEK), one (1) VCP 42 AIBG TFU and one (1) ANA Coy (90 pax) including OMLT (moving in 3 groups).

3) MISSION/CONOPS OF UNIT (OP LEONIDAS¹)

Intent

By countering OMF attacks on CHORA I want to be able to continue the positive developments that are ongoing in that area. By creating a situation where ANSF is able to preserve CHORA I want to return to the situation where ANSF is primarily responsible for the security and TFU is supporting the local governance of CHORA on all lines of operation. I realise this will be event and intell driven.

a) Conops

TFU elms will be the primary force to defend CHORA. In due time ANSF will take over the responsibility for the security in that area. This will take some time and all effort must be focused on that direction. This means all TFU assets must direct their capabilities, be it through their contacts or through physical presence, to achieve this situation. Slowly the situation must shift from TFU security to ANSF security. In the mean time TFU elms must be prepared to counter any OMF threat directed towards CHORA.

b) Main effort

Securing CHORA

c) Phases

i) Phase 0: Operation Rabenhaupt

The period before the time period in this Frago 42 AIBG was primarily responsible for the security in CHORA with the aim on preservation of CHORA. This phase ended 1 June 2007.

ii) Phase 1: Transition

In this phase 42 AIBG and ANSF will conduct combined operations to preserve CHORA and to set the conditions for the hand over to ANSF. This phase started 2 June 2007.

iii) Phase 2: NFO

In this phase ANSF will primarily be responsible for the security in CHORA. TFU elms will support the local governance on all lines of operation by conducting NFO.

d) 42 AIBG

42 AIBG is to keep presence in CHORA IOT preserve it and set the conditions for a hand over to the ANSF.

¹ (See FRAGO 019 (OP LEONIDAS) to Opord 003 (OP ARAMAY) of COM 1 (NLD/AUS) TFU ISAF.

- e) PRT
PRT is to spt 42 AIBG in securing CHORA and a responsible hand over to ANSF and start up development activities in the area, in phase 1 specifically focused on capacity building of ANSF.
- f) All other units
Spt BG IOT facilitate a responsible hand over to ANSF.
- g) Coordinating instructions.
In phase 1 of this operation ROE is delegated to BG.

4) EXECUTION

Review of events according to five phases of the AAR:

Phase 0 General

Already for weeks reports came in via G2 TFU on a build-up of OMF in the areas and valleys around CHORA. Harassment attacks against ISAF, ANSF and the local population have been ongoing for some considerable time. Examples of these harassment attacks are harassment fires occurring against the CHPs around CHORA and a pressure-plate IED that has been used against a civilian taxi, in the course of which several civilians were killed and wounded. Also ANP, carrying out a search and arresting several Taliban in West-CHORA, were threatened by Taliban to release their leaders, leading to a tense situation. Already in April OMF successfully occupied the CHP at KALA KALA after which BG TFU assisted ANP in re-capturing the CHP. Reporting in the last days stated that local population was growing restless, already leaving their qalas, closing their shops at the bazaar and that children were not going to school anymore. Also a lot of unrest occurred within the key-leader positions of several GoU local leaders in CHORA, not favouring the situation at hand.

Phase I Prelude.

On Friday 15th of June a SVBIED attack in Tarin Kowt was the upbeat for the attack on CHORA, based on G2 TFU assessments made in the preceding months. OPERATION LEONIDAS is already weeks in effect at that time, giving orders and guide-lines for upcoming operations of TFU Units, especially to the BG TFU and PRT TFU.

In the night of 15 to 16 June aircraft were available above CHORA conducting an area reconnaissance. They discovered OMF troop movements in the area east of CHORA, moving west, in the vicinity of SARAB. G2 TFU assessed a continuing build-up of OMF towards the CHORA area, numbers between 800-1000 fighters. This confirms reportings from G2 TFU in the preceding months which became clear during the early morning of the 16th of June around 0200LT. OMF reported coming from CAHAR CHINEH province, BALUCHI Valley, MIRABAD area, DORAFSHAN area and the valleys North-east of CHORA and East of SARAB, based on eye-witness reports and Intell reports from G2 TFU.

This was the start of a coordinated OMF attack with the objective to seize CHORA DC. The effect to be achieved by the OMF was, and still is, IO exploitation for the new OMF commanders in URUZGAN that they are able to defeat ISAF forces iot re-establish FOM on OMF LOCs from GIZAB to the southern part of AFGHANISTAN.

The 16th of June shows more Troops in Contact (TICs) involving ANSF in CHORA and BG TFU. All units present at that time receive fire from OMF side and OMF tries to close in to CHORA DC from all sides. ANP posts are then no longer able to accurately defend themselves. On the 16th of June Commander TFU decided to act pre-emptive and ordered the BG to further reinforce CHORA.

Phase II Defence.

On the early evening of the 16th of June situation in CHORA deteriorates in a way, that Commander A-coy AIBG declares that if the situation will not be altered quickly in favour of ANSF or TFU, he will be run over and OMF will be able to seize CHORA DC. This (and latest reportings) is the trigger for Commander TFU to consider the situation. Present were Commander TFU (Col van Griensven), COS TFU (), G3 TFU (), Regad TFU (), Commander AIBG () and S3 AIBG (). The situation had developed in a way that there were 2 options left: leave and let CHORA fall into the hands of the OMF or stay and defend CHORA.

Leaving CHORA was no option. The population would flee from OMF occupation. Already there were reportings on OMF executing people that were pro-GoU or refused to fight with them. Leaving CHORA would also mean that OMF would have a big IO as well as a geographical success. It would increase the pressure on TARIN KOWT, endanger the TFU mission and undermine the credibility of ISAF and TFU in particular. That is why Commander TFU decided to stay, reinforce and defend CHORA with all means available. There was also discussion on how this could be done most effectively under the given circumstances. Avoiding collateral damage as much as possible was one of the main topics.

To synchronize the support to 42 AIBG in CHORA an engagement area is created. Initially this area was the area west of the vertical 21. This is the area where the last two days most of the OMF reportings came from. To support the unit on the ground in its self defence this is the area where 42 AIBG can target at pinpointed known targets such as avenues of approach of the OMF and known strongholds from previous reportings without direct eyes on. This has been done in consultation with RC(S). East of that line direct PID was still necessary before engagement was allowed. This control measurement was imposed to minimise collateral damage.

Before engaging in the area, west of vertical 21, started, the local population was warned to leave that area through their tribal leaders. ANP was used to pick-up the population and bring them East of the vertical 22. This all happened prior to bringing the engagement area into effect.

TFU as of then used all assets available to turn the tide and give Cdr A-coy all support needed to prevent CHORA and themselves from being overrun. An intensive night of battle between BG TF assets and OMF takes place. In the early morning, around 17.0400LT JUN 07 resulting in a situation in favour of TFU ISAF and local national population by having taken away the initiative from OMF side.

Phase III Status Quo.

Around 17.0400LT JUN 07, COM BG TFU and some reinforcements went to CHORA with his VCP to establish contact with Cdr A-coy. OMF is still trying to get hold of SARAB HILL and SARAB VILLAGE (at that moment still in the hands of () CHP commander SARAB). Commander TFU issues the frago on Operation TROY in order to reinforce the troops in CHORA and to execute misleading operations to distract OMF from CHORA through the BALUHI valley. During the day of the 17th of June and the 18th of June ongoing fire-fights occur in the CHORA area as well as near SARAB HILL and SARAB VILLAGE. Elements of TFU consolidated their positions while OMF was still active within the green zone. TFU was pushed back into an area of 4 square kilometres around the District Centre. Because of the risk of culmination COM TFU decided to counter-attack in order to re-establish the positions as before the 16th of June.

COM BG and Cdr A-coy are conducting a decision making process to conduct an offensive operation to re-capture the CHPs KALA KALA, NYAZI, at the same time freeing the green zone in CHORA of OMF.

Militias are forming a force to free SARAB HILL and VILLAGE from OMF.

Call signs of TFU (SFTG VIPER and a platoon of 42 AIBG) move to the DORAFSHAN area, South of the BALUCHI PASS, in order to distract OMF from the western part of CHORA. This decreased the pressure on the western side and enabled the BG assets to further establish a status quo, preparing for future operations. An extra platoon is being moved from DEH RAWOD to TARIN KOWT to support the upcoming operation. Furthermore reinforcements are sent to CHORA to defend and to take part in the upcoming attack.

Phase IV Attack.

Operation FLIEGENFANGER of Commander 42 AIBG is issued to take away the last initiative of OMF in the CHORA area, freeing the green zone of OMF, re-occupying the CHPs KALA KALA and NYAZI. At 10.30 hrs elements of the TFU under command of Commander 42 AIBG attack into western direction. ANA & OMLT play an important role in this operation. Elements of the BG attack on a northern and southern axis while ANA proceed along the central axis through the green zone. At the end of the day the objectives have been seized. The CHPs are again in ANSF/TFU hands and the OMF has been driven from the green zone. In the mean time the militias from CHORA are moving into eastern direction in order to re-taking SARAB CHP and SARAB Village. They also achieve their objectives.

Phase V Aftermath.

After the seizure of the CHPs the focus is back again on having the local authorities in the lead again. At this moment ANA is still occupying the CHPs west of CHORA with TOOR ABDULLAH again on the CHPs in SARAB. TFU is decreasing the number of forces in CHORA and returning to the situation as it was before the 16th of June. At the same time continuous efforts were being made to get information on any damage occurred and any casualties inflicted by either side.

Detailed info you will find in the mentioned Supplements below and especially the detailed Logbooks of BG TFU, Logbooks TFU HQ (including message-interaction between RC(S) and Opsroom TFU HQ). Also the extended reports on used Artillery and air-assets, gives a good view on used weaponsystems together with accurate BDA on assets used. The ISIS snap-shots in comparison with the Logbook reportings will complete the view on events occurred and operations run.

5) SITUATION OWN TROOPS (INCL. COALITION FORCES)

a) Personnel

- i) KIA : 1x NLD Mil
- ii) WIA : 4x NLD Mil
- iii) MIA : Nil

b) Logistic

- i) Equipment
1x PATRIA damaged due to impact 82mm Mor round, still serviceable. 1x 81mm Mor damaged, out of use, at CHORA DC compound.
- ii) Ammunition used

6) ENEMY

a) Intention of OMF

OMF is determined in taking over CHORA DC so OMF can exploit even the smallest success in a massive Informations Operations (IO) campaign. At the same time enhancing and maintaining a guaranteed line of communications and logistical support.

b) Action taken by OMF

The OMF have been building up forces and activities during several weeks in the valleys surrounding CHORA, like BALUCHI VALLEY, and reinforcements were send in from GIZAB, CAHAR CHINEH, the Eastern SARAB area, MIRABAD and even from outside the province. Multiple reportings indicate the presence of foreign fighters.

c) Possible future OMF COA

OMF will continuously try to influence the CHORA area as long as it can contribute to either their IO or their freedom of movement.

d) Detainees made by TFU

Nil

e) KIA/WIA/BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

KIA: (based on Definitive Intell reporting received) 150-200x OMF,

WIA: (based on Definitive Intell reporting received) 6x OMF.

No definitive reportings or visual confirmation based on body-count could have been made. It is a known OMF TTP to take away any WIA and KIA from the battle-field under any circumstances.

7) CIVILIANS

Involvement on infrastructure and population.

Phase 0 General.

Nil

Phase I Prelude.

a) Involvement

Not known if any civilians were actively involved in the fights that occurred during this period.

b) Impact

Via PRT reports are coming in about people being killed by the OMF.

c) Casualties

Unknown.

Phase II Defence.

a) Involvement

It is assessed as likely that local civilians during this period took up arms against OMF. Reportings also indicate that civilians were forced by the OMF to join them and to fight with them. This can not be confirmed by TFU elements in CHORA. It is assessed that local population is involved in the fights in and around CHORA. A large effort has been put in the warning of the population by BG TFU and Mission teams

towards tribal leaders to get the population into safety. ANP helped to evacuate the population at risk.

b) Impact

Not known, assessed that the local population has been affected by the attacks of OMF. Although likely, it is not known if and how many local nationals were involved in the fights that have occurred.

c) Casualties

Exact numbers have not been reported on KIA and WIA LNs. Counting the casualties is not possible, even not by local authorities, therefore exact numbers and wounded can not be determined. Death people are being buried within 24hrs after having deceased. Wounded people are not always being taken to the nearest hospital or reported to other medical facilities / aid-stations. Reports come in on atrocities committed by the OMF to the local population. However, although all effort has been put in to minimize collateral damage, it can not be excluded that LNs have been wounded or killed by TFU and ISAF (air) assets, although some reports indicate that a number of civilians might already have been killed prior to the defence phase. PRT has been investigating the possible collateral damage and the possible casualties amongst the population.

See Supplement L: Functional Specialist reports PRT

Phase III Status Quo.

a) Involvement

Since fighting was still going on, out of the side of TFU units, it can be assessed that the population took up their arms to defend themselves against the OMF. Definitive reports on this are not available. Also some of the population moved further out of the endangered area because they were afraid. At the same time, some of the shops in CHORA went open and children came to school again. Hereby giving the signals that the local population still believed in a safe and secure CHORA.

Reports came in that OMF are harassing GoU minded population, also stating some were killed, amongst them women and children.

b) Impact: nstr

c) Casualties

No known casualties from this phase.

See Supplement L: Functional Specialist reports PRT

Phase IV Attack.

a) Involvement

Reportings come in that local population is being further harassed by OMF.

Population are taking up arms to secure themselves from OMF harassment.

actively rounds up people (militia) to re-capture and free SARAB from OMF together with the remnants of the ANP left in CHORA.

b) Impact

NSTR

c) Casualties

No known casualties have been reported from this period.

See Supplement L: Functional Specialist reports PRT

Phase V.

- a) Involvement
The population is returning to normal life. Shops are opening again and children are going to school.
- b) Impact
Unknown.
- c) Casualties
More light can be shed on the current situation, because larger party of PRT Functional Specialists are sent to CHORA for assessing the situation. Reportings are coming in at TFU as of that moment.

Conclusive:

The most accurate information can be found in the reportings from Functional Specialist Health of the PRT TFU , together with the report from the Senior Medical Officer of TFU.

8) LOCAL AUTHORITIES/SECURITY FORCES

Phase 0.

- a) Involvement
ANP were defending the CPs around CHORA DC, already lacking ammunition. Not being supported by authorities from TARIN KOWT.
- b) Impact
Occupation of CPs is to a minimum at times, due to continuous harassment fires.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
NSTR

Phase I Prelude.

- a) Involvement
ANP were defending the CPs around CHORA DC, already lacking ammunition. Not being supported by authorities from TARIN KOWT.
- b) Impact
Occupation of CPs is to a minimum at times, due to continuous harassment fires.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
Not known.

Phase II Defence.

- a) Involvement
Local authorities have asked TFU to defend CHORA against any OMF influence. Local authorities also played a large role in alarming LNs in the CHORA DC area for the fighting activities at hand. They advised and asked LNs involved to, at least for the time being, leave the area. They assisted in bringing local national population to safer areas East of CHORA DC. ANA is also deployed in CHORA. They are in the direct surroundings of the DC acting as a QRF. ANP is initially defending the CHPs. Eventually they have to leave the CHPs and flee. It is not exactly known where they ran to. Some were picked up to return to the DC.
- b) Impact
Impact on the local authorities is not known in this phase.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
Not known.

Phase III Status Quo.

- a) Involvement
ANP is on CHORA DC. ANA & OMLT are moving with BG TFU to CHORA DC. In total 90 pax ANA are present during this period.
- b) Impact
ANP is not effective anymore.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
Not known.

Phase IV Attack.

- a) Involvement
90 pax ANA & OMLT are taking part in the attack in CHORA DC area against OMF, alongside with BG TFU. First ANA moves through the Green Zone towards the West part of CHORA. They have the task to finally take possession of CPs KALA KALA, NYAZI and key-terrain part CEMETARY HILL. It is in this phase that [REDACTED] has brought together at first 30 pax and later 120-150 pax to fight along TFU units in the counter-attack in CHORA DC area. [REDACTED] is the QRF ANP commander and he moved to SARAB and re-conquered the SARAB HILL and SARAB VILLAGE on OMF.
- b) Impact
Not known.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
ANA none, militia unknown.

Phase V Aftermath.

- a) Involvement
ASP (87 pax) are pushed towards CHORA CPs, after a delay, so ANA can be released from the CPs. Current ASP as well as ANA & OMLT are in CHORA DC area for securing the area, together with a platoon from BG TFU. Not before ASP had arrived, BG TFU could down-size there force lay-down in CHORA.
- b) Impact
NSTR.
- c) KIA/WIA/MIA
NSTR.

9) **LEGAL AUTHORITIES**

Phase 0

Nothing special to report.

Phase I Prelude

In the weeks earlier, already several fire-fights with OMF occurred and information from Intell sources state that an OMF attack was imminent or already at hand, therefore the reportings on TICs as of the 16th of June show a clear build-up of pressure from OMF on CHORA DC area. For a detailed report see Supplement B and D. Final Intell reportings state that large numbers of OMF are starting to move up to CHORA as of 160210LT JUN 07. A PID can not be established at that time on spotted movements witnessed by [REDACTED] (fixed wing air-support). Therefore no firings occurred on these persons. What becomes clear, based on more Intell reports, is the high and likely probability that OMF is preparing a (coordinated) attack on CHORA. As of 16.0637LT OMF starts with the actual firings of weaponsystems like 82m Mors, RPGs and small

arms fire on positions of TFU and CHPs occupied by ANP (Aghan National Police). At that moment the act of self-defence is a fact and OMF fires are being answered by BG TFU elements supported by air-assets of ISAF and RC(S) available, both fixed and rotary wing.

As of this moment in time OMF continues to engage our TFU and ANSF units during the rest of the day. A situation occurs of continuous threat on TFU/ANSF units and of course there exists now the inherent right of (extended) self-defence. Furthermore, for this situation ROE [redacted] have been delegated to COM TFU by COM RC(S). For details on all situations in which OMF fire has been received and answered, I refer to mentioned logbooks.

In all situations that occurred, the actions taken by TFU were taken within the given ROE delegations and, as far as it can be investigated, only use of necessary force, proportional and minimum of amount of force needed has been used taking into account the operational circumstances. As far as it shows there has been no reportings of any relevant collateral damage thus far.

Phase II Defence.

During the entire day of the 16th of June, as mentioned earlier, TFU have been in firing contact with OMF. From Intell reports it obviously came clear that the OMF intended to conquer CHORA DC. Especially as of 16.1950LT JUN 07 the situation worsened around CHORA DC, that much that Cdr A-coy needed all assets available in CHORA of TFU and ANP to keep CHORA out of the hands of OMF. At this time darkness sets in and Cdr A-coy states quite clear that CHORA DC will fall if not being supported as soon as possible with all assets available. Moreover, the CHPs KALA KALA, NYAZI and SARAB seem to be fallen under OMF control. At 16.2054LT JUN 07 an engagement area had been created and ordered west of vertical 42S TB 21. Reason for this was that Intell reports and reports from Cdr A-coy stated that large concentrations of OMF were moving within the limits of this area. After consultation with RC(S) within this area EF were engaged without PID as of being a serious and imminent threat, after LNs were warned through their leadership.

Large concentrations of OMF on its own already forms enough ground for self-defence and extended self-defence, because of the fact that there was an imminent attack at hand, the continuous pressure on TFU units rose and the intent of the OMF was clear, also illustrated by final Intell reportings.

Besides this, Commander TFU was authorized on basis of ROE delegator [redacted] in combination with continuous reporting of hostile intends and hostile acts.

Under named circumstances there has been made a continuous effort to minimize the use of force, especially to minimize the chance of casualties being inflicted under the LNs population and also prevent collateral damage as much as possible.

In order to try to reduce the amount of casualties among civilians, by means of PRT, [redacted] (Chief of police) was warned at dtg 162130 June 2007 and asked to warn the civilians to leave this area. He on his turn send a car to [redacted] the tribal leader in the region and living in OAL-EH-YE;RAGH (grid square 42S TB 2137) with the message to take care that all the civilians living in the engagement area had to leave. The village is located in the engagement area. North of the village in the engagement area there is less housing. It was not told to [redacted] that it might be possible that air operations would be executed, because there was always a chance that OMF would intercept this information.

In the course of the evening and after dtg 162130 June 2007 (exact time unknown) the PRT has phoned with [REDACTED] reported in this conversation that all the woman and children had left already the village. [REDACTED] was advised, together with the males who had stayed behind, also to leave the village. Within the realistic possibilities every measure had been taken to take care that the civilians were warned to the highest possible extend under these circumstances. Needless to say that it was impossible to enter the engagement area with own units to warn the people because of the enormous concentration of OMF in the area.

The necessity to get own units out of a oppressing encirclement, the significance to preserve CHORA as essential for the success of the mission, the request of governor MUNIB to defend in CHORA and the ruthless way of operating of OMF in respect of the civilians (throats were cut of captured civilians and women were burned), were important considerations to meet with the principle of proportionality.

In all situations TFU has acted – taken into account the operational situation – within the applicable ROE. Also in the sense that the presence of large numbers of OMF in the engagement area made this a military objective. As far as known up till now the use of force was necessary, proportional and the minimum force taking into account the operational situation. Under this extreme circumstances, to the highest possible extend, was tried to avoid collateral damage among the civilian population, but with the OMF deliberately mingling with civilians and forcing them to stay, this was very difficult to execute.

Phase III Status Quo.

Between 17.0400LT JUN 07 and the early morning of the 19th. In these phase there have been several TICs. In all situations of engagement by OMF was responded by TFU with the use of force in self defence.

In all situations units of TFU acted within the given ROE delegations. The principles of necessity and proportionality were taken into account.

Phase IV Attack.

During this phase ROE [REDACTED] was authorized to the BG TFU: Op TROY. They haven't met with substantial resistance from OMF. ANA has been in fire-contact with OMF. In a very few situations units of the BG and ANA with OMLT (see Supplement F: OMLT/ANA AAR report) were shot at by the OMF. ANA with OMLT entered several qalas which had just been left by OMF or were still occupied in some cases. In all situations was acted in accordance with the applicable ROE and responded with fire in self-defence. This may have lead to KIA or WIA among OMF, but unknown which number.

Phase V.

Nothing special to report.

10) MEDIA PRESENCE

Media TV-crew of RTL has been present in the area on 20th of June, the day directly after the counter-attack had been executed by BG TFU, together with a visit of Governar Munib and Commander TFU.

COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT

In the early evening of 16 June the situation had deteriorated in a way that FE were pushed back to an area of 4 square kilometres around CHORA DC. I had the choice to leave CHORA and hand over the area with all its inhabitants to the OMF or to stay and defend. Because handing CHORA over to the OMF would not only endanger the population but would also bring a huge IO success to the OMF. And losing CHORA would have a very disastrous effect to the mission of ISAF in general and TFU in particular I decided to stay in CHORA, reinforce and defend fiercely with all means available. Within the ROE given and after consultation with Commander RC(S) we created an engagement area in which we struck the majority of the OMF. This would later turn out to be decisive in the defence of CHORA. Seen the fact that the governor and other local authorities requested us to defend CHORA the importance was stressed. As result of this severe fight I believe that we set back the OMF in trying to achieve their goals and disrupted them for a longer period. Due to the fact that we defended CHORA, the majority of the local population is still supporting us and this gives us the opportunity to further execute our mission in URUZGAN. I regret the fact that it is also likely that there were civilian casualties as result of our defence of CHORA.

COM 1 (NLD/TFU) TFU

J.F.A.M. van Griensven
Colonel

- Supplement A: ISIS Snapshots TICs 16-06-07
- Supplement B: daily force laydown Ops TFU
- Supplement C: Logbook TICs BG OPS TFE-3 TFU
- Supplement D: Logbook 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN
- Supplement E: AAR JOINT FIRES
- ✓ Supplement E: Appendix 1: JOINT FIRES, ARTILLERY FIRES & FW/RW **NATO SECRET**
ENGAGEMENTS, SNAPSHOTS BDA LOCATIONS.
- ✗ Supplement E: Appendix 2: JF IDF report 160000Lt - 201200Ly June 07 **NATO SECRET**
- ✗ Supplement E: Appendix 3: JF FW/RW Report 160000Lt - 201200Lt June 07 **NATO SECRET**
- Supplement F: ANA-OMLT AAR report
- ✓ Supplement G: TPT rapport 19 juni 2007
- Supplement H: SMO report CHORA
- Supplement I: Report AAR COM BG on the Battle of CHORA 15th - 21st of June 07
- Supplement J: Report Cdr A-coy (to follow)
- Supplement K: REPORT Cdr B-Coy BG TFE-3 TFU ISAF
- Supplement L: Functional Specialist report PRT
- Supplement L Appendix 1: Translation audio record


Supplement A (ISIS Snapshots TICs 16-06-07)

Snapshots TICs 16-06-07


Editor:
CHOPS TFU


Date: 27-06-2007

16 06 07 LT Jun 07
16 07 07 LT Dof Hill
16 07 13 pax OMF KIA
16 07 14 LT PZH firing




16 074 0LT PZH
enclosing 82mm pos
NW INVAZI





16 1022LT Panna 13
hit by 82mm, lightly
damaged, no
casualties
Scumishes near
SARAB ongoing

16 1555LT 2x 500 lbs
dropped on area where
QMF fired from
16 1645LT 82mm fired
from loc 42S TB 212
382 ar LL24 and 13
Engagement with
155mm or direct fire
from LL24 or LL13



Supplement B (Daily Laydown Ops TFU HQ)

Daily force laydown

Editor:
CHOPS TFU

Date: 27-06-2007

CHORA AREA

Since 16.0209LT reports movement OMF → FW ISR
16.0700LT AHS eng 82mm Cem Hill → 13 OMF KIA
16.0710LT PzH eng Cem Hill pos OMF
16.0742LT PzH eng 82mm NW NYAZI

16-06-07

1.2 / 1.3
+ ANA (50) +
OMLT + TPT + MT

CHORA AREA

17-06-07

**Re-supply 81mm
AMMO + 50 ANA /
OMLT**

**1.2 / 1.3 / 2.4
+ ANA (50) / OMLT / MT**

**'ANSF/0.5/VCP
REINFORCE CHORA**

17-06-07

Militia

ANA (90)

13

05

12

24

VCP

VUT 42

CM

PF 66

11

26

2.6

009

6.9

69


POENTJAK

2.7

27

NABIA HILLS

Militia + QRF ANP at WANOW




CHORA AREA

18-06-07

**1.2 / 1.3 / 2.4 / 0.5
+ ANA (90) / OMLT / MT**

- MISSION SECRET / A12 REL GCTF, ISAF AND NATO -



PHASE IV

OP TROY
19-06-'07


Date: 27-06-2007

OP TROY force laydown

- LL 12 & 26 on Northern approach
- LL 11 & 24 on Southern approach
- ANA in middle with 90 pax ANA
- LL10R and 81mm Mor at CHORA DC White Compound
- LL05 Recce screening towards East CHORA – SARAB
- LL 35 & BG VCP in South CHORA (the Saddle of Chora)

CHORA AREA


19-06-07



**1.2/1.3/2.4/2.6/10.5/VCP/6.9
+ANA(90)/OMLT/MT/TPT**

- MISSION SECRET / A1.2 REL GCTF, ISAF AND NATO -

19-06-07



Supplement C (Logbook TICs in June '07 (NLD))
Author: BG OPS TFE-3 TFU

Editor:
CHOPS TFU

Majr

27-06-'07

LOGBOOK 42 BLJ

16 00.00juni07 t/m 16 23.59juni07



Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
00.04	24	seedorf	verb?	I & d	closed
00.05	poentjak	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
00.43	24	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
00.44	10	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
00.51	poentjak	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
01.32	24	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
01.55	poentjak	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
02.00	TFU		er vliegen 2 boven chora. Deze zien 60 a 65 pax verplaatsen op STB 3468-4473. waar zit 1.3?	1.3 is binnen. We hebben niks buiten	closed
02.15	seedorf	chora	paxen komen langs sarab. WM68 wekken en contact laten nemen met TULIP. En COMM MISSIE TEAM laten bellen naar de post sarab.	kvo	closed
02.25	chora	seedorf	geen verbinding met sarab. Van comm missie team		closed
02.30	24	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
02.42	alo	chora	wm 68 geinf.		closed
02.47	TFU		heeft missie team geen verb.? Of geen tel?		closed
02.52	poentjak	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
02.52	chora		missie team geen tel.		closed
02.56	loui	wm68	praatje over situatie. Paxen zitten 1km van post		closed
03.02	24	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
03.30	TFU		post niet te bereiken, paxen 500m van post. Gaan kijken of waarschuwingsschoten kan geven.. moeten weg. Ja gooien flairs af.		closed
03.34	10B1	seedorf	van W hebben nog steeds visueel op 311-406 en ze gaan west		closed
03.43	TFU		paxen verplaatsen naar zuidelijke anp-post		closed
03.54	10	seedorf	50 a 60 pax op 3086-4042 van		closed

03.55	24	seedorf	2omin ga ik RTB		denk aan de tics van anp omgeving wanof	closed
04.00	10R	seedorf	heb 50 a 60 pax vanaf N-O kvt 34-44, omdat ze van N-O komen vind ik dit echt een target. Kan ik vuren vrij krijgen?			closed
04.02	TFU		groep heeft zich waarschijnlijk opgesplitst, en verplaatsen nu mss in groepjes van 4 a 5 ??			closed
04.06	10	seedorf	kan prt TK contact maken met de westelijke posten op chora?		gaan prt wakken en laten bellen	closed
04.17	poentjak	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden			closed
04.20	charlie		maak een salta over de 50 a 60 pax.....		salta ligt klaar mocht ie nodig zijn	closed
04.28	charlie	poentjak	kan 24 op seedorf net komen? Locatie 24? En hoe snel naar female feature?			closed
04.29	wm66	seedorf	locatie qs 7602-1879			closed
04.31	24e	charlie	staan op 50% brandstof. Moeten via WC of poentjak?		nu naar poentjak en dan asap female Feature's	closed
04.46	TFU		bezig AH los te krijgen... zodat zij kunne n gaan kijken. met kunnen de AH zelf ingrijpen bij PID			closed
04.56	10	seedorf	sitrep? En 1.3 gaat naar Nyazi (west van de stad) met als reden geen contact met posten meer. 1.2 Noord oost van stad en ANA blijft in de stad. Dit ter voorkoming BLEU ON BLEU. :it op kallah kallah, DC heeft geen contact batt leeg hebben AH's toegewezen. Gaan warm draaien en dan de lucht in		zijn bezig met AH los te krijgen	closed
05.02	TFU					closed
05.05	charlie	10	AH komen als ze warm zijn komen uw kant op. als ze er zijn, moeten jullie met AH maar opnieuw gaan zoeken, jullie en AH's hebben en PRT hier kan ook geen contact krijgen met anp posten			closed
05.17	poentjak	seedorf	24 bevindt zich bij waterbak			closed
05.23	10E	seedorf	volgens hem worden de posten ANP, aangevallen door OMF			closed
05.24	Kalil		posten KK, Niazy, sarab worden nu aangevallen			closed
05.26	10E	seedorf	KK ziet OMF, OMF omsingeld de post... :voorbereidingen op de bazar			closed
05.28	PRT		checkpost sarab omsingelt.			closed
05.31	poentjak	seedorf	24 t-splitsing carna gepasseerd			closed
05.31	13	seedorf	verticaal 21, eyes on. (nyazi)			closed
05.42	10e	seedorf	GERUCHTEN DAT NIAZY NU WORD AANGEVALLEN			closed

05.43	10e	seedorf	i op bazar auto die voor grote explosie gaat zorgen	closed
05.45	10E	seedorf	eerdere mortier inslagen uit west	closed
05.47	charlie	10	anp-posten hebben contact gehad met kazum, alle anp er op de post blijven. Alles wat er buiten loopt OMF!!! Geef u dat ook door aan hun!!	closed
06.01	C	10	AH's kijken in SHARAB, we gaan alle ROZ's hot maken, 1.3 krijgt steun van PZH, 1.3 moet ten Oosten van NIAZY blijven ivm killzone 155mm. Bij PID AH engage, ROZ CHORA 81mm HOT	closed
06.06	seedorf	poentjak	sitrep?	closed
06.08	10	seedorf	van in de gevechtsposities, klaar om aan te vallen	closed
06.08	poentjak	seedorf	2.4 geheel terug op poentjak	closed
06.20	10	seedorf	commander in Kallah Kallah, massale aanval gepland, de ANP posten zijn volledig omsingeld.	closed
06.24	TFU	seedorf	ten Zuiden van Kallah Kallah staat een machine geweer opgesteld	closed
06.26	10	seedorf	Mr vuur, Point of origin: 4027. kunnen we 155mm krijgen?	closed
06.35	10	seedorf	ersterkingen aangevoerd, 1.3 ziet gevechten met de posten, bestrijden met de AH	closed
06.40	10	seedorf	Zuid van cemetery hill, coo 2440, 1.2 gaat de-turnen	closed
06.41	10	seedorf	negatief, niazy wordt vanuit Zuid bevuurd.	closed
06.50	10	seedorf	Taliban is vlakbij, proberen zo dicht mogelijk te komen, zitten inu pai Zuid van ons	closed
06.51	seedorf	poentjak	sitrep chora gegeven, wat is sitrep enh. 2.4?	closed
06.51	TFU	seedorf	healfire engage	closed
06.56	10	seedorf	i: vuur overval met 17 RPG en 4 x ?	closed
06.59	poentjak	seedorf	enh. 2.4 nog 3 x vtg aflanken	closed
07.09	10	seedorf	op 4027, 13 x pax omf KIA	closed
07.12	seedorf	10	bevestig dat AH oost van NIAZY links van vert. 21	closed
07.13	seedorf	PZH	VUREN VRIJ	closed
07.16	10	seedorf	wat is de ????	closed
07.23	10	seedorf	omf wil anp post ten zuide van brown compound aanvallen, bericht is dat die verlaten is, en zo doorstromen naar de white compound.	closed
			0 over 15 min. boven u	closed
			AH-weels up	closed
			KVO	closed

07.29	seedorf	24	overschakelen naar bulldog net, bericht van 20 R	kvo	closed
07.35	10	seedorf	mogelijk over 60 min. een predator boven u, kan de WM dit aan?		closed
07.40	24e	seedorf	waterbak gepasseerd		closed
07.42	WM66	seedorf	PZH effectief, REPEAT		closed
07.43	WM66	seedorf	air assets zijn op het moment teveel naar het Westen, stop vuur 155mm, on my command over, omdat aanvliegroute vanuit West is.	roger, 1 x round er al uit!	closed
07.47	WM	seedorf	0830 in overhead		closed
07.48	24e	seedorf	loc krt vierkant 1975		closed
07.51	10	seedorf	vuur effectief, nieuw grid: 193 360, nr stelling		closed
07.53	WM68	seedorf	WM68 kan geen 3e air asset erbij, WM66 overnemen	WM66 kvo	closed
07.55	24e	seedorf	loc verticale 77		closed
08.02	WM68	seedorf	shots not observed, repaet, ad 300m North West		closed
08.07	10	seedorf	taliban kijkt of ze nog gaan aanvallen, 17 KIA, 4 MIA, 2 x PKM schutter KIA		closed
08.13	seedorf	10	WM66 heeft geen		closed
08.14	seedorf	10	or toch door WM68, AH via CCA		closed
08.16	seedorf	10	fixwing als		closed
08.17	24	seedorf	24 onder waarneming, plan om te aan te grijpen. ik sta 1 km zuid van 2 tieten en heb dat onder waarneming	L wordt C band analoog	closed
08.18	poentjak	seedorf	omf pland nog een aanval op poentjak		closed
08.23	poentjak	seedorf	enh. 2.4 schiet .50 op de 2 tieten uit te lokken, kijken of daar wat zit.	roger, enh. 11 gaat nu als QRF in de dash staan	closed

08.33	10	seedorf	ANP nog op zijn posten in SHARAB, vlag wordt gehezen als herkenningsteken eigen troepen. Bericht is dat 100 pax omf zich zullen verplaatsen richting KALLAH KALLAH		closed
08.38	10	seedorf	SADAM kia		closed
08.40	RTF	ops	RTF start firing 100m range		closed
08.41	seedorf	10	WM68 heeft aan de lijn?		closed
08.45	QE,QR,QH	seedorf	verbindingscheck	bezig met contact zoeken, inmiddels hebben ze contact luid en duidelijk	closed
08.47	seedorf	10	wat is de eff. Van AH t.a.v. redcon 2 op TK?	Zolang kunnen de AH terug	closed
08.55	10	seedorf	icom: KALLAH KALLAH en NIAZY in handen van de OMF, echter de posten zijn nog bezet door de ANP, voor de PZH nieuwe coo, assenkruis 2039	roger	closed
08.57	seedorf	10	voor de hebben we opvolgers, de AH kunnen terug, gaarne over de route te vliegen en poentjak om daar te scannen		closed
08.58	24	seedorf	femal feature gepasseerd		closed
08.59	seedorf	10	als SADAM, leider van de strijders daadwerkelijk is uitgeschakeld is dat serieuze moreel klap voor de rest van de strijders		closed
09.00	24	seedorf	kan ik bij het zadel overschakelen naar pelotons net 10?	positief	closed
09.01	seedorf	10	155mm. Ready on your command, kvo bericht 24?	positief	closed
09.06	seedorf	1.1	uw loc?	bij de poort ri krtvrk 7922	closed
09.14	10	seedorf	WM heeft aan de lijn		closed
09.16	Q	seedorf	van de base in het net		closed
09.17	24	seedorf	1 km ten Zuiden van het zadel	10, kvo bericht	closed
09.25	20F	seedorf	verbindingscheck		closed
09.26	24	seedorf	geen sync met 10 op pel net.		closed

09.28	Q	seedorf	loc IRISH crossing + gepasseerd	Taliban houd Wanow, Spel' Andei Shundai, Satu baba onder waarneming dat is enth 2.4	closed
09.32	poentjak	seedorf	welke enh in SANGAR? spotter heeft ze onder waarneming en moet ze onder waarneming houden		closed
09.47	poentjak	seedorf	omf heel dicht bij de White compound en willen hem aanvallen.	10 kvo bericht	closed
09.50	Q	seedorf	waarschuwings schot bij Wanow		closed
09.53	10	seedorf	White compound word beschoten, 1.3 ontvangt Mr inslagen, coo voor de PZH: 195 390 fire on my command, fire for effect		closed
09.58	seedorf	10	PZH ready at your command	roger, wacht	closed
10.20	10	seedorf	1 x pax van enh. 1.3 heeft zijn vingers gebroeken door middel van een vtg luik, gaan hem ophalen en naar de White compound brengen.		closed
10.23	10	seedorf	vuur effectief, EOM, enh. 2.4 in ons gebied bij KALLAH KALLAH en heft zicht op enh. 1.3. de patria van hun met de granaat achterin is veilig gesteld. Bericht: we moeten laag blijven, geen gebruik meer maken van de		closed
10.32	poentjak	seedorf	vanuit Noord Oost KKW schoten gehoord, afstand onbekend		closed
10.38	poentjak	seedorf	vanuit Noord Oost wederom KKW schoten gehoord.		closed
10.45	poentjak	seedorf	meerdere schoten gehoord vanuit green zone SHORK MURGAB		closed
10.47	10	seedorf	taliban moet hun wapens weggoeien en terug trekken de beluchi in.		closed
10.48	Q	seedorf	IED alley uitvoerig aan het searchen ivm dreiging en te rustig		closed
10.51	10	seedorf	.50 = 80%, MAG = 80%, AGL = 50%, 81mm HE 70%		closed
10.53	10	seedorf	SPIN SPENCER is KIA	waarschijnlijk dezelfde persoon als SADAM	closed

11.13	N00R	seedorf	verbindingscheck			closed
11.14	poentjak	seedorf	wapens en munitie verzamelen om een volgende aanval te plannen, signaal vanuit poentjak zeer sterk			closed
11.19	poentjak	seedorf	vanuit poentjak, 11 velden afstand 2 a 3 km, volgens de tolg gaat het om een nieuwe groep			closed
11.43	Q	seedorf	nog steeds op loc IED alley, 100m voor cemetery hill, searchen op aangeven van de Golf.			closed
11.57	20F	seedorf	verbindingscheck			closed
12.04	10	seedorf	update: op dit moment is het rustig, ontvangen wel een hoop icom, de volgende aanval zal spoedig plaatsvinden			closed
12.10	QE	seedorf	qs 7354 1640, zijn vtg aan het bergen.			closed
12.15	10R	seedorf	13 reorg na hgr in patria, 3R hand tussen luik, medivac niet nodig.. 13 wissel met 12 naar west. 13 2 gpn N/O 1400 rip 2 en 3e pel. Sit ANA ongewijzigd. Sarab vallei afsluiten met stam. 24 zuid oever, houdt west dicht. Ernst noord.			closed
12.38	seedorf	10	r nog 60 min, fixwing tot einde playtime.			closed
12.39	poentjak	seedorf	omf is aan het graven (stellingen???) willen rustig aan doen. De gegraven 'stellingen???' zijn voor toekomstige acties			closed
12.48	QE	seedorf	patria gaat zeker kantelen, graag de buffel			closed
13.01	seedorf	QE	buffel komt met 26 en uw eigen vtg heeft de vreemde motor olie, dus wisselen in de dasht. 26 met laatste covo terug			closed
13.15	poentjak	seedorf	Zijn gestopt met vechten. Versterkingen aangekomen.			closed
13.27	26	seedorf	toestemming testfire?		positief	closed
13.39	10	seedorf	Bij Sarab veel [redacted] oa: hebben de zwager van [redacted] Gaan/zijn zijn huis binnenvallen (van TA). 40 pax OMF willen Sarab aanvallen. Op de west: 6 x OMF wil Niazi aanvallen			closed
13.49	10	seedorf	[redacted] willen vanaf bazar Z van Ali Shirzai aanvallen.			closed
13.52	QE	seedorf	26 al weg?		van 26: op HWR, bezig met oleaat ed en dan komen we	closed
14.03	20	seedorf	kan ik langs met ehd bij patria? Can QE: ja			closed
14.04	O	seedorf	verbindingscheck			closed
14.17	26	seedorf	van de base in het net		luid en duidelijk	closed
14.49	10	seedorf	W van Cemetery Hill staat mortierpositie, gaan we bestrijden met [redacted] daarna [redacted] door naar Sarab		QE KVO	closed
14.49	20	seedorf	Wanow gepasseerd			closed

15.06	10	seedorf	OMF probeert ISAF in te sluiten Z van Brown Compound met oa 10 pax met RPG. 10 andere pax verplaatsen zich naar quala's bij oude bazar		closed
15.25	10	seedorf	lok 13: 2320-4070. Lok 12: 223-392. ANA rond Ali Shirzai (230-360). 24 KVK 2236.		closed
15.27	20	seedorf	lok: 759-208.		closed
15.32	QE	seedorf	G bak vrij, maken gereed voor verplaatsen richting de desht, gaan daar mijn bak maken		closed
15.39	poentjak	seedorf	2 1 berichten: 1ste: Bij Chora lui met RPG's. Aanvulling van de folk: KK niet in handen van OMF, maar heeft wel eerste prio. 2e bericht: door vliegtuigen houden ze zich rustig. Zodra vliegtuigen weg zijn, zetten ze de aanval weer in.		closed
15.42	NSS00R	seedorf	Onze [] wil met [] van Poentjak op reservenet Seedorf spreken.	Doorgegeven aan Poentjak	closed
15.57	poentjak	seedorf	26 en 69 aangekomen Kraai 1, klein deel gaat kraai 2 verkennen		closed
16.02	10	seedorf	Wordt geschoten bij Niazi van Z naar N		closed
16.03	20	seedorf	Aangekomen kraai 1, ga zo mee om kraai 2 te verkennen. Graag ROZ kraai 1 en 2	TFU: hoeft geen ROZ, want valt onder vanity. 20 KVO	closed
16.21	poentjak	seedorf	Malim Saab (fon) op CP bazar Chora. Zou bekend zijn dat hij samenwerkt met OMF. OMF is daar ook aanwezig, zijn bezig een hinderlaag voor te bereiden.		closed
16.20	TFU	seedorf	Hamaduniah Akhundzada zegt over [] dat ze DC omsingeld hebben (Chora). Willen aanval uitvoeren		closed
16.53	20	seedorf	26 aangekomen kraai 2, starten met searchen		closed
16.56	20	seedorf	t kraai 1: bezig met ANP post aan te vallen, personeel is op de vlucht geslagen		closed

17.01	20	seedorf	OMF zou heel Chora in handen hebben, muv wit gebouw (White Compound)		closed
17.03	10	seedorf	12 meidt dat post Niazi wordt losgelaten door ANP		closed
17.05	10	seedorf	OMF nog aan het knokken, overgegeven aan OMF		closed
17.09	20	seedorf	: zijn vanaf centrum Chora zware wapens aan het verzamelen naar andere lokaties		closed
17.19	TFU	seedorf	bezig met extra fixing te regelen met meer zware bommen		closed
17.27	20	seedorf	zelfde bericht als net, zware wapens aan het verplaatsen in Chora vis route 'Sesam'.		closed
17.28	TFU	seedorf	AH's beschikbaar	doorgegeven aan 10. 10: Graag	closed
17.29	poentjak	seedorf	Nog steeds aan het verzamelen om ons aan te grijpen. Waarneming op vrouwen en kinderen verplaatsen van San Murghab (FON) naar het zuiden		closed
17.34	poentjak	seedorf	hebben 4 vgn in zicht, gaan nu aanvallen		closed
17.40	20	seedorf	ontplooit in kraai 1 en kraai 2, zware middelen in kraai 2		closed
17.48	seedorf	20	situatie bij zij hebben defecte voertuigen op de voertuigen wisselen		closed
17.50	seedorf	20	26 is op het moment de opdracht los aan het laten, zakt naar Zuid, omf andere zijde berg.		closed
17.52	poentjak	seedorf	: enh. Statisch op smalle weg, waarschijnlijk enh. 1.2 we gaan ze zo meteen aangrijpen.		closed
17.54	seedorf	PZH	vuur! (coo 41 S QS 740 285)	1 x round onderweg	closed
17.56	seedorf	10	AH airborne over 07 minuten		closed
18.00	seedorf	PZH	nieuwe vuuraanvraag op: QS 7472 2976		closed
18.01	seedorf	10	AH wheels up	rounds complete 2 x	closed

18.05	seedorf	10	vtg aangrijpen, mr in stelling brengen, op de oude bazaar maar die van White compound of Niazy? Alles valt binnen bereik, verder F16 bom op quala laten vallen waar vanuit gevuid werd		closed
18.07	PZH	seedorf	shot over	1 x round	closed
18.10	10	seedorf	WM heeft contact met AH		closed
18.11	26	seedorf	intel hila ligt bij moskee via poentjak doorgegeven		closed
18.11	PZH	seedorf	shot over	1 x round	closed
18.15	2W	seedorf	harassment fire possible enemy op		closed
18.21	seedorf	20	is iedereen uit kraai 2 weg? Wat is nieuwe loc?	positief, nieuw is kraai 1	closed
18.22	seedorf	10	hoeveel 500 ponders zijn er daarstraks geworpen?	1x	closed
18.23	10	seedorf	situatie lijkt zich op dit moment te stabiliseren, zijn nog quala s aan het bestrijden waar nog veel vuur uit komt, AH in overhead position, over ze zijn er bang voor, verstoppen zich in de green en in hun quala s. MR schieten in voorbereiding		closed
18.33	PZH	seedorf	shot over. Possible OMF op	4 x round	closed
18.38	2W	seedorf	end of mission, geen meer		closed
18.38	PRT	seedorf	burger in chora heeft een vlag op zijn quala geplaatst in de hoop dat wij niet meer op zijn quala zullen vuren, hij heeft gewonde familie leden en is er nu mee naar de medical centre in DC		closed
18.45	10	seedorf	heeft met zijn bom de quala uitgeschakeld van waaruit de ANP is bestookt geworden		closed
18.47	poentjak	seedorf	van , omf omgeving wc en chora eeft zich terug getrokken		closed
18.49	10	seedorf	vuur afgegeven op coo 218 370, multiple kilis in quala, ernaast kk waargenomen, AH engage		closed
18.49	seedorf	10	over 20 min heeft WM 68 beschikbaar		closed
18.51	poentjak	seedorf	van : 1 x spotter in de heuveltoppen in chora		closed
18.53	10	seedorf	bestrijden nu de groep quala's, die ernaast zit vermoedelijk KAKA, verticale 22 ri oost, omf cp onder vuur met heilfire, de rest wat eruit komt met 30 mm.		closed
18.54	20	seedorf	update tigershark?	geen bijzonderheden	closed
18.55	poentjak	seedorf	in chora trekken omf zich terug, omsingelen nog 1 x anp post		closed
18.56	10	seedorf	de , boven ons, hebben wij die tot beschikking?	die wordt beswuurd door de ALO	closed
18.57	C	20	TS alles (-) geen bijzonderheden		closed
19.04	seedorf	20	einde playtime voor de tigershark, geen bijzonderheden		closed

19.06	10	seedorf	de mannen van [redacted] zijn nog met 5 paxen op post KALLAH KALLAH, NIAZY is verlaten		closed
19.14	viper	seedorf	loc. Is crossing SPIN KECHAH		closed
19.20	10	seedorf	KAKA is dood word er vermeld		closed
19.27	seedorf	10	info over predator: callsign is [redacted], frequentie [redacted] krijgt u van overlord zelf		closed
19.30	seedorf	10	vraag voor WM68, AH rippen of 1 voor 1 terugkeren?	waarschijnlijk 1 voor 1, heb nog doelaanbod openstaan	closed
19.34	seedorf	10	s gecanceld!		closed
19.37	10	seedorf	ik maak op dit moment volop gebruik van de AH om de commander met paxen te escorteren naar de post Kallah Kallah en weer terug. De vraag van daarnet ga ik uitzetten bij WM en kom ik op terug.		closed
19.39	10	seedorf	WM heeft liever AH dan [redacted] wordt teruggestuurd		closed
19.45	10	seedorf	op KALLAH KALLAH nu nog maar 3 paxen zonder munitie, post gaat bijna vallen		closed
19.49	seedorf	10	24 doorgang in zadel vrij houden, waar bevindt omf zich nu? Zo nauwkeurig mogelijk		closed
19.50	1.1	seedorf	40 paxen aangehouden die vluchten van Chora naar TK		closed
19.50			Runnerdienst overgenomen door [redacted]		closed
19.51	10	seedorf	meld mij wanneer u 12 vertikaal van 22 hebt		closed
19.54	seedorf	11E	geef nogmaals coo 11		closed
19.55	11E	seedorf	coo loc 11 2185 2770		closed
20.07	C	10R	MBT deconflicte air assats, Fixed wing meld zich in bij WM 68 op wine 07. Vervolgens targeting door WM 66 op wine 02. 13 kan dmv cca AH's aansturen. Zodra er toewijzing is hoort u dat maar procedure's zijn nu afgesproken.		closed
20.11	C	11E	We gaan reserve eenheid formeren van [redacted] JR gaat mee. Vzk om op female feature te gaan staan dan pikt 00R u daar op om N van Chora te steunen	00R KVO	closed
20.14	Mortar range	Ops	vzk vuren	vuren vrij	closed
20.19	10R	C	zijn bezig weg vrij te maken voor cop [redacted] om zijn mannen te extracten. Vind nu hand over plaats van stabs. O sector is leeg W is zeker nog niet leeg		closed

20.20	10	C	coo 12 42STB22683968 meest W vtg. coo 24 42STB22513719 ook meest W vtg		closed
20.24	OW	WL68	FM in holding. O van vert 40 aldaar stack in HT		closed
20.26	QW	seedorf	wat is coo van 20R	41SQS76442593	closed
20.27	C	10	via WM67; zodra actie AH's ten einde is laten screenen ri O kan 13 ze overnemen voor CCA		closed
20.29	poentjak	seedorf	taliban gaat nu slapen 04.00 weer verder met actie		closed
20.33	S2	seedorf	: ANA heeft hoogste OMF mil leden gearresteerd		closed
20.35	poentjak	seedorf	van 20 Geen bijzonderheden		closed
20.36	10R	C	is onderweg terug niasi. Chief of police is onderweg terug van Kalla Kalla. 24 heeft 1x gewonde ana in been geschoten. Fob loc Anp die mijn kant op willen gaan kijken hoe we dat doen. Gewonden van mijn locatie zijn op pick up geladen onderweg ri TK. Straatbeeld is leeg. Winkels zijn dicht op last van taliban volgens prt om plunderen makkelijker te maken. 1x pax aangehouden en daarna ze hebben de baas opgepakt is nu detianee		closed
20.44	C	10B	sitrep vpl ri wanow om pakketje op te pikken		closed
20.47	C	poentjak	laat op mijn net komen		closed
20.48	QR	C	u wilt dat wij IEDalley gaan searchen	positief	closed
20.49	C	20	wij hebben geen capaciteit voor searich bij nacht bereid voor om met misschien 26 en misschien 11 voor om op mijn bevel chora te gaan steunen	zelfde positie als van de week	closed
			negatief positie's zijn niet meer te bereiken	wat is het tijdsbestek	closed
			afn van situatie maar kan snel zijn		closed
20.58	Poentjak	seedorf	vorige 1 04.00 moet 16.00 zijn en op chorabazaar heeft omf een WP ingericht in schooltje		closed
20.59	00R	11	kom morgen met militie verkel en nog wat ri wanow. Hou rekening met samenkomen en searichen female feature		closed
21.00	10	seedorf	tussen 21 en 22 geen NLD nog wel ANP. OMF is aan het hergroeperen op vert 20 op 41SQS 4834248447 heeft paxen gezien		closed
21.09	20R	seedorf	zie paxen verzamelen bij quala	pid is vuren vrij	closed
21.11	C	10	niet gehoord	via volp	closed
21.13	C	10	wil schieten met PZH. Beginnen tussen vert 21 en 22 en horizon 37 en 40		closed

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21.14	PZH	seedorf	shot out			
21.16	20	C	wilt u volgende keer seintje geven als PZH gaat vuren			closed
21.20	PZH	seedorf	shot out			closed
21.23	PZH	seedorf	shot out			closed
21.24	C	10E	Hoe zit het met AH's en is ANP al O van 22			closed
21.25	pzh	seedorf	shot out			closed
21.25	poentjak	seedorf	omf wil vanacht VC omsingelen			closed
21.28	10B	seedorf	zal van poentjak zenden aan 10			closed
21.32	2W	seedorf	via PZH hebben licht geschoten vanaf Poentjak. Paxen vluchten weg			closed
21.33	20	seedorf	In omg Z van kraai 1 vpl paxen en heb tracers gezien. Geef waaschuwingsschoten			closed
21.38	C	10	niet gehoord			closed
21.39	seedorf	10	via VOJP is het mogelijk dat wm ons op de hoogte houd voor hoe en wat bommen via seedorf net			closed
21.42	10	seedorf	Alle ISAFEenh O van 22		Er hangt fixed wing voor WM wij vullen de pauze's met PZH	closed
21.46	2W	seedorf	verzoekt prox op paxen die quala uit en weer in lopen		C: afgewezen	closed
21.46	C	20	20E, Laat: op mijn net komen en blijven			closed
21.49	C	20E	via vustnet horen wij 81MM zonder PID.		Roger 20R krijgt geen contact met u	closed
21.51	10R	C	PID is vuren NID is niet vuren			closed
21.55	C	10	Logee op Brown compound gelieve naam scannen 42STB 237366 is zojuist radioverkeer geweest door omf. Is vlak bij 24 kijk of zij er iets aan kunnen doen			closed
21.58	20R	seedorf	heb weer verbinding. Ben ook op buildog. Geen aanv bijzonderh.		Als C u nodig heeft roept hij	closed
21.59	20	seedorf	wat verplaatst door greenzone?			closed
22.04	20	seedorf	7476-2334 quala van waaruit geschoten wordt			closed
22.09	20	C	wederom tracers uit Quala Z van ons zou graag wat meer willen dan licht schieten		wat dacht u van 25MM vlakbaan	closed
			dat komt maar tot de muur		wil zo weinig mogelijk colleteral damage	closed
			zijn er dan air assets voor mij		negatief alles is voorf chora	closed
			Als ik rondom lig en zie wederom tracers uit quala dan wil ik graag aangrijpen			closed

22.16	C	20	op coo 41SQS 749298 verm spotters kijk of u er vanuit huidige locatie iets aan kan doen anders voor !						closed
22.18	10	C	herhaal grid 749 298					was voor 20	closed
22.18	C	20	op coo 41SQS 749298 verm spotters kijk of u er vanuit huidige locatie iets aan kan doen anders voor					kijk of P zicht heeft want die had vandaag beste zicht	closed
22.23	seedorf	20	actie verm spotters gaat naar					P blijft waarn en kan steunen	closed
22.28	C	10	Kisten die WM nu aan de lijn moeten meteen getarget worden en moeten meteen bommen gooien zodat OMF het niet weer gaat proberen						closed
22.33	C	10	niet gehoord						closed
22.35	C	20	heeft an de lijn, zodra ze iets zien, direct bom erop						closed
22.35	C	10	Morgen 08.00 resupply door lucht op bekende LS 81MM in 1x chinook + 2x AH. Laadtijd 07.30 land 08.00					behoefte .50	closed
22.37	S6	p+chora	geen ma vop te lnt						closed
22.39	TFU	seedorf	50 pax ri Wanow						closed
22.43	viper	seedorf	op spotter is bom gegooid						closed
22.47	poentjak	seedorf	20 op C net						closed
22.49	20	seedorf	20 voorb met 26 evt met 11 naar Chora steun verlenen. Vrianten 1) 20 +26. 2) 20+26+11. 3) 20+26+11+samengesteld pakket						closed
22.55	0W	11	voor WM 67. Chief 31 naar wm 62 op lion 12. grid 41SQS 597212 via Z ri TK. WM67 contact met ons op laten nemen						closed
22.56	WM67	0W	net comms gehad met.... Probeer te pushen voor 62. Blijven O van vert 21						closed
23.01	0W	11	Voor WM67 WM66 heeft voor 60 min geen controle over Snel luchtruim vrij voor PZH						closed
23.09	0F1	seedorf	en Chora 15 min geleden is al doorgegeven aan Poentjak						closed
23.12	WM67	seedorf	U krijgt van mij seintje als Pzh kan vuren						closed
23.15	G3	seedorf	rdt geretasked, gaat BDA CC post bekijken						closed
23.21	QR	seedorf	verbingscheck					luid en duidelijk	closed
23.22	26	seedorf	geen bijzonderheden						closed
23.25	seedorf	10	sitrep? 10: 1 quala vernietigd, gaan straks de andere doen. (4027-4033) Ehdn geen bijzonderheden. C: Wil Pzh schieten, echter fixwing belemmert dit.						closed
23.28	61Z	seedorf	verbingscheck					luid en duidelijk, 61Z niet gehoord	closed

LOGBOOK 42 BLJ

17 00.00juni07 t/m 17 23.59juni07



Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
			RUNNER:		
00.03	0W	WM67	Lokatie van HVI 42 S TB 41494-41048.		Closed.
00.01	PZH		1ste schot		Closed.
00.03	PZH		2e schot		Closed.
00.12	10E	C	Vraag over RIP klasse 5	C: gaat beginnen met voorbereiden	Closed.
00.19	RTF	Seedorf	Kunnen voor 0400 geen tolk regelen.		Closed.
00.20	WM 67	Seedorf	Nog pzh en hoelang? Doel gecalled schijnt extra quala bij te zijn gekomen.	Nog pzh, maar storing. Wacht op STAB. Ik heb 2 quala's N, nog 1 extra. Voorstel 2 aangrijpen.	Closed.
00.25	WM 67	Seedorf	0W: ja (TFU confirms) WM 67: ik kom terug met BDA pzh na laatste schot 18 dode; herhaal. Quala op genoemde grid 2 x meest N grid, pak eerst N daarna evt Z		Closed.
00.31	WM 67	Seedorf	met 0W coördineren over juiste quala		Closed.
00.32	10	Seedorf	van T pzh: 1) 18 gewonden. 2) terugtrekken naar greenzone. Vuur mag intensiever. TFU: 7 man militie uur reactie	hebben overeenstemming	Closed.
00.32	PZH		3e schot		Closed.
00.34	PZH		4e schot		Closed.
00.35	PZH		5e schot		Closed.
00.36	PZH		6e schot		Closed.
00.37	PZH		7e schot		Closed.
00.39	PZH		8e schot		Closed.
00.41	PZH		9e schot		Closed.
00.42	WM 67	0W	Eyes on, binnen nu en 05 minuten bestrijden		Closed.
00.45	PZH		10e schot		Closed.
00.45	PZH		11e schot		Closed.
00.47	WM 67	0W	HVI aangrijpen in 02 minuten		Closed.

00.48	PZH		12e schot			Closed.
00.50	PZH		13e schot			Closed.
00.53	WM 67	0W	afgelopen, nog BDA?		roger	Closed.
00.53	PZH		14e schot			Closed.
00.55	PZH		15e schot			Closed.
00.57	0W	WM67	TFU is benieuwd naar BDA. HAWK 15 doel BDA by voice.			Closed.
00.58	PZH		16e schot			Closed.
00.00	PZH		17e schot			Closed.
00.00	WM 67	Seedorf	Er rennen 3 pax uit het doel dat net bestreden is, uitschakelen?		C: Positief	Closed.
01.02	PZH		18e schot			Closed.
01.05	PZH		19e schot			Closed.
01.05	Poenjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.			Closed.
01.08	26	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.			Closed.
01.11	0W	Seedorf	42 STB 31176-41201 nieuw grid HVI quala		s nog steeds op paxen vorige quala engaged	Closed.
01.14	PZH		20ste schot			Closed.
01.14	WM 67	Seedorf	2 van de 3 pax uitgeschakeld en doel effectief bestreden.			Closed.
01.15	PZH		21ste schot			Closed.
01.16	C	10	Sitrep? Alles rustig.		C: Wij gaan door met pzh.	Closed.
01.23	PZH		22ste schot			Closed.
01.26	WM 67	Seedorf	Coo van quala bij kleine heuvel juist?			Closed.
01.27	WM 67	Seedorf	4472, ANP post lijkt 400 meter west. Coördinatie met 0W over juiste quala deconflicte niet nodig. Aangrijpen		Positief.	Closed.
01.29	PZH		23ste schot			Closed.
01.35	PZH		24ste schot			Closed.
01.39	WM 67	Seedorf	opgedragen doel is uitgezet, dichtbijzijnde doel ligt er 50 meter vandaan. 4472 3 x gebouw, daarvan de middelste.			Closed.
01.40	PZH		25ste schot			Closed.
01.42	WM 67	Seedorf	Pakken middelste quala aan.			Closed.
01.46	WM 67	Seedorf	er is een n het gebied-van wie-niet voor ons			Closed.
01.48	PZH		26ste schot			Closed.
01.57	WM 67	Seedorf	inzet over enkele minuten. HAWK 15			Closed.
02.28	WM 67	Seedorf	qualacomplex 41 SQS 777-358 zijn multiplequala's, kan doel er niet uithalen. Wel aantal hotspots, gaan we bekijken.			Closed.

03.05	20	Seedorf	heeft moeite met opstellingen te bereiken vanwege problemen met voertuigen. Verwachten tussen 0500 en 0600 op lokatie aan te komen. Gaan met klein clubje van 20 om 0415 naar kraai 2 en dan zsm terug		Closed.
03.07	Seedorf	MW67	lokatie/activiteiten WM66?	Onbekend	Closed.
03.08	Seedorf	10	Lokatie WM 66?	Z van oever, KVK 2347	Closed.
03.30	Seedorf	10	sitrep: quala 4022 helemaal weg, quala 4131 voor de helft, andere helft doen we zo. Sectoren leeg, alles rustig, wacht op uitkomst OBP		Closed.
03.46	TFU	Seedorf	Militie bij Wanow is gereed		Closed.
03.48	10	Seedorf	Gaan laatste gedeelte 4131 platgooien		Closed.
04.26	20	Seedorf	69 kraai 1 overgenomen		Closed.
04.33	00R	Seedorf	Verbinding?	Zeer zacht.	Closed.
04.35	05R	Seedorf	Wij gaan voorwaarts.		Closed.
04.45	26	Seedorf	Kraai 1, weer volop		Closed.
04.45	00R	Seedorf	Graag contact opnemen met 11.		Closed.
04.46	00R	Seedorf	Wil contact leggen met bij Female Feature.		Closed.
04.47	00R	Seedorf	Voor 11: over 120 minuten rendez-vous.	11 KVO.	Closed.
04.50	60Z	Seedorf	Verbinding?	Luid en duidelijk.	Closed.
04.50	Seedorf	00R	60Z is uw LO bij		Closed.
05.00	20	Seedorf	Vrouwen en kinderen verplaatsen vanuit Baluchi. Normaal richting		Closed.
05.08	10	Seedorf	i voorbij verticaal 78?	Negatief. 10: dan zetten wij actie voort.	Closed.
05.10	00R	Seedorf	Irish Crossing.		Closed.
05.11	00R	Seedorf	Graag op de hoogte houden van		Closed.
05.15	Seedorf	10	Sitrep? 10: Rustig, vee. TB aan het vergaderen. Quala 4073???? (Verbinding viel weg)		Closed.
05.15	20	Seedorf	Laatste bericht 10: Normal pattern of life.		Closed.
05.20	00R	Seedorf	Club die N van Wanow zou staan, staan Z van Wanow. Daarom nu searchen en laat de club dan aanhaken.		Closed.
05.25	20	Seedorf	i: Auto met zware wapens aan het verplaatsen naar Chora.		Closed.
05.27	20	Seedorf	i: TB heeft Chora in handen, WC omsingeld en post in handen.		Closed.
05.28	20	Seedorf	i: Waarneming op club die rivierbedding passeert.		Closed.

05.38	20	Seedorf	berichten. 1) Zodra de wapens in Chora zijn gaan we het gebouw aanvallen. 2) OMF actief in Baluchi, willen aanvallen vanuit zelfde plek als gisteren.		Closed.
05.58	00R	Seedorf	wij passeren semetery hill, 11R moet gereed staan als wij arriveren kunnen aansluiten en verpl naar het zadel in KvK 2131	11R KVO	Closed.
06.01	20	Seedorf	ze zijn bezig met MM naar hoge grond te krijgen om ons aan te grijpen tevens ehd43 horizontaal 22		Closed.
06.08	Seedorf	10	weet u iets over KL 5 en of ANA invliegen	we staan te springen om KL 5, ik kan geen LZ gegaranderen	Closed.
06.08	Seedorf	00R	1e slag wordt KL 5, 2e slag wordt ANA		Closed.
06.12	20	Seedorf	dat ze ze volledig omsingeld hebben, vermoedelijk WC		Closed.
06.15	20	Seedorf	dat ze in 1 of 2 aanvallen de WC in handen kunnen hebben, ehd 43 horizontaal 24		Closed.
06.30	Seedorf	00R	p grid 746176 en gaan naar de 2 tietes		Closed.
06.46	C	00R	de situatie: vanaf 00.00 OMF niet meer opgetreden tegen ons, slechte danwel geen comms met 10. FW is voortdurend aanw alle doelen zijn bestreden we wachten tot OMF weer iets doet		Closed.
06.56	20	Seedorf	wrn gehad op vermoedelijke loc uitschot MM we houden het onder wrn		Closed.
07.09	00R	60Z	geen comms met 60Z		Closed.
07.13	00R	Seedorf	00R heeft bpd gegeven verpl + 360 inrichten in KvK 2533 en 2532		Closed.
07.15	00R	11	11 krijgt opdr te verpl naar KvK 2131		Closed.
07.21	20	Seedorf	N 41 nadert loc overwatch tevens zicht op vtg'n met paxen verpl van N naar Z		Closed.
07.36	20	Seedorf	OMF is van plan zware wpn's te gebr omg Sangar	00R KVO	Closed.
07.45	20	Seedorf	SITREP N 43 heeft over-watch betrokken een uitgestegen deel gaat quala 15 bezoeken. Van mijn O zijde gaat 26 rg green zone		closed.

07.54	00C	00R	in de log transport per heli ook 15 pax ANA aanwezig			
08.05	00R	00C	SITREP: van 10 het lijkt rustig O v/d rivier gaat 05 kijken. W om de bocht geen zicht meer		heli ter beschikking voor de WM	Closed. Closed.
08.09	10	Seedorf	chinook staat bij mij aan de grond			Closed.
08.15	20	Seedorf	van mijn 69 5x SAF schoten vanuit green zone gericht op opst Kraai 1			Closed.
08.22	00C	11	wilt u WM 67 contact opnemen met Joint Fires TACP ADMIN			Closed.
08.30	20	Seedorf	schoten vanaf de W bank kunnen niet zien waar vandaan tevens 2 paxen op brommer met RPG		schoten zijn v	Closed.
08.51	20	Seedorf	op grid QS 7218 2432 daar verbleef waarsch [redacted] it zou waarsch [redacted] zijn en heeft het pand verlaten			Closed.
08.52	10R	Seedorf	SITREP: 05 vertrekt over 8 min rg Sarab vallei, vanuit het W vertikaal 22 een vluchtelingen stroom 175 pax vrouwen + kinderen rg de crossing			Closed.
09.05	10	Seedorf	O v/d stad rg NO 60 pax op de vlucht waaronder doden en gewonden			Closed.
09.08	00R	Seedorf	vb check		Luid en duidelijk.	Closed.
09.10	10R	Seedorf	v r landing chinook bevestigd, TB wil naar een andere plaats en dwingt mensen om mee te vechten			Closed.
09.24	20	Seedorf	N43 in de Green Zone, quala 14+16 zijn gezuiverd nu onderweg naar quala 15, de schoten waren waarsch v een enkele man die nu pleite is, op dit moment geen vuur contact. De [redacted] staat roodgloeiend: we gaan ze aanvallen en wachten af			Closed.
09.30	WM68	Seedorf	WM66 neemt het over en is bezig met [redacted] en verkennt de route naar Sarab			Closed.
09.36	20	Seedorf	li [redacted] ze hebben troepen v ons onder wrn waarschi n l v c/s Akun Zada (fonetisch)			Closed.

10.13	05E	Seedorf	worden de veretasked			
10.23	20	Seedorf	SITREP: op dit moment korte gevechtspauze geen wrn op OMF en geen vuurcontact we blijven in opst en proberen vuurcontact te houden	Positief gaan naar TIC 20/N43		Closed. Closed.
10.25	WC	Seedorf	een ASG medewerker heeft de WC gemeld dat TB het oord Ganizi heeft omsingeld	doorgegeven aan S2		Closed.
PHW vuurt						
10.28						Closed.
10.39	20	Seedorf	ze zijn gestopt met vuren, over head			Closed.
AH's airborne						
10.44	TFU					Closed.
10.50	11R	Seedorf	ik sta in 360 stuurhuis Patria kapot heb O bij me			Closed.
10.51	05R	Seedorf	locals gesproken zeggen: TB voornamelijk actief in Kala Kala en Niazy, vluchtelingen meldend dat ze uit hu huizen zijn getrapt. De av op Sarab komt uit Nowri + Z uit bergen, exacte situatie pol cdm't onbekend. Tussen DC en loc 05 geen TB, situatie ontspannen	ik informeer herstel		Closed.
11.05						
10.55	05R	Seedorf	vluchtelingen v W naar O omg 2456 4009			Closed.
11.03	WM67	Seedorf	heeft de WM63 bij N43 nog steeds lucht steun nodig?			Closed.
11.10	26	Seedorf	26 gaat quala zuiveren op grid 7365 2650	positief de freq is CYAN 12		Closed.
11.16	26	Seedorf	de voorgenomde quala was de vermoedelijke mortier opst			Closed.
11.29	10	Seedorf	is oke en houd stand dit komt v iemand v/d post Niazi			Closed.
11.35	20	Seedorf	quala doorzocht geen bijz aangetroffen 26 keert terug			Closed.

11.44	00C	20	26 en N43 niet voor invallen duisternis opst verlaten			Closed.
11.59	10	0.0	komt er een chef van police naar mij toe?		positief	Closed.
12.02	10	0.5	airassets zijn weg RTB. Alo bezig nieuwe te regelen.			Closed.
12.10	5	0.0	heb sterke lijn..... heb AT4 geschoten ga zo 40mm schieten, wachten op airassets			closed
12.20	S2		waarneming op 4x tanks op heuvel. Gaan met rpg aanpakken			closed
12.27	Poentjak	Seedorf	de voertuigen die nu terug trekken laten we in een ambush lopen.	10, 05	KVO	closed
12.37	00R	Seedorf	omf stuurd mensen uit hun huizen, klappen in de greenzone			closed
12.42	0.5	0.0	VTG: 1xMB met lekke brandstof-tank, 1x fennek lekke band???. Heb 60mm geschoten op ridge 1979 (KVT 28-38) en de 82mm kwam van ridge 2030 (KVT 2940)			closed
12.46	0.5	0.0	geen airassets pas over 10min			closed
12.47	0.0	Seedorf	11 dan zuid ter hoogte van poentjak (voor duisternis naar TK)			closed
12.51	20	Seedorf	montieren op 43. locale leiders uit chora tot 150pax, gaan rond omgeving chora			closed
13.10	11	Seedorf	kan ik gelijk naar TK? GOLF-bak onwisslen en buffel achter laten en dan terug de dasht in.		Charlie KVO	closed
13.14	0.5	0.0	heb weer 3d steun. 05B(amateur WM) gericht naar t oost, omdat dat de afbreek route van omf is.			closed
13.18	0.0	Seedorf	vcp op 42 STB 2391-3610, hebben contact met			closed
13.20	11e	Seedorf	kl III en voor d1 water en eten klaar zetten		s4 kvo voor eten en drinken	closed
13.29	11e	Seedorf	horizontaal 24			closed
13.40	11e	Seedorf	horizontaal 20			closed
13.47	TFU		18.00 laa os. 19.00 wanow gecleard bij RTF			closed

13.56	10	Seedorf	24 herbevo op WC. 1.2 en 1.3 al herbevo en in eigen opsbox, 24 tot 1700 WC dan richting zuid. Sitrep ziekenhuis: 20 gewonde waarvan de dokter met 6pax niks kan (geen middelen voor)	vraag loopt bij S4	closed
14.02	11e	Seedorf	statisch ivm kapotte golf bak op 7439-1859		closed
14.10	20	Seedorf	' gaat loslaten vanaf 1700 route KOWTWAL-WANOW-TK		closed
14.12			vraag van 26? Vertrekken wij ook met [] mee?	2.6 hoort van ons	closed
14.14	10	0.5	ze proberen verkleed als vrouw te ontkomen		closed
14.15	11e	Seedorf	we rijden weer		closed
14.22	0.5	10	sitrep MB met kapotte tank. Scheur van 2cm. Bdr-dop zit erin, hij start weer.		closed
14.27	10	0.5	1800 is goede tijd voor uw ontvangst op WC. Kan Oscar naar de voertuigen kijken		closed
14.33	0.5	10	zien 10 pax bij quala's 301-409, gaan kijken of t omf is.. Mss de paxen die een hinderlaag hadden voorbereid voor 05		closed
14.35	pzh		43 heeft met 60mm op paxen geschoten		closed
15.28	alo		klopt t dat een F16 al zijn bommen kwijt is?	van 00R kvo	closed
15.32	00R	Seedorf	zonder tegen spraak van Charlie. Keer ik met [] m 1800 terug naar TK		closed
15.38	11e	Seedorf	zuid van wanow, klaar met searchen		closed
15.45	charlie	20	voortstelling 20: 24 RIP uit chora op 18-06, 25 wacht met 20 op 18-06, 26 terug naar base 18e bij eerste licht, Rip in poentjak 19-06 27 rip uit poentjak 19-06 dan qrf		closed
15.55	11	Seedorf	Irish Crossing.		closed
15.57	charlie	chora	11 morgen inrippen chora en ana paxen mee, 12 blijft tot 21e in chora, 11 tot 19e QRF / dan neemt 26 dat over. 13 logist rip op de 21e en gelijk met 12 terug naar TK		closed

17.31	PZH		7e 155mm				
17.38	10	05R	u vanuit de flank aanvallen. Hebben nog 2x RPG				closed
17.41	10	05R	1.3 ziet Noord 05 paxen in ruines met wapens				closed
17.43	10	05R	de paxen in de ruines rennen nu de greenzone in.				closed
17.46	10	00R	PID op quala 252-378.				closed
17.48	0.5	10	locatie 26518-38609 heb ik PID			oord. Met 05 ivm danger close	closed
17.55	00C	20	bent u bezig met loslaten opst?				closed
17.56	00C	00R	als u gaat loslaten komt u bij de female f ehd 26 tegen die blijven daar voor de RON			positief rg 2 tieten	closed
17.58	05R	Seedorf	ik bevind me in gedekte pos en zie nog steeds paxen vuren vanaf de ruine, v 20 pax komen om te versterken				closed
18.09	HWR	Seedorf	vuren vrij heavy wapen range?				closed
18.23	Seedorf	00R	op de brug bij Wanow zit RTF daar zit een ned bij met c/s Z61daar kan u zaken mee doen om te doorschrijven			positief	closed
18.24	Seedorf	20	u loc?			ik nader de 2 tieten vanaf Z ehd 69 is er ook bij	closed
18.40	Z61	Seedorf	vb check			slecht	closed
18.46	26	Seedorf	26 en 69 in RON loc TB 1950 2535				closed
18.50	00C	00R	gaat 24 met u mee naar TK			Negatief.	closed
18.53	Seedorf	00R	RTF niet voor 19.30 op nde Wanow				closed
19.07	00R	20	de lichtgewonde v 26 kan zo bij mij instappen en terug naar TK				closed
19.12	Z61	Seedorf	vb check			Luid en duidelijk.	closed
19.15	00R	Seedorf	1 pax 20(lichtgewonde) ingestapt				closed
19.18	149	Seedorf	140 is een element v 149 deze gaat searchen tot cem. Hill vervolgens road block samen met ANP inrichten. Dus de weg is vrij v T junction tot cem.hill. Als 00R bij horizontaal 17 is moet ie zich melden				closed
19.20	Seedorf	00R	vanaf horiz.taal 17 wordt u verwacht in te melden bij 149				closed
19.36	VVM69	Seedorf	vb check			Luid en duidelijk.	closed
19.39	Poentjak	Seedorf	verzameling v 50 pax op 713 237 waarschijnlijk begraafplaats				closed
19.40	149	Seedorf	loc 00R?			wacht	closed
19.41	Seedorf	00R	u loc?			KVK 7519 +c/s 149 kvo	closed
19.44	TF66	Seedorf	einde vuur HWR				closed
19.44	10	Seedorf	zware gevechten Niazi v te post v ; eindelijk ingenomen ze zullen ons vanavond v alle kanten aanv				closed
19.51	10	Seedorf	de post Sarab staat in brand, zware gev Niazi + Kala Kala				closed

19.53	00R	10	wie vechten er?					
19.55	10	Seedorf	TB wil zadel innemen zodat er geen versterking kan komen				ik weet het ook niet	closed
20.03	10	Seedorf	TB opst ingericht om de WC aan te vallen, tevens een OPSEC bericht GOA overlegt de situatie met OMF					closed
20.07	QE	Seedorf	roto TK					closed
20.15	QR	Seedorf	ik wil in contact komen met I49				dit heeft seedorf geregeld,	closed
20.27	Seedorf	10	AH's over 20 min in u omg				ik zal WM informeren	closed
20.30	10	Seedorf	TB wil een strong hold inr Z-O v Ali Shirzai verder willen ze het oord av, ehd 05 op de WC, I s zijn er ook nog steeds en gooien bommen op vupo's					closed
20.36	Seedorf	10	AH's wheels up					closed
20.40	10	Seedorf	v ehd 1.3 licht granaten omg Sarab van wie is onbekend					closed
20.52	00R	Seedorf	Irish Crossing					closed
20.54	Seedorf	QW	wat is u loc?					closed
20.57	Seedorf	00R	u kunt vanaf 21.30 aftanken				41SQS 7248 1757	closed
21.02	QR	Seedorf	ik sta vast met een vtg op 7191777 de buffel trekt hem eruit				roto TK	closed
21.10	QR	Seedorf	we hebben veel moeite met black out rijden in het terrein gaan daarom met licht rijden kunt u de rest v/d ehd'n informeren				positief	closed
21.13	10	Seedorf	ze zijn bezig met iets te maken op de oude bazaar					closed
21.14	QR	Seedorf	vanaf mijn loc rg O tracers + defonaties					closed
21.15	Poentjak	Seedorf	vanaf loc ANP post lax KKW + RPG vuur in Z O rg wij zelf staan niet onder vuur					closed
21.21	00B	poentjak	op u vraag heeft de post ingenomen PRT bevestigd dit					closed
21.23	00R	Seedorf	10 op de base					closed
21.23	10	Seedorf	2.4 ziet Z v zadel expl en tracers					closed
21.31	Poentjak	Seedorf	na betere wrn zou het kunnen zijn dat de schoten afkomen uit Kuchkin in KvK 7418					closed
21.31	10	Seedorf	vanuit Derafshan Area 80 pax OMF deze kant op, ik laat WM met de kijken					closed
21.35	Poentjak	Seedorf	de schoten vallen verder in O rg					closed
21.37	Poentjak	Seedorf	onder leiding v Arab gaan ze de check point av					closed
21.40	Seedorf	poentjak	check point omg Sarregin daar wordt gevocht komt v PRT					closed
21.41	QR	Seedorf	mijn loc in KvK 6918					closed
21.53	QE	Seedorf	loc QS 67541893					closed
22.17	QE	Seedorf	loc QS 67552060					closed

LOGBOOK 42 BLJ

18 00.00juni07 t/m 18 23.59juni07



Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
00.05	QR	Seedorf	ik moet morgen voor 7 dagen naar chora?	geen zorgen maken om 08.00	closed
00.11	10b1	Seedorf	voor de actie van l... AH niet mogelijk. Wel tussen 0200/0300 Fixtwing. Vraag de actie tussen die tijden te houden.		closed
00.26	aussies		als er bij zijn horen wij t via de KAP. Van de en andersom ook. Onze bindings-vrouwje daar kan relaxeren		closed
00.30	10b1	Seedorf	10R over 1 min op de volipe		closed
00.37	DW	Seedorf	kan 00R of 00C naar 30R bellen?	kvo 00C	closed
00.40	Herstel	Qoscar	herstel heeft contact gehad met Qoscar, en gaan benodigde spullen regelen.		closed
01.06	TFU	10	t schijnt dat [] dubbel spel speelt, hou hem in de gaten.		closed
01.11	26WC	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
01.17	TFU		bij sarab totaal geen bijz.		closed
01.18	S4/Charlie /vipet		bij first day light, gedeelte van [] net Q-oscar terug naar TK. Onderdelen halen en dan terug. Patria maken en dan terug naar TK	QR-kvo	closed
01.26	poentjak	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
01.30	volendam	ops	imm ROZ aanvraag voor illum, coord QS 297-165 meerdere voertuigen en paxen bij quala met groene deur. Willen beter inzicht krijgen.	naar TFU	closed
01.33	TFU		ROZ HOT SCALLOP		closed
01.33	26	Seedorf	golf die aan kliinkt bij 11, heeft die ook meer tijd dan?	kvo	closed
01.35	PZH-DW	ops	is de roz hot?	kvo	closed
02.06	DW	Seedorf	vermoedelijk zicht op vergader-locatie, hebben 6x illum geschoten ,paxen bewegen de quala in. Houden zicht op de locatie. Verder geen bijz.		closed

02.12	DW	Seedorf	2x 3VTG met paxen eromheen. Ook op squire beweging. 2x licht continu en 2x knipperend (geel en wit) halverwege de oever. Zeker geen normal patt of life (mss munutie of paxen overdracht.)		closed
02.24	poentjak	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
02.30	10R	Seedorf	heeft tweinig eigen troepen. Dus hij gaat niet. airassets niet meer nodig.		closed
02.40	TFU		hoeveel VTG heeft 24 buiten?	11	closed
03.05	dw	Seedorf	alles is weer op normale sterkte, alles is weer rustig op volendam. Roz cold		closed
03.27	poentjak	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
03.29	20	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
03.35	tfu		gaat 05 om 0500 de poort uit naar sarab? Prt zegt dat?		closed
03.36	seedorf	10	10 kvo 05 gaat met topcover vanaf 0500 de poort uit. Topcover tot 0600. kan t langer?	also positief tot hoe laat?	closed
03.38	10	Seedorf	05 gaat om 07.30 pas weg. Alleen topcover bij TIC. Vanaf 13.30 meer topcover beschikbaar		closed
03.39	10	Seedorf	tot 10.00 uur topcover???		closed
03.53	RTF		kan pas na 0500 wanow passeren? Dit ivm [redacted] die rond 04.40 daar rijden?	vo	closed
04.00	20	Seedorf	opstelling losgelaten. Rijden nu naar TK	kvo 05.00 wanow	closed
04.05	poentjak	Seedorf	geen bijzonderheden		closed
04.22	poentjak	Seedorf	26 horizontaal 22		closed
02.25	nassau43	qr	lijft achter. 43 vetrekt om 04.30		closed
04.30	poentjak	Seedorf	26 horizontaal 21		closed
04.33	poentjak	Seedorf	26 horizontaal 20		closed
04.41	poentjak	Seedorf	26 horizontaal 19		closed
04.44	20	Seedorf	naderen ID-alley, gaan via id-alley, naar Tjunksion zo verder.	contact met India49 gehad) kvo	closed
04.49	poentjak	Seedorf	26 horizontaal 17		closed
05.15	61Z	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk	closed
05.20	20	Seedorf	26 en 69 irish gepasseerd		closed
05.30	20	Seedorf	0600 klasse III voor 13 VTG		closed
05.48			Runnerdienst overgenomen door [redacted]		closed
05.45	20R	Seedorf	op de base uit het net	KI 3 vanaf 06.00	closed
06.43	TFU	Seedorf	Van [redacted] ats gaande in Khorma		closed

06.46	seedorf	11		omg khorma gaat iets gebeuren			closed
07.01	TFU	Seedorf		schreeuwt hele nacht al moord en brand. Is bezig doden te begraven en heeft geen kl V meer			closed
07.01	poentjak	Seedorf		geen bijzonderheden			closed
07.02	seedorf	10		Gaat 05 zo ri Sharab?	is al onderweg		closed
				Hebben die kl V bij voor post Sharab?	neg alleen eigen kl V		closed
				van PRT: Taliban zou aanval voorbereiden op post in Sharab			closed
07.14	DRW	Seedorf		wat zijn de plannen van 1.1 en ANA			closed
07.17	10	Seedorf		35 komt voor 5 dagen ri TK	laat 10R zo contact met u opn		closed
07.18	seedorf	10		van 10R 12 blijft op W; ANA ongewijzigd in districtcentrum en 13 blijft op WC			closed
07.46	seedorf	10		kunt u aangeven hoe ver 05 gaat	05 in overwatch aansl coo		closed
07.51	10	Seedorf		is er bij 05 WM aanwezig	negatief wel een Ecas		closed
				van : willen aanval uitvoeren op 05; hebben 2 ANPers gevangen en onthoofd; vanuit Nawri hoop paxen ri WC. [] taat voor poort met paxen die willen dat wij Sharab gaan ontzetten			closed
07.53	10	Seedorf					closed
08.23	seedorf	10			wacht		closed
					05 overwatch op TB 27763788.		closed
08.28	poentjak	Seedorf		Schoten door post gehoord in baluci vallei geen waarneming	05 word aangevallen en hindlaag; en gaan WC aanvallen. Zien ook mensen vluchten vanuit O.		closed
08.29	N42R	Seedorf		verbinding, ga zo vpl van TK naar Chora maak op Wanow contact met I	luid en duidelijk		closed
08.30	seedorf	N42R		Gaat u ri Chora of Khorma	Ri uw QRF		closed
08.32	10	Seedorf		ontvangen heel veel 05 onder waarneming aanval vanuit de bergen; 24 in het zadel gaan ze bestoken met 82MM; Bewegingen vanuit W ri WC			closed
08.41	TFU	Seedorf		Rotary is niet op de [] maar wel direct beschikbaar			closed

09.20	DRW	Seedorf	37 is door mourchaipas zou zich in het net melden. 35 is halverwege mourchaipas		closed
09.12	seedorf	10	wat is exacte coo 24?	wacht	closed
09.21	seedorf	10	Hebt u al exact coo 24?	neg zijn aan het vpl	closed
			hebt u assets nodig?	om Sharab zijn zware klappen gehoord waarsch mortieren	closed
			Kunt u 24 vragen of ze airassets of pzh nodig hebben	We doen het nu met 81 MM vzk wel om heli	closed
09.27	C	10	wat is de mogelijke inzet van AH's en kunnen die het verschil maken	24 heeft WM bij, er speelt meer in het gebied kunnen ze even kijken	closed
09.29	C	10	situatie is mij duidelijk proberen airassets te krijgen		closed
09.34	Pzh	Seedorf	via vustnet 37 vert 39		closed
09.35	WM69	Seedorf	verbinding, ben onderdeel van 37 vert 40	luid en duidelijk	closed
09.35	37R	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk	closed
09.48	C	runner	Nu staf bijeen roepen		closed

10.03	QR	Seedorf	ik ga losweken van [redacted] ta tot uw beschikking	closed
10.05	seedorf	QR	van C u laat niet los van [redacted] u krijgt beide vervolgoopdracht	closed
10.10	seedorf	37R	Niet op het net ivm tic	closed
10.15	10	Seedorf	ik probeer via voip	closed
10.16	C	QR	verwachte hersteltijd 90 min dan met patria voor vervolgoopdracht vpl ri female feature aansluiten 20 buffel is onderdeel van QRF dus met jullie	closed gaat buffel met ons of <input type="checkbox"/> nee closed
10.18	10	Seedorf	Mortierstuk defect vzk om nieuw stuk	closed
10.20	20	Seedorf	motel kunt u buldog laten roepen en mag ik 69 mee	closed
10.21	00R	20C	als u 69 kunt contacten kunnen ze mee	closed
10.23	QR	Seedorf	vzk om 26 de AGL van 11 bij herstel mee te nemen	closed
10.24	00R	10	10B gaat regelen	closed
10.30	35E	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk wegblijven van net ivm tic closed
10.40	20F	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk closed
10.44	C	10	AH's hebben wheels up tbv windmill of cca	medevac is bijna op loc closed

11.03	ALO	2 F1	tijn leeg ander 2 zijn nog bezig	closed
11.08	C	10	binnen nu en een uur vertrekt 26 olv 20R ri N en indien mogelijk sluit QR aan . 35 is binnen paar uur op TK stuur ik meteen door. Wat nu boven je hangt blijft ook voor jou. Geef een vert zodat wie ook PZH kunnen viiren	closed
11.13	seedorf	11		
11.16	N42R	11		positief
11.18	37R	Seedorf	Patria is gereed gaan beide door met vervolgopdracht vert 55	Seedorf KVO
11.19	C		Alle localen met wpn wil om te ontzetten. WC directe omg omringt door ANA. Zadel en 05 zijn vrij. 05 is druk vanaf en we willen Pzh gaan inzetten	closed
11.20	QR	Seedorf	gaan zo vertrekken naar female feature. O geeft aan dat KL3 nog maar 50% is.	Mogelijk via Poentjak voor herbevo
11.23	10	D	kunnen we medische apparatuur gebruikt bij opzetje nog gebruiken.	Negatief 5 meter afstand
11.36	10	C	Militie + Ana met 8 vtgen ri sharab. Omf zit in post Niasi gaan we nu platgoolien. 10 pax OMF gedood op Qualyrag	closed
11.37	10	Seedorf	sitrep: militie en 8 vtgn richting Sarab. OMF op Nuasi wordt aangegrepen. 10 pax OMF gedood op Qual eh ye Ragh door vliegtuigbom. 05 op oost doel zoeken.	closed
11.38	10	Seedorf		closed
11.48	S2	Seedorf	Tigershark airborne.	closed
11.55	QR	Seedorf	Wanow nog bezet door RTF? TFU: Positief. QR: Kan ik dan op TK herbevo doen, das dan sneller, toestemming? S4: Positief. QR: Kom met 10 tgn, vraag aan C of ik buffel moet meenemen of op TK laten.	Pending
11.59	poentjak	Seedorf	Talin Arab en Omari gaan samenvoegen om onze troepen aan te vallen. Richting en afstand onbekend.	closed
11.59	seedorf	QR	Lok?	
12.00	poentjak	Seedorf	: Club die door rivierbedding verplaatst richting Chora wordt aangegrepen.	closed
			QS 7003-1694	closed

	seedorf	QR	Poentjak doorgegeven			
12.00	seedorf	QR	Poentjak doorgegeven			closed
12.11	C	QR	Buffel blijft bij julie, gaat mee naar Noord		Roger	closed
12.15	poentjak	Seedorf	Intellvlucht van NSS43 heeft gewapende paxen waargenomen bij ingang Baluchi, coo 738-294. Ook gewapende paxen waargenomen door NSS43 en onszelf. Paxen gaan quala in waar 26 gister instap heeft gedaan. Willen graag met 81 mm aangrijpen vanuit eigen lokatie. Coo quala: 7361-2632.			closed
12.17	poentjak	Seedorf	eerste schoten eruit.			closed
12.20	20R	Seedorf	verplaatsen met alles naar HWR			closed
12.22	QE	Seedorf	Verplaatsen richting Wanow Bridge			closed
12.27	intell	Seedorf	van SM S2: er wordt bevestigd dat er suïciders in TK zijn (13).		Doorgegeven aan Q en 20	closed
12.28	QE	Seedorf	Wanow Bridge gepasseerd			closed
12.29	seedorf	37	Lokatie/verbinding?		37 niet gehoord	closed
12.30	WM69	Seedorf	lok KVK 6008, wachten tot 37 doorschrijdt.			closed
12.34	26E	Seedorf	verbinding?		luid en duidelijk	closed
12.36	QE	Seedorf	over 15 min aankomst, klasse 3 graag.		WA gbeld, stuurt zsm iemand	closed
12.37	seedorf	10	TS tussen 85 en 95			closed
12.38	QE	Seedorf	moet startmotor MB vervangen, heb ong 60 min, lukt dat?		O A-cje gebeld	closed
12.38	05F	Seedorf	verbinding?		luid en duidelijk	closed
12.38	seedorf	QR			roger, rijden nu door dhest, Z van TK	closed
12.39	pzh	Seedorf	van 2W: wordt gevraagd op dan KKW			closed
12.41	seedorf	WM 69	voor 35: scherp blijven in TK ivm suïciders in TK			closed
12.42	QE	Seedorf	graag WA bellen voor klasse 3		Al	closed
12.42	TFU	Seedorf				closed
12.44	20	Seedorf	met 26, 00, 69 en 67 van de base, in het net			closed
12.48	seedorf	10	10 niet gehoord			closed
12.49	QE	Seedorf	op de base			closed

	TS	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk	closed
12.57	TS	Seedorf			closed
12.58	00R	Seedorf			closed
12.59	poentjak	Seedorf			closed
			Voer de troepen die bovenop heuvel staan, onderaan de heuvel is TB aan het verzamelen om aan te grijpen.		
			Richting/afstand onbekend, ergens in dhest		
12.59	seedorf	05R	05 niet gehoord		closed
13.00	seedorf	10	Poentjak doorgegeven		closed
13.00	poentjak	Seedorf	20 en rest IC	10 geeft door aan 05	closed
13.06	poentjak	Seedorf	NSS 43 vraagt of TS over W-bank richting Baluchi kan vliegen	negatief	closed
13.08	seedorf	TS	Als Chora rustig is, kan dan voor NSS43 kijken?	Zal kijken hoe en wat	closed
13.14	WM69	Seedorf	van mijn ops: advies voor 35 om TK te derouteren	kiopt, ivm ivm suiciders in TK. WM69: ik zal nogmaals doorgeven aan 35	closed
13.14	WM69	Seedorf	slechte verbinding met 35	ok, ik geef door aan 35	closed
13.15	seedorf	35	suiciders in TK.	roger, mijn huidige lok is QS 6698-1295	closed
13.22	35E	Seedorf	naderen uw lok	roger, ga langs HWR voor ontladen, wij sturen iemand voor opvang. WA gebeld voor kl 3	closed
13.26	seedorf	VSO	naar ops komen	roger	closed
13.27			PZH 00 min		
13.27	35E	Seedorf	aangekomen op uw lok		closed
13.30	seedorf	10	10 niet gehoord		closed
13.33	seedorf	35E	kl3 geregeld	sta op parkplaats jingletrucks. Seedorf: komt MB naar u toe	closed
13.35	00R	Seedorf	ik en de rest in KVK 7519		closed
13.37	seedorf	10	10 niet gehoord		closed
13.44	G	ops	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk	closed
13.50	G3	Seedorf	wil Sarab Hill weer innemen, is nu bij		closed

13.51	poentjak	Seedorf	nog een mogelijke mortieropstelling, proberen ooo te achterhalen		closed
13.58	00R	Seedorf	2 tt		closed
14.02	10	Seedorf	Wil compound Akhter Mohammed platgooien. (bericht v.		closed
14.07	10	Seedorf	Sarab enigszins onder controle. TB vlucht oost. TF Guhl houdt er zicht op, gaat erheen		closed
14.10	G	ops	vurenvrij?	positief	closed
14.17	10	alle stations	00 onderweg naar onze lok, dan koppen bij elkaar voor planning volgende dagen		closed
14.18	TS	Seedorf	Sarab niks te zien		closed
14.30	10	Seedorf	KVK voor TS: 3243-3230-2941. ANP KVK 2940.	Doorgegeven aan TS	closed
14.36	10	Seedorf	ANA quala gevonden bij crossing. In quala 10 pax met rekening houden met meenemen naar BC		closed
14.40	seedorf	10	PRT zegt dat Sarab city onder mortiervuur ligt		closed
14.40	seedorf	TS	PRT zegt dat Sarab city onder mortiervuur ligt		closed
14.42	TFU	Seedorf	afvuurlokatie mortier is Sarab Hill	doorgegeven aan 10	closed
14.45	11	Seedorf	gaan zo rollen, lok 26 en 20?	Female feature	closed
14.52	seedorf	11	nog niet van de base, moet 35 meenemen		closed
14.55	poentjak	Seedorf	gaat 35 naar mijn lokatie of female feature?	FF	closed
14.57	c	00R	35 link up TK, gereed maken voor vertrek. 11 neemt 35 mee, dan heeft u 3 peils bij 20. Sit Chora bekend? 00R: positief		closed
14.58	C 1	Seedorf	graag QR op kantoor S3	QR naar S3 gestuurd	closed
15.00	TS	Seedorf	Sarab geen afvuurlok of inslagen te bekenen. Andere KVK nog bekijken?	positief	closed
15.01	20R	Seedorf	vtgn oost van 2 tt, graag inzicht dmv TS		closed
15.02	WM67	Seedorf	10 bekend dat we Mike en vuurcapaciteit bij hebben	doorgegeven aan TS. TS: Roger, doen we die eerst	closed
15.04	G	ops		onbekend, doorgegeven aan 10	closed
15.04	20R	Seedorf	Coo voor TS: 273-299		closed
15.10	PRT	Seedorf	05 inzicht op Sarab ivm mortiervuur?	doorgegeven aan TS	closed
15.13	00R	Seedorf	verbinding?	bij 10 niks bekend, TS niks gezien	closed
15.16	seedorf	10	doorgegeven aan WM, misreps ontvangen	zacht	closed
15.36	20	Seedorf	van 10: in KVK 2941 nauwe doorgang, zit TB	10: ik geef het door	closed
15.45	10	Seedorf	FW voor 68 misschief 23 2 x F18		closed

15.50	10	Seedorf	vanaf vert 22 verpl vrouwen en kinderen naar oost, west van vert 22 alles leeg		closed
15.54	TS	Seedorf	op genoemde coo 2 pax met ezels en hele hebben en houden. Verplaatsen erg snel, kijken haast te hebben	doorgegeven aan 10. 10: TS mag loslaten	closed
16.00	poentjak	Seedorf	IED leggen voor NSS 43	TS naar Baluchi voor NSS 43	closed
16.07	NSS00R	Seedorf	verbinding?	luid en duidelijk	closed
16.14	10	Seedorf	(VOIP) houdt rekening met 9-liner. 4 gewonden (allemaal ANA of ANP) 1 x prio		closed
16.24	26E	Seedorf	laten los, verplaatsen verder noord		closed
16.25	TS	Seedorf	op genoemde lok geen bijzonderheden. Op coo 41 S QS 733-293 veel beweging	doorgegeven aan NSS 43	closed
16.28	seedorf	10	Sarab village onder continue mortiervuur. Positie afvuurlokatie is Sarab Hill	10: gaan kijken, bij PID gaan we bestrijden	closed
16.31	TS	Seedorf	verzoek WK van de lijn		closed
16.38	10	Seedorf	80 pax richting TK met hebben en houden, meerdere bevestigingen dat sarab in handen van OMF is 051 [] controleren vuur in sarab	10R contact gehad	closed
16.44	35E	Seedorf	test fire		closed
16.56	seedorf	10	[] = nummer is nummer voor uw amv-er kan hij assistentie krijgen van arts role 2?	kvo	closed
17.01	26E	Seedorf	ron op 233-317		closed
17.32	11e	Seedorf	van de base in t net verplaatsen met 35->26		closed
17.33	poentjak	Seedorf	weer cntact gehad GZ dan bestrijden met 81mm		closed
17.34	11E	Seedorf	Taliban waarschuwen elkaar met post-duiven		closed
17.46	11E	Seedorf	I C		closed
17.51	seedorf	10	air assets nu naar		closed
17.54	11e	Seedorf	11 en 35 crossing gepasseerd		closed
18.06	seedorf	10	[]	Zelf-bomber staat klaar	closed
18.09	100M	ops	vuren vrij 100m?	ga nu kijken	closed
				positief	closed
18.21	seedorf	poentjak	vuren juli met 81 mm		closed
18.26	poentjak	Seedorf	oord van 81mm na vragen via vust net of 43	postief 81mm op	closed
18.27	100m	ops	einde vuren		closed

18.30	poentjak	Seedorf	27 vuurt met MM op grid 7217 2625		closed
18.37	11	Seedorf	horizontaal 22		closed
18.48	poentjak	Seedorf	WM68: 2x F16 doorpushen naar WM64, Freq Cyan12, Callsign joorgeven aan 10E		closed
18.55	poentjak	Seedorf	afbreken tekort Kl V en kapotte voertuigen, vanavond voertuigen en manschappen terug TK		closed
18.57	11E	Seedorf	horizontaal 27 gepasseerd RON in KVK 2228 ehd 35 ook in de omg		closed
19.00	seedorf	10	van Alo Callsign 2x F16 wordt 2; Callsigr		closed
19.02	26E	11E	defect voertuig, vraag van 26E kun je slepen.		closed
19.02	26E	Seedorf	26 wil commando voering doen, 11 + 35 verplaatsen richting 26		closed
19.20	11E	Seedorf	RON 42 STG 2143 2747		closed
19.24	35E	Seedorf	RON TB 2066 2803		closed
19.33	35E	Seedorf	verplaatst richting 26		closed
19.47	10	Seedorf	sitrep 24. bij 24 nu rustig, hebben met fixtwing locaties bestookt. Aantal bommen volgt.	hebben jullie stretchers ontvangen? 3x kvo	closed
19.58	india 49	nassau 40	niet gehoord		closed
20.10	IW	Seedorf	v 26 81 MM moeilijk wrnbaar, geen paxen meer gezien en geen vuur meer gehad		closed

LOGBOOK 42 BLJ

19 00.00juni07 t/m 19 23.59juni07



Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
00.10	N41	Seedorf	ik probeer contact op te nemen met I49 dit lukt niet, ik sta op QS 7205 1770 Oost v Kotwal x-ing en onze Patria staat vast kan niet zelfst bergen daarom graag steun v Bush Master om uit te lieren, ik kan de veiligheids bezetting v RTF overnemen		Closed
00.12	Poentjak	Seedorf	wij schieten op dit moment licht		Closed
00.19	Poentjak	Seedorf	SITREP doel en licht: vlg'n blijven staan op loc, 2 brommers v N naar Z, 1 brommer v Z naar N. Bij het 1e licht pers rg vlg en green zone, we leggen er nu 10 min licht op tbv W het is vermoedelijk een IED loc		Closed
00.22	Seedorf	N41	contact gehad met [redacted] zij hebben meer info nodig omtrend Patria		Closed
00.23	Poentjak	Seedorf	SQS 70592192 = loc vlg'n. nu ook veel paxen aan het verpl rg green zone geen wrn op wpn's		Closed
00.26	Seedorf	N41	willen weten hoe zwaar Patria is		Closed
00.28	Poentjak	Seedorf	zicht op paxen die verdwijnen de green zone in, vlg'n blijven staan geen PID, end of mission		Closed
00.30	Poentjak	Seedorf	vraag v 2W of er nog FW of Rot Wing langs komt om foto's v de loc te nemen	rond 02.00 FW tbv Sarab,wij vragen TFU of dit mog is	Closed
00.33	Seedorf	N41	[redacted] gaan voorber treffen en komen u kant op, vanaf Wanow wordt de aktie opgestart, ze willen een herk teken ET		Closed
00.34	26	Seedorf	geen bijz		Closed
00.35	Seedorf	viper ops	geinformeerd over 2e grid v Poentjak ivm mog IED of andere dreiging, OPS zou ehd'n informeren		Closed
01.11	11	Seedorf	geen bijz		Closed
01.19	N41	Seedorf	[redacted] zijn doorgereaden bij T-splitsing		Closed
01.21	Seedorf	N41	ze gaan nu keren		Closed
01.33	N41	Seedorf	link up met de [redacted]		Closed
01.48	26	Seedorf	geen bijz		Closed
02.21	11	Seedorf	geen bijz		Closed

02.22	35	Seedorf	geen bijz				
02.22	Poentjak	Seedorf	geen bijz		Lowland 20E c/s heli freq CAG		Closed
02.24	26	Seedorf	geen bijz				Closed
02.52	N41	Seedorf	de Patria krijgen we niet los, eigen OPS is op de hoogte en rijden er vrtg'n van ons of dr op de MSR		negatief		Closed
04.26	Seedorf	Poentjak	heli met log lading zal om 09.15 op u loc zijn				Closed
04.33	0	Seedorf	vb check		luid en duidelijk		Closed
04.40	Seedorf	26,11,35	bijzonderheden?		negatief		Closed
05.16	p+10	Seedorf	geen bijz				Closed
05.55	26E	Seedorf	gaat richting 10				Closed
06.08	00R	Seedorf	Uitgangssituatie 10:00: Albatros: Noord: 26 en 12. Midden: ANA. Zuid: 24 en 11. Zadel: 35. White compound; Noord-oost: 13 en 69. 05: zuid-oost met waarneming op Sarab.				Closed
06.34	35E	Seedorf	Testfire op lokatie:				Closed
06.48	11E	Seedorf	Verbinding?		luid en duidelijk		Closed
07.27	100mtr	ops	Aanvang schieten 100 meter baan.		Vuren vrij		Closed
07.28	TFU	Seedorf	Herbevo heli wordt + 1 uur		Doorgegeven aan Poentjak		Closed
07.40	WM 67	Seedorf	Verbinding?		slecht		Closed
08.03	Poentjak	Seedorf	Grote explosie KVK 6921				Closed
08.12	Poentjak	Seedorf	Coo explosie 41 S QS 6904-2128.				Closed
08.20	Poentjak	Seedorf	: Schaap heeft IED laten afgaan op de heuvelrand. (komt overeen met lokatie explosie)				Closed
08.32	Poentjak	Seedorf	: Waarneming op 3 x pantser vrtg en 4 x ANP vrtg omgeving Chora.				Closed
08.35	Poentjak	Seedorf	(VOIP) Graag ROZ tussen 0900 en 1000 ivm inschieten grondwapens.		Toegestaan		Closed
08.45	RTF	Seedorf	: Willen humphry's aangrijpen N-O TK				Closed
08.50	00R	Seedorf	Alle ehdn Chora, berichten voor subehdn via		doorgegeven aan 20		Closed
08.56	10	0	Sarab onder mortiervuur.				Closed
08.57	TFU	Seedorf	11.15 landt heli in TK		Seedorf KVO		Closed
08.58	10	0	Mutalib om het leven gekomen, wordt door 2 bronnen in Chora bevestigd.		Doorgegeven aan S4 en TK		Closed
09.03	Poentjak	Seedorf	plate settelen, gaan 81 mm schieten vanaf onze lokatie		Seedorf KVO		Closed
09.05	NSS41	Seedorf	Nog steeds vast op 721-177				Closed
09.14	00R	Seedorf	Verbinding?		slecht		Closed

09.17	00R	Seedorf	Verbinding?		iets beter	Closed
09.19	00R	Seedorf	op coo 2335-3699			Closed
09.31	20	Seedorf	Verbinding?		luid en duidelijk	Closed
09.35	13R	Seedorf	diverse OMF groepen willen zich overgeven.			Closed
09.36	R	20	Tijden FW boven u even onbekend. Rolexen tot tijdstip air assets?		00R KVO	Closed
09.38	TFU	Seedorf	1: OMF gaat kinderen inzetten (oog en oor of schild door tussen de kinderen te verplaatsen)			Closed
09.45	00R	Seedorf	Verbinding? Hebben mast opgezet		krakend en niet helder	Closed
09.47	10E	Seedorf	1: Grote TB leider is dood, opvolger is Mulah Wali		doorgegeven aan TFU	Closed
09.55	TFU	Seedorf	Dudes hangen erboven		doorgegeven aan C en 00	Closed
09.56	TFU	Seedorf	1: OMF heeft IED's geplaatst waar tanks hebben gereden (kan voor allebei de assen gelden)			Closed
09.56	00R	Seedorf	10:00 rollen			Closed
09.57	S4	Seedorf	11:00 gaat 2 O met , poort uit na			Closed
09.58	TFU	Seedorf	Toch nog geen topcover.			Closed
10.09	TFU	Seedorf	Op dit moment komen 2 F16's (CS Rammits) zich innemen bij WM € Dan komt een gat van 10 minuten en dan 2 F 15's met CS Dudes		doorgegeven aan 00, 00 wacht	Closed
10.20	G3		F16's overhead, hand over met s over ongeveer Pzh gereed, moeten straks bommen gaan gooien, voor afleiding in het zuiden		Doorgegeven aan 10, geeft door aan 00R	Closed
10.28	60Z	Seedorf	Verbinding?		luid en duidelijk	Closed
10.31	TFU	Seedorf	Wheels up vanaf KAF (log rip)		S4 geïnformeerd	Closed
10.35	C	00R	sitrep lokaties eigen troepen?		Noord: 10 verticaal 22. Midden: ANA verticaal 228. Zuid: 20 verticaal 22	Closed
10.38	TFU	Seedorf) : OMF trekt met zware wapens vanuit Baluchi naar het noorden (Chora)		doorgegeven aan 00R	Closed
10.41	PZH		2 schoten gelost			Closed
10.42	20	Seedorf	: Omgeving centrum Chora hinderlaag			Closed
10.43	PZH		2 schoten gelost			Closed
10.48	00R	Seedorf	Voertuigen in het vizier, willen actie ondernemen			Closed
10.49	PZH		2 schoten gelost			Closed
10.52	20	Seedorf	1: TB omgeving KK, hebben te weinig personeel, willen terugvallen naar rivierbedding om ANA aan te grijpen			Closed

10.55	Poentjak	Seedorf	willen massale uitgestegen aanval op coalition forces gaan doen.	doorgegeven aan 00R	Closed
10.56	PZH		2 schoten gelost		Closed
10.56	NSS41	Seedorf	Lokatie waar OMF wil aanvallen?	Zuid van Chora Crossing	Closed
11.03	00R	Seedorf	TB ziet eenheid waar ze eerder mee gevochten hebben in Derf Shan (fon) en willen ze nu hier aangrijpen	doorgegeven aan TFU	Closed
11.05	00R	Seedorf	TB wil ook Derf Shan aanvallen		Closed
11.05	pzh		2 schoten gelost		Closed
11.05	2 O	ops	van de base, in het net		Closed
11.10	00R	Seedorf	TB opdracht gekregen om te vuren tot ze leeg zijn en dan omkleden in burger/burka	doorgegeven aan TFU	Closed
11.20	2 O	Seedorf	Irish gepasseerd		Closed
11.26	100mtr	ops	einde vuren	doorgegeven aan	Closed
11.33	TFU	Seedorf	Vanuit Mierabad verplaatsen een paar TB leiders met ongeveer 100 man via Baluchi naar Chora (ICOM)		Closed
11.35	00R	Seedorf	TB meldt dat ze onder vuur liggen		Closed
11.36	00R	C	Noord: 26 heeft verticaal 22 bereikt, maar ligt een rotsblok op de weg. EOD gaat die laten springen. Midden: ANA aangekomenverticaal 22.1. Zuid: 24 eagle. 11 en 35 aangesloten schouder ANA. Noord kan even duren. ANA verplaatst verder naar west en wordt vanuit zuid gesteund door 20.		Closed
11.37	20	Seedorf	TB ziet vtgn verplaatsen, wachten tot ze voorbij zijn en gaan dan actie doen		Closed
11.38	S4	Seedorf	Wheels up	Doorgegeven aan Poentjak	Closed

12.22 00R Seedorf : TB heeft 5 mortieren, maar geen personeel om te bedienen. Moeten mortieren camoufleren met bladeren ivm zicht vanuit de lucht.

Closed

12.35	00R	Seedorf	Situatie oost: ehd 05 houdt Z-O in de gaten dmv screening; omgeving rustig. Tussen Sarab en WC treedt [redacted] op. Zou zich concentreren op behouden van heuvels bij Sarab, echter gaat nu zuiveren tot WC, echter niet verder dan verticaal 265.		Closed
12.40	Viper	Seedorf			Closed
12.41	00R	20	voor 35: Vanuit Z naderen 5 vtgn met hoge snelheid.	20 gaat vtgn aanhouden	Closed
12.50	00R	Seedorf	Gaan rots laten springen. Zodra rots gesprongen is (thv verticaal 22) gaat 26 voorwaarts richting Eagle		Closed
13.05	ALO	Seedorf	J-TACérs moeten [redacted] loslaten, kunnen F16's behouden.	Doorgegeven aan 00R	Closed
13.10	TFU	Seedorf	7 voertuigen komen gewonden ophalen	doorgegeven aan 00R	Closed
13.13	Viper	Seedorf			Closed
13.15	00R	Seedorf	26 gaat voorwaarts over 22, U gaat voorwaarts over 214		Closed
13.22	00R	Seedorf	ANA dat GZ onderzoekt krijgt van locals te horen dat zo'n 100 pax OMF is gevluht richting West. ANA onderzoekt quala's en vindt verlaten opstellingen		Closed
13.26	Seedorf	00R	Voor WM67: In Chora airspace TS tussen 8.5 en 9.5	00R geeft het door	Closed
13.26	S4	Seedorf	Medivac vindt plaats voor 1700 tenzij toestand betrokkene ernstig verslechterd.	Doorgegeven aan Poentjak	Closed
13.36	Seedorf	00R	WM 67 moet nog clear geven voor TS	00R geef het door aan 20	Pending
13.36	20	Seedorf	Van WM67: TS heeft de airspace		Closed
13.39	TS	Seedorf	Pimple Feature volledig verlaten		Closed
13.46	00R	Seedorf	[redacted] mortieren staan niet in, maar net achter de quala's	doorgegeven aan 00R	Closed
13.49	comcen	chora	HF aanzetten		Closed
13.58	00R	Seedorf	vraag aan TS: weg uit chora??		Closed
14.02	nassau 00R	Seedorf	verbinding?	noord van hor 39. oost van vert. 27	Closed
14.11	00R	Seedorf	rrmit naar 12.000 F aria geocleard voor TS	hoort ons niet	Closed
14.15	00R	Seedorf	aan TS van verticaal 27, horizontaal 36 tot 44 in de gaten houden		Closed
14.16	TS	Seedorf	KVT 26-40 helemaal leeg		Closed
14.18	00R	Seedorf	collega [redacted] heeft touraya niet aan staan. Vraag [redacted] of hij wat VTG heeft rijden van Barixy-driehoek ---> chora		Closed

14.40	00R	Seedorf	burdy burdy. Lijn compleet vast. Voorlopig hier blijven. Vraag aan Charlie, opvolg Forces wanneer komen die? Anders moeten we een nacht sytuatie voorbereiden	charlie nog niet bekend	Closed
14.42	00R	Seedorf	00R aan TS wanneer lijn 27 helemaal tot horizontaal 44 is bekeken gaat ie naar chora en zuid entrance bekijken.	TS kvo	Closed
14.41	ops	helpdesh	laptop runner op nieuw geladen		Closed
14.50	TS	Seedorf	balluci helemaal leeg. Geen bijz.		Closed
14.52	2oscar	ops	op base uit net		Closed
14.55	charlie	chora	geef door aan 00R: overleg over vervolg actie van nu.		Closed
14.55			Electro-monteur heeft motel mee genomen om te maken.		Pending
15.03	00R	Seedorf	ben 100m verplaatst, heb nu goed bereik.		Closed
15.10	00R	charlie	onderling KVO over vervolg actie. 00R gaat naar WC met sectie van 24, om gefaxte plan te lezen.		Closed
15.58			electro-monteur : mode knop is dood. Gaan proberen intern te solderen. Lukt dit niet, moet ie opgestuurd orde naar NL.		Closed
16.01	10E	Seedorf			Closed
16.30	00R	20	ana slag naar niazy en KK. 26 en 10 opbox niazy innemen. 05 oost/zuid-oost, 35 in t zadel. Als t rustig is 20/24/11/35 de dasht in voor RON. De 20e rond 08.00 12/13/69 via chora. Dan 12/13/35/69 naar TK en 11 WC		Closed
16.56	Seedorf	10	intrep 159 naar u, gaat over zelf-bombers. Informeer uw makkers		Closed
17.32	G2	Seedorf	man met vest waarschijnlijk naar de meisjes school andere mog ANP, de VBIED zijn doel is misschien Gouverment Compound of ANP Headquarters of NDS Headquarters		Closed
17.47	Poentjak	Seedorf	v T melding over een IED in Nakel dessert 1e peiling 121 graden 2e peiling 127 graden		Closed
18.05	0	Seedorf	vb check	luid en duidelijk	Closed
18.28	2W	Seedorf	46 B. sync laten uitvoeren		Closed

LOGBOOK 42 BLJ

20 00.00juni07 t/m 20 23.59juni07



Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
00.08	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		
01.16	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		Closed.
02.15	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		Closed.
03.05	24	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		Closed.
03.11	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		Closed.
03.55	10E	Seedorf	ANA op post KK ziet bewegingen in de GZ. Graag ROZ aanvragen.	TFU vraagt ROZ aan.	Closed.
04.04	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.		Closed.
04.07	TFU	Seedorf	ROZ is hot (SEAT)		Closed.
04.15	10E	Seedorf	Op post KK op afstand 200/600 meter mogelijk OMF. KK stuurt ANA patrouille eruit. WC heeft 2 x 81 mm ILL. geschoten.		Closed.
04.27	10E	Seedorf	ANA geen bijzonderheden te melden, ROZ kan cold.		Closed.
05.00	Poentjak	Seedorf	Geen bijzonderheden.	TFU maakt ROZ cold.	Closed.
05.27	10E	Seedorf	alles rustig		Closed.
07.18	TFU		ROZ is hot silica		
07.25	00R	Seedorf	horizontaal. 30 gepasseerd		Closed.
07.35	12E	Seedorf	1e deel van rip. Zijn nu bij horizontaal 27 (statisch ivm searchen)		Closed.

07.38	13E	Seedorf	in de dasht geen bijz.		Closed.
07.39	12e	Seedorf	elementen 1.3 en 00 bij mij.		Closed.
07.40	00R	Seedorf	alleen 00 bij 13		Closed.
07.42	10	alle stations	eigen vuur bij kalla kalla		Closed.
07.49	12E	Seedorf	vraag: zijn er vanmrgen nog troepen verplaatst van ons door wanow, semitery-hill id-alley? Wij nemen QRF over. Kan dit na de seremonie?	negatief voor troepen verplaatsing. En voor vraag 2: positief	Closed.
07.57	seedorf	10	kunt u de HF aanzetten		Closed.
07.57	WM68	Seedorf	verb? Locatie 12 en 13 horizontaal 26	Luid en duidelijk	Closed.
08.05	WM68	Seedorf	13 horizontaal 24		Closed.
08.07	Poentjak	Seedorf	ui de richting van chora: pas op er rijd een eenheid rond, en jullie mogen niet onderkent worden.		Closed.
08.09	12	Seedorf	12 horizontaal 22		Closed.
08.12	WM68	Seedorf	13 horizontaal 22		Closed.
08.15	Y2	Seedorf	met 12 naar base		Closed.
08.21	Poentjak	Seedorf	over 't bericht van gister ied in NAKEL. Nu weer icom: EU- eenheden rijden er nu.	12 en 13 KVO	Closed.
08.22	00R	Seedorf	locatie DASHT NAKEL?	zuid van u	Closed.
08.22	WM68	Seedorf	13 horizontaal 20		Closed.
08.28	TFU		pax heeft opdracht gekregen batteri pack aan te sluiten		Closed.
08.33	12e	Seedorf	onze loc. QS 7370-1667 gaan searchen -->ID alley	kvo icom bericht TFU	Closed.
08.37	00D	10	verhaal van belading helt doorgegeven en info over spullen va	Wij melden weels-up	Closed.
08.43	WM68	Seedorf	12 en 13 op QS 736-164		Closed.
08.57	10	Seedorf	13 in overwatch en 12 searchen wheels-up?		Closed.
09.10	TFU		AH hebben geen contact met chora	neg. Zijn nog aan t beladen	Closed.
09.12	seedorf	10	voor 05. HF aanzetten	10 kvo, maken contact	Closed.
09.18	India	Seedorf	heavy wapen range	vuren vrij	Closed.

09.53	12e	Seedorf	wanow geseacht nu naar irish		closed.
09.55	Poentjak	Seedorf	nog steeds mensen op WC. Gaan plan maken om aan te vallen		closed.
09.59	TF66	ops	vuren vrij heavy?	vuren vrij	Closed.
10.05	12e	Seedorf	irish gepasseerd en 2 verzoeken: aftanken en QRF overdracht na de ceremonie?	allebij positief	Closed.
10.24	00R	Seedorf	op base uit net. Tevens 12e ook		Closed.
10.39	TFU		hebben fixtwing die vrij hangen. En willen test missie doen, heeft u een WM voor ze?	gaan we uitzoeken	Closed.
10.39	seedorf	10	10 niet gehoord		Closed.

10.54	comcen	chora	HF aanzetten		pending
11.08	TFU		Rammit 63 over 3min overhead		Closed.
11.10	TFU		WM en rammit hebben SYNC	chora KVO	Closed.
11.14	chora	Seedorf	2.0 op WC voor herbevo		Closed.
11.49	10	Seedorf	doelen worden bestreden bij Niazi en Kala Kala		Closed.
12.04	10	Seedorf	doelen worden nog bestreden bij Niazi en Kala Kala met 81MM het lijkt erop dat het rustig gaat worden		Closed.
12.40	seedorf	10	we moeten weten waar de rammits mee bezig zijn	rammits zijn weg nu de overhead	Closed.
12.51	seedorf	WM67	bericht v Joint Fires AH's gaan weg voor de volgende x freq GREEN		Closed.

12.58	10	Seedorf						
13.19	Poentjak	Seedorf		Geen bijzonderheden.				Closed.
13.51	seedorf	10		F.W is beschikbaar kunt u ze gebruiken		pos tbv WMM67		Closed.
14.15	seedorf	10		zijn er al ehd'n terug rg TK		neg		Closed.
14.16	seedorf	10		RECOIL 43 tili 16.00 for W67				Closed.
14.20	seedorf	10		wheels up				Closed.
14.56	seedorf	10		SITREP ehd'n				pending
14.58	10	Seedorf		v WM 67: 10 pax + brommers verpl Z naar O met haast in TB		11 WC, 35 Z v x-ing, 20 KK, 05 rg		Closed.
15.11	10	Seedorf		gecontroleerd geb op 4TSTB 3117 4184, AH heeft ze onder wrn		O, 26 Niazi		Closed.
15.14	seedorf	10		paxen vluchten met spoed rg O				Closed.
15.43	10	Seedorf		u moet PID hebben om de AH's te laten vuren,tevens zegt 00R: de				Closed.
15.47	10	Seedorf		plek waar de paxen gezien zijn is door Militia beheersd geb		we gaan er voorzichtig mee om		Closed.
15.55	10	Seedorf		wheels up				Closed.
15.56	100 mtr	Seedorf		1 pax = I heeft de heli niet gehaald				Closed.
16.12	G2	10		bericht v 00W voor opmaak PM rapport 68 is in TK en 66 is niet op				Closed.
16.25	seedorf	10		de WC tevens de paxen van vorige bericht niet meer te zien				Closed.
16.31	seedorf	10		vuren vrij 100mtr		positief		Closed.
16.35	Poentjak	Seedorf		TB ziet ehd 24 staan en er zijn nog strijders in het oord QYR in Kvk				Closed.
17.06	seedorf	10		PMR zo ver mgl opmaken en naar de VSO sturen				Closed.
17.43	100mtr	Seedorf		heeft de FW vandaag nog bommen gegooid/ gestraifed?		FW in de middag 4xGBU		Closed.
18.00	seedorf	10		PMR is verstuurd				Closed.
18.29	10	Seedorf		loc 05 ?				Closed.
21.05	comcen	Seedorf		klaar met vuren				Closed.
18.00	seedorf	10		lokatie 24?				Closed.
18.29	10	Seedorf		20 en 24 laten opstelling los en verplaatsen richting dheest. Nieuw				pending
21.05	comcen	Seedorf		coo volgt				pending
21.05	comcen	Seedorf		Chora moet HF aanzetten		doorgegeven aan Chora		Closed.

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

Fm DTG 160000 Jun 07 till 162400 Jun 07

Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
0210	ALO	Ops	60 - 70 pax gathering on the road moving W	ecce / PRT try to make contact	Closed
0230	Bdoc	Ops	Explosion heard NNE of tower 1 / RTF tower 4 heard same sound and direction		Closed
0245	Bdoc	Ops	2x explosion + SAF heard by tower 1, tower 4 and unit RTF 41(0,5 - 1 km E) poss CP WANOV	PRT informed to make contact w CP Wanov	Closed
0255	ALO	Ops	40 pax moving at grid 42S TB 3155 4096 (ivo Sarab Village)	ecce	Closed
0300	PRT	Ops	Gen Qasum send out " ANP QRF" and reported	" fight is over"	Closed
0340	ALO	Ops	60 pax at grid 42S TB 3086 4042 (ivo Sarab S) in small group moving W	A10 SOF w flares	Closed
0435	BG	Ops	are retask, we have no airassets, we req for AH spt	G3 informed / AHops informed / RCS informed	Closed
0450	Ops	RCS	TFU requests AH spt regarding reporting posted in AEGIS INTEL window to get SA and possibly eng 60/70 pax tactically moving towards CF loc.	[04:51] <RC_S_DO2> rgr. w/o	Closed
0452	RCS	Ops		[04:52] <NLD_TFU_OPS>	Closed

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					Neg, already tasked for CJSOTF tic.	
0503	RCS SDO	Ops	TFU, RC(S) SDO approves release of 2 x AH in order to develop Situational awareness. The last known posn of suspected EF as reported by was 42S TB 3086-4042. ROE re with hold at the moment. Self defence applied			Closed
0505	Ops	RCS	ROE are already been delegated to TFU for these cases. These elms are sure OMF we don't want to spread them with a AH recee. Seen the situation (iminent threat to ANSF/CF) they must engage.			Closed
0509	RCS SDO	Ops	You have authority to launch, I must seek authority for the attack [05:10] <RC_S_SDO> rgr,		[05:10] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Start seeking we need that approval, but we already have the ROE for this operation (LEONIDAS)	Closed
0515	RCS SDO	Ops	I need 2 things: PID and intent. Develop SA and come back to me in 15 minutes, by that time I will		[05:16] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr	Closed

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			have COS and legad hre.			
0525	Ops	RCS	PID has been established by windmill 68 through groups insurgents with weapons			Closed
0527	Ops	RCS	At the moment all CHPs around CHORA are under attack			Closed
0543	Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: CPs SARAB (2x) are surrounded by INS			Closed
0555	Ops	RCS	IMM RHR ROZ/ 42S TB 232.399 /5nm/ 10.000ft AMSL/ c/s WL 68 / CAG 57.850/ 81mm		IMM ROZ NAME: SALSA HOT / 2128: ATTN IMM ROZ SALSA 10nm and radius and FL200	Pending
0603	Ops	RCS	TIC SALTA C/s LL10 S: 60 - 70 OMF A: attack of several ANP CP ivo CHORA L: CP SARAB 42S TB 307 415, 310 413/ CP NYAZI 42S TB 208 392/ CP KALAKALA 42S TB 197 375 T: 16 0525LT JUN 07 A: ANSF defending / LL13(inf plt) move W to		ISAF Event NR 06-410	Closed

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0608	Ops	RCS	Nyazi for create overwatch, AH on loc CHORA			
0637	Ops	RCS	RHR VANITY NORTH/ 23nm / 23.000ft AMSL / GTL023 /C/S:Tktower/U 247.100/ PzH 155mm HE update 06-410: reports that according to ANP cdr .. all CP at CHORA are surrounded, T B have placed a HMG at S-side of the village and they are firing, PID of mor loc at 42S TB 395 378, CF will engage w AH and mortar fire	0620 HOT /		Closed
0642	Ops	RCS	update 06-410: correction also of 06:37 TFU G23, of POO mortar loc grid 42S TB 1953 3880.		AH's positive engages on mortar loc.	Closed
0645	PRT	Ops	fight in his area			Closed
0653	Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: AH QRF reported SA at loc SARAB 42S TB 308 415, no OMF fights seen.			Closed
0706	RCS- ALO	Ops	Two eading to WL68. Callsign is Hawg23. Please ensure WL68 is on Wine07 now.			Closed
0725	Ops	RCS	update 06-410: AH engaged OMF mortar loc, loc destroyed, report of 13x OMF KIA, 155mm engage OMF at grid 42S TB 195 389.			Closed
0740	Ops	RCS	Update event nr 06-410: TFU req to prolong AHs since this event seems to develop in time.			Closed

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0741	Ops	RCS	Att AHs will RTB for refuel. Req to have other 2 AHs inbound to achieve enduring top cover.	Closed
0903	Ops	RCS	Update event nr 06-410: LL13 in over watch by CP NYAZI, LL12 in over watch north from White Compound, platoon ANA by White Compound, LL24 awaiting in the dash south from CHORA for supporting CHORA area, QRF disposition north of WANOW bridge, possible OMF surrounding the two CP at SARAB(not confirmed)	Closed
0946	Ops	RCS	update event 06-410: NYAZI CP engaged by OMF 82mm, return fire with 155mm	Closed
1004	PRT	Ops	Difference message from [redacted], Com of CP SARAB, OMF, firing from the quala's surround the CP's, the cemetery and the hill east (42S TB 29 40), the request for air support.	Closed
1023	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: APC(PATRIA) hit by 82mm mortar grd grid 42S TB2133 3892, no wounded personnel, lightly damaged vehicle, engaged with 155mm.	Closed
1039	Ops	RCS	Shooting Report C/s LL11E	Closed

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		<p>S: several pax LN's A: ignored stop sign, WANOW BRIDGE L: loc LL11 grid 41S QS 72210 15210 T: 160952LT jun 07 A: c/S LL11E, QRF platoon moving north, warning shot fired with SA, the LN's stopped ,no damage, no injuries, nfr</p>		
1129	Ops	<p>RCS N/E from PB POENTJAK, receive Intel from grid 41S QS 74 26, definitive Intel states: TB re-enforcements take up arms and prepare for attack. CHORA DC area quiet ATT, CP SARAB grid 42S TB 308 408 still receiving harassment fire.</p>		Closed
1355	Ops	<p>RCS Event 06-410 update: TIC will not be closed due to ongoing reports from ANP side that they are still being surrounded by OMF on their CPs KALA KALA, NYAZI and SARAB. Although BG assets in CHORA state it is rather quiet. 1x Patria APC been damaged by 82mm grenade is only lightly damaged and now</p>		Closed

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			servicable again. It is assessed as likely that OMF will maintain pressure and try to re-take positions for engagement on CF and ANP. TFU will deploy...			
1356	JHFA-FWD	OPS	EMP31 w/u ROB ISO MM(S) 06-16F now on route to BSN			Closed
1357	Ops	RCS	to BALUCHI Valley Pass for extra pressure on OMF in DORAFSHAN area (South BALUCHI). Current BDA: 43x OMF KIA, 2x OMF WIA (Based on definitive Intell reporting).			Closed
1402	Ops	RCS	Reporting are being received that TK airspace is closed ?? This is not done by TFU, pls advise. ROZ VANITY NORTH is HOT but only in GTL 023 degrees. including safety margins.			Closed
1434	Ops	RCS	Update event nr 06-410: 82mm fired fro 42S TB195 389 towards CP NYAZI, FW in support with WL68.			Closed
1525	OPS	RCS-SDO	KIA OMF due to: PzH 155mm, 2x Hellfire, Maingun firings from FW / F-16. ANP can			Closed

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		<p>hold KALA KALA, NYAZI. It now looks like SARAB CP has fallen, no definitive info on this CP. Situation is likely to remain flammable, OMF is not out of the area. At this moment rather quiet. LL 13 has received 82mm Mor rnd near NYAZI, directed F-16 on this target and FW fired main-gun. 82mm firing ceased. NFTR</p>		
1553	Ops	<p>[redacted] are moving towards BALUCHI Valley / Pass, through DORAFSHAN area. This operation is in spt of the current CHORA threat. OP LEONIDAS is covering situation involving the CHORA DC area. Therefore ROE will be delegated to [redacted] for this mission to BALUCHI (approx 24-36hrs)</p>	RCS	Closed
1555	OPS	<p>Update 06-410: F-16s dropped 1x 500lbs on location OMF (42S TB 2000 3975) firing at CP NYAZI (ANP). A second 500lbs will be dropped shortly. OMF PID and CDE level taken into</p>	RCS	Closed

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			account.		
1637	Ops	RCS	<p>RIGHT MESSAGE: Update 06-410: 2x 500lbs dropped by FW RAMMITs. Both direct hit, OMF in surrounding seen to have fled away by []</p> <p>No engagement on these persons.</p> <p>Firing OMF ceased after engagement.</p>		Closed
1649	Ops	RCS	<p>Update event 06-410: OMF fired with 82mm mortar from grid 42S TB 212 382 on LL12, then OMF have fired with 82mm mortar on LL24</p>		Closed
1722	Ops	RCS	<p>Update 06-410: 1x 107mm fired towards CHORA from 41S QS 757 380, TFU fired PZH at POO. 2x 82mm fired at pos LL24 and LL12. Looking for POO, will engage with direct fire or 81mm.</p> <p>Current situation warms up in DORAFSHAN near LL26 (41S QS 7388 2758) and N40 (41S QS 625 081), women and children are leaving area.</p>		Closed
1732	Ops	RCS	<p>Update 06-410: S. OMF unk /A. 82mm firing /L. 42S TB 205 377 /T. 161730LT /A.</p> <p>Req AHs for spt to TIC in CHORA.</p> <p>Especially LL 12 (42S TB 2170 3899) receive</p>		Closed

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			much 82mm.			
1739	RCS- SDO	Ops	RC(S) SDO approves release of 2 x AH ISO TFU C/Ss LL24 and LL12 TIC 06-410 CHORA district. ATF, TFU Ackn			Closed
1744	Ops	RCS	Update DORAFSHAN LL26 / N40: Def Intell: OMF going up hill to higher ground to attack LL26 from above. Def Intell reports are getting more intense and threatening			Closed
PHASE II						
	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: situation at CHORA deteriorated so much that we need all possible assets to hold the city. Coy cdr stresses that the city will fall if not supported. All cps are low on ammo as well			Closed
	Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: BG TFU created a box between horizontals 41S QS/ 42S TB 37 & 40 and vertical 42S TB 21 & 22. All ANSF West of vertical 22 will be withdrawn. Allready CP KALA KALA 42S TB 197 375 has been abandoned,			Closed

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		<p>CP NYAZI 42S TB 208 392 is occupied but will be deserted. [redacted] assist ANSF to leave the posts.</p> <p>All available air-assets will be used to engage targets within the mentioned box. Com A-coy Inf at CHORA urges once again on swift and decisive action to keep CHORA DC. LL 11 and LL 26 are moving up to 42S TB 240 360 to keep the southern route..... open for possible assistance for CHORA or as a route out off CHORA LL 13 is North of CHORA DC, LL 12 is West of CHORA DC blocking, ANA remains in village centre, LL 24 remains South of CHORA to block off OMF approaching from South-west into CHORA.</p> <p>C2 node currently known for the OMF action against CHORA DC is known to be in 41S QS 48342 48447 (46km</p>	
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>		<p>Closed</p>

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			NWW from CHORA). It is just on the outskirts of OOB HAMLET. We will target this C2 node with FW asap.			
Ops	RCS		Both CP NYAZI and CP KALA KALA are now empty and East of Engagement Area FW/RW. East of vertical 42S TB 22.			Closed
RCS SDO	Ops		Can you confirm that CP SARAB has also been abandoned? We get conflicting information on that.		[21:35] NLD_TFU_OPS CP SARAB has been abandoned/overrun as off this afternoon. Based on info from PRT TFU and imagery of burning qala CP	
RCS	Ops		For tasking of "GHOST": Some questions: Do the C/Ss in Chora still eyes on the EF? If so could you give us the grids. If not can you give us the grids whers contact heas been lost? (more q's to follow).		[22:06] Last EF in Engagement box horizontal 37 till 40 and vertical 42S TB 21 till 22, centre of this box 42S TB 215 385. A stated C2 OMF from 42S	


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			<p>TB 237 366. If EF can not be PID, we always have the C2 node of [redacted] at [redacted] 41S QS 48342 48447 (46km NWW from CHORA).</p>
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>Update 06-410: At this time Cdr A-coy Inf at CHORA is talking FW and RW assets on possible targets OMF. Larger part of OMF is well assessed to move within CHORA within Green Zone, getting into better fighting positions. Although, no cntct actually has occurred in the last hour. Only one known C2 location is spotted at Southern entrance to CHORA at 42S TB 237 366. ALI TFU elms in CHORA are in defensive positions incl ANA in Centre of CHORA.</p>	

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	RCS	Ops	<p>Recommend jtac get eyes on the c2 node with air and determine options</p>	<p>Negative, two C2 nodes reported. One NWW of CHORA (42km) near FOB COBRA, the one near the TIC is at 42S TB 237 366, South approach/entrance of CHORA valley.</p>
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Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 17-06-07)

LOGBOOK 1 (NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

Fm DTG 170000 Jun 07 till 172400 Jun 07

Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: In the opsbox multiple targets have been engaged w/ FW and PzH. More engagement to follow [REDACTED] the BALUCHI PASS (41S QS 749 298). At TK currently TFU, together w/ TF66 and ANSF/militia are preparing to reinforce CHORA. 40 pax militia will move to SAR REGIN (41S QS 77 16) to counter OMF threat.		Closed
[REDACTED]	RCS	Ops	: if you do not tel JTAC that KIFC is to control you will loose this asset ACK	0040: We need the to engage targets	Closed
[REDACTED]	RCS	Ops	: what authority do you have to engage the targets? the ' has picked up NO enemy activity at the compound	00:48 TFU-OPS ack 0043 or loose this asset! 00:54 Ref 0048: TFU DCHOPS spoke w/ RC(S) CHOPS. We'll inform our JTAC to	Closed

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				ignore the [redacted] and we'll pass target grids of the PZH. Pse contact your CHOPS for this.	
RCS	Ops		[redacted]		Closed
Ops	RCS		Situation in CHORA is still tense, additional ground forces are required. Available on short notice at the moment if [redacted] Please request this asset at ISAF.		Closed
RCS SDO	G3		Hi [redacted] We have given the [redacted] a go, but with very little success. [redacted] In the mean time we have attempted to locate the enemy at each of the locations where you have had troops in contact, but have not been able to identify anything.	01:48 NLD_TFU_OPS We have had multiple sources. Own troops with eyes c and calls from local authorities.	Closed
				01:49 RC_S_SDO OK. Of course we don't	

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<p>█</p>	<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>Situation has not died completely but is decreasing. We are now targeting last number of known targets and will they see how the situation is. Have you seen my request in the main window on They are ready to be launched but they need a GO in the national line. This should be requested through ISAF. Could you please do this ASAP because otherwise they are not able to support us. They are the only groundforces left.</p>	<p>doubt that, but for whatever reason it has been impossible for us to verify – had the situation died down?</p>	<p>Closed</p>
<p>█</p>	<p>RCS SDO</p>	<p>Ops</p>	<p>Ret have you discussed there use with the TF? Also what are you planning to use the TF for? If the CO is content for to be deployed and</p>	<p></p>	<p>Closed</p>

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		believes the task to be appropriate, he needs to speak to the [REDACTED] Also could you give us a view on the Cave complex that was engaged this evening and please verify that you are clear that normal rules apply for the application of Fires: you must have PID before you engage a target wi		
RCS DO	Ops	Just to confirm CO in previous message is CO [REDACTED] not TFU.		Closed
PHASE III				
Ops	RCS	Unfortunately bad lines. I tried to tell you that we have a CH coming to TK at 0730 for 81mm mor resupply for CHORA. We would like to move 50 PAX ANA as well to CHORA. We would like your approval for this transfer. Might it me possible to get more CHs, or just multiple waves?	04.25: Checking with Avn at the moment 04:26 RC_S_SDO I would prefer 1 wave only but w/o	Closed

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Ops	RCS	Sir, 50 PAX ANA and all the ammo won't fit	04:32 RC_S_SDO rgr, i know, other choppers	Closed
Ops	RCS	_____ We really need an answer.	04:41 RC_S_SDO: I am still waiting for ISAF HQ! _____ to approve	Closed
RSC SDO	Ops	It will be done, Avn is looking at earliest possible time. He is working his magic at the moment	04.42 got permission to deploy _____	Closed
RCS SDO	Ops	What is the earliest your trp can be ready for pick- up, where and who is in charge of HLS	05:15 NLD_TFU_OPS 0730LT the will be ready and your Q about HLS will be LL10.	Closed
RCS SDO	Ops	do you have a frequency and where is pick up point for ANA. We are looking at 2 trips	05:21 NLD_TFU_OPS rgr, PUP will be the FARP	Closed

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Ops	RCS	<p>Update 06-410: CHORA DC area remains restless, Def Intell tells OMF want to attack SANGAR CP 42S TB 2401 3841 with heavy wpns (unk). BALUCHI PASS is stable now. WANOW area is stable. Current disposition units: [REDACTED] ANA(50) at CHORA, [REDACTED] n Desht S off CHORA, [REDACTED] at BALUCHI PASS, [REDACTED]</p>	at TK, freq CAG: 57.850.	Closed
Ops	RCS	<p>[REDACTED] reports they are moving to assessed OMF compound loc at 41S QS 7212 2620 (entrance BALUCHI PASS). Def Intell states: They (CF) are coming to our CP (OMF).</p>		Closed
Ops	RCS	<p>Imminent Threat C/s N40 S: unk A: Def Intell states: They come to our CP, if they come any closer we will go and fight. L: 41S QS 7212 2620 EF T: 17.0800LT JUN 07</p>		Closed

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	Ops	RCS	<p>A: AT 41S QS 704 264 dismounted patrol of C/s moving towards suspicious COI at 41S QS 7212 2620.</p> <p>Mounted part in overwatch to spt dismounted part</p> <p>TIC SALT A C/s N40</p> <p>S: unk</p> <p>A: OMF firing SAF / RPG at loc N40/N43</p> <p>L: 41S QS 7212 2620 EF</p> <p>T: 17.0800LT JUN 07</p> <p>A: AT 41S QS 704 264 dismounted patrol of C/s moved towards suspicious COI at 41S QS 7212 2620. Mounted part in overwatch to spt dismounted part. / C/s N43 fires back with direct fire SAF/.50Cal</p>	ISAF event # 06-433	Closed
	Ops	RCS	<p>Update SALTA 0841: SAF/RPG fire from OMF 41S QS 718 264. N43 moves in on OMF loc using GPMG/SAF/.50Cal from 41S QS 710 267.</p>		Closed
	Ops	RCS	<p>blocks and spt from Eastbank Dorafshan 41S QS 740 276. N40 spt N43 from 41S QS 728 259.</p>		Closed

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Ops	RCS	Update TIC 0841: C/s N40/43 move East with dismounted elms (16 pax) from qala to qala (41S QS 719 263). Blocking from West with veh (2x North, 9x South, 2x West)		Closed
Ops	RCS	Update TIC 0841: N40/43 do not need RW att. Situation seems in hand. Still OMF present in area. C/s moving up further North to BALUCHI PASS.		Closed
Ops	RCS	ISAF event 06-443: N40 TIC closed		Closed
Ops	RCS	Re-open event 06-443 S: Unk A: SAF/RPG/107mm/Def Intell states use of 82mm Mors L: 41S QS 7391 2758 T: 17 0955LT JUN 07 A: No cas from projectiles, C/s N43 moves forward dismounted, still spt by vehicles from higher ground. Using SAF and GPMG/AGL	Re-open TIC 06-443	Closed
Ops	RCS	POO 107mm 41S QS 733 263, POO 82mm Mors		Closed

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			7362 2649 => firing with 25mm on positions.		
ATF S3 AH	Ops		req locstat N40 / II26		Closed
Ops	ATF S3 AH		locstat: N40 41S QS 719 263, dismounted elm near greenzone 41S QS 739 275.		Closed
Ops	RCS		update 06-443: req RW QRF to redcon 2 iso N40 / LL26, att FW at loc TIC.		Closed
RCS SDO	Ops		RC(S) SDO approves of ATF QRF to ISO TFU EVENT 443. TFU, ATF ack		Closed
Ops	RCS		Update 06-443: PID 5 OMF, receiving SAF/RPG/107mm/82mm mors. from 41S QS 738 273. 41S QS 738 273 POO 107mm. N43 pin- pointing OMF, firing back with own means. PZH 155mm in direct-spt of this TIC. being pushed from CHORA DC area to this event. AHs => req launch AHs iso TIC, so will go back to CHORA DC area		Closed
RCS SDO	Ops		RC(S) SDO approves release of 2 x AH from ATF iso TIC at 41S Qs 738273. ATF, TF U ack		Closed

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Ops	RCS	TIC SALTA C/s LL05 S: unkn A: SAF/RPG L: En 42S TB 286 387 T: 17 1139LT JUN 07 A: LL05 receipt, 42S TB 2803 3851 / move back to W / FW at loc.	ISAF EVENT NR 06-448	closed
Ops	RCS	update 06-443: N40 171220L receive 2x 107mm, POI 300m S of own loc		Closed
Ops	RCS	update 06-433: N40 42S QS 709 253, dism elm near greenzone / receive mortarfire and SAF / try to locat POO /create overwatch on high ground w suportive fire.		Closed
RCS	Ops	Can the 06=410 tic be closed, or is it still ongoing.	[13:32] <NLD_TFU_OPS> The LNO TFU has current pos and situation own troops, pls cntct him.	Closed
RCS	Ops	rgr, but you consider this tic to be still open?		Closed
SDO		ackn		
Ops	RCS	YEs G3 TFU still wants this TIC to be open, so		Closed

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	SDO	ROZ VANITY remains open, air-assets can be called upon shortly. Although OMF is assessed to be moving to better attack positions at the same time re-grouping, TFU wants to be able to react asap with combined air-assets on swiftly changing situations. OMF is known to pop-up like a weasel spontaneously. CHOPS TFU		
█	Ops	Update 06-410: As it looks now, besides OMF several LNs have been killed and wounded in last nights events at CHORA. Although some killed were inflicted by OMF, it can not be ruled out that collateral damage has been done to the civilian population, getting caught up in the fightings / bombings. As it states now [redacted] Cdr A-coy at CHORA has 6x serious WIA at CHORA hospital, on which they can not operate there any further. Req to transport cas to....TK NLD Role II for treatment.	[14:35] <NLD_TFU_OPS> If granted 9-liners will follow.	Closed
█	medops Ops	all 9 liner requests should be initially passed via this desk and not to individual MTF's		Closed

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Ops	RCS	Ref 1434: 9-liners will be made for 6x WIA LNs, all stable and given first-aid by local doctors and NLD MEDIC. w/o		Pending / closed
Ops	RCS	Update 06-433: C/s N43 received SAF and RPG fire from 41S QS 7241 2890. C/s engaging with 60mm and AGL. FW iso C/s still needed. OMF seems not willing to leave, C/s neither...	[15:09] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Ref to 06-443: Grid EF should be 41S QS 7241 2690.	Closed
Ops	RCS	Ref to 06-443: TIC is still open, still need air. Even ISR shows ambush loc occupied to attack C/s N43. N43 now moving in to engage.		Closed
Ops	RCS	Update TFU.: Event 06-410 is open, no changes to situation in CHORA. OMF keeps rather quiet now, assessed to be re-grouping/ rounding up new fighters amongst LNs (un-voluntarily)/ re-positioning through green-zone and especially from SARAB area (East of CHORA). Reportings come from BG [redacted] at CHORA they have engaged OMF near SARAB CP, but due to bad-comms no specifics arrive yet. NFTR.	Event 06-448 is closed	Closed
RCS	Ops	*****All TFs please note tonight's IWS Conference	Ack 1615	Closed

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			Call is cancelled due to the repatriation ceremony at KAF. TFH, TFK, TFU, TFZ, TF1F and TF71 ack *****		
Ops	RCS	Delayed SALTA C/s [redacted] S: 10x OMF at/around 2x qalas A: PID as OMF at known qalas to be "owned" by OMF. L: En 42S TB 301 409 T: 17 1528LT JUN 07 A: LL05 receipt used FW to drop 4x GBU 12 (2x on Mortar position, 2x in qala. All four direct hit on target) All positions destroyed. event 06-443 N40 is closed, NFTR.			Closed
Ops	RCS	RHR RHINO		06-443 closed	Closed
Ops	RCS	delayed SALTA C/s [redacted] S: OMF OP on hilltop (cave) A: observing CF, handover equipment incl SA. L: own location 41S QS 7092 3120 T: 17 1705LT June 07		1708 HOT / 180032 COLD ISAF event# 06-456 closed at 17 1740L jun 07 RCS called we notice as an update.	Closed

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			A: LL26,inf platoon, in overwatch and fired harassing fire 155mm / OMF fled		
Ops	RCS		TIC SALTA C/s [redacted] S: unkn A: SAF/3x RPG L: En 42S TB 2523 3814 T: 17 1725LT JUN 07 A: LL05 receipt, 42S TB 2484 3761 /FW engaged w strafe.	Ops TFU rgr. re-open event 06-448 Ref SALTA 1803: TIC LL05 is closed	Closed
Bdoc	Ops		Possible car accident inner/outer defence wall	guardC take care w patr	Closed
OPS	RCS		Update event 06-410: Situation W CHORA deteriorated again. At CPs KALA KALA and NYAZI again fighting. CF had visual att. Req AHs to gain SA and possible eng OMF at these CPs. CP of SARAB (v) has fallen and will be used for near future ops against CHORA DC. This also counts for S CHORA (SANGAR).	[20:11] <NLD_ATF_S3_AIR_AH> grid enemy?	Closed
OPS	RCS		Grid CPs KALA KALA: 42S TB 1970 3750 and NYAZI: 42S TB 2080 3918.		Closed
RCS-	OPS		SDO (S) approves release of 2 AH's ATF ISO		Closed

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SDO		CHORA TIC ref 20:10. ATF, TFU Ack		
Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: have dropped ordnance on OMF mor loc at 42S TB 2940 and 42S TB 2937 and at 41S QS 78010 40153. BDA: according to a/c: direct hit. AHs will be used to get SA at W CHORA and also for BDA at the en mor loc and the CPs of SARAB (because a burning house has been observed).		
Ops	RCS	TIC SALTA C/s ANP S: unkn A: SAF and RPG L: OMF loc 41S QS 7716 T: 172200LT JUN 07 A: ANP CP, ANP returning fire, RTF moving with one platoon to 41S QS 6717.	ISAF EVENT NR 06-462 18.00.58LT : TIC CLOSED	Closed
Ops	RCS	Update event ref 2208 ANP TIC: situation seems to calmed down. TFU will spt w/ 155 Illum for more SA. Also QRF ANP is on loc of RTF plt at 41S QS 76 15.		
Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: CP cdr at SARAB states		

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			that he's very low on ammo and the CPs are about to fall. TFU sent AHs to get SA and possible eng OMF in their surroundings.	
█	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: Cp SARAB HILL is abandoned, CP SARAB VILLAGE still manned, but very low on ammo. AHs are RTB because of fuel. FW will show presence above this area.	
█	Ops	RCS	Update TIC ANP ref 2008: TFU is firing illum. RTF and ANP report that the fight turned heavier again.	

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IMM Re-supply and transport ANA to CHORA

- [04:23] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Unfortunately bad lines. I tried to tell you that we have a CH coming to TK at 0730 for 81mm mor resupply for CHORA. We would like to move 50 PAX ANA as well to CHORA. We would like your approval for this transfer. Might it be possible to get more CHs, or just multiple waves?
- [04:25] <RC_S_SDO> Checking with Avn at the moment
- [04:26] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr
- [04:26] <RC_S_SDO> I would prefer 1 wave only but w/o
- [04:31] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Sir, 50 PAX ANA and all the ammo won't fit
- [04:32] <RC_S_SDO> rgr, i know, other choppers
- [04:33] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr
- [05:04] <RC_S_SDO> It will be done, Avn is looking at earliest possible time. He is working his magic at the moment
- [05:06] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr and many thx for that.
- [05:11] <RC_S_SDO> What is the earliest your trip can be ready for pick-up, where and who is in charge of HLS
- [05:15] <NLD_TFU_OPS> 0730L.T the will be ready and your Q about HLS will be LL10.
- [05:17] <RC_S_SDO> do you have a frequency and where is pick up point for ANA. We are looking at 2 trips
- [05:21] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr, PUP will be the FARP at TK, freq CAG: 57.850.
- [05:42] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> good morning....I need a bit of info to help coordinate the insertion of 50 ANA pax.

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The plan is to use 2 x NLD Chinooks early this afternoon after they finish the repatriation ceremony for the fallen Dutch soldier

- [05:43] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr. What info do you need?
- [05:44] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> I need information about the insertion zone. What is the grid? Who are the forces that are going to be securing the site? What is their callsign?
- [05:45] <NLD_TFU_OPS> loc: 42S TB 2324 3991. C/s w/o
- [05:45] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> rgr
- [05:47] <NLD_TFU_OPS> unit [redacted] (inf/plt)
- [05:50] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> this is a NLD inf platoon?
- [05:51] <NLD_TFU_OPS> yes
- [05:51] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> Is this the area of an ongoing TIC?
- [05:51] <NLD_TFU_OPS> att quiet, but yes this is in the middle of the city.
- [05:53] <NLD_TFU_OPS> G3 considers timing of 1330 as late. Is it not possible to combine it w/ the resupply flight?
- [05:53] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> I'm not sure of the threat in the area, but landing in the middle of a built up area may not be the best option. Are there any other potential landing sites which would be suitable for you which aren't in the city
- [05:55] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> It will be late because the aircraft are taking part in a ramp ceremony for the Dutch soldier that was killed a couple of days ago, and then flying his body back to KAF at 11 am. They are not available before then.
- [05:55] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Sir, this is the safest place we can give you
- [05:55] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> ok...I will pass this on to the CH planners
- [06:04] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Sir, in and around the HLS there's no fighting att. In the wider area (around the city, we consider the situation as more hostile. The HLS is at the White compound, which is currently the Coy CP.

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[06:05] <NLD_TFU_OPS> BG is considering att what to do whith the AMRs.

[06:18] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> sorry...I was disconnected. I have looked at two options for inserting the 50 ANA troops this morning. The CH that is doing the ammo resupply would need [REDACTED] into the LZ to complete the resupply and the pax move. This is very dangerous.

[06:20] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> Second and best option is that one aircraft does the ammo move this morning, and when the second CH becomes available (early this afternoon after the Dutch repatriation ceremony) both aircraft make one trip to insert all 50 ANA into the area

[06:21] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr. BG Cdr chooses for the 2nd option.

[06:26] <RC_S_J3_AVN_RCC> roger....I have just spoken by phone with the Dutch Chinook planner and he will contact you in a few moments on MIRC

[06:29] <NLD_TFU_OPS> rgr

[06:35] <NLD_TFU_OPS> OMLT/ANA would like to use the space A in the first wave (resupply in the morning).

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Fm DTG 180000 Jun 07 till 182400 Jun 07

Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
			PHASE III		
	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-462: f [redacted] reached the ANP CP of SAR REGIN. evrything quiet att. Plt will stay at the CP ufn.		Closed
	Ops	RCS	Update TIC 06-462: TIC closed. RTF pit will RON on the CP.	0058LT: 06-462: TIC closed	Closed
	Ops	RCS	IMM RHR ROZ/ 41S QS324 178/5nm/ 10.000ft AMSL/ GTL270/c/s LL34 / CAG 57.850/ 81mm ILLum	01:34; IMM ROZ SCALLOP is now HOT / 0302 COLD	Closed
	OPS	RCS	Update event 06-410. Att quiet. CP cdr of SARAB still asking for help. TFU elms report no activity, also Ahs haven't seen any movements. TFU will use FW to get more SA and ex a show of presence to give ground elms some rest and give spt to this CP.		Closed

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OPS	RCS	Update event 06-410: FW is receiving SARAB, checking all locs that the CP Cdr of SARAB is reporting as hostile. No OMF has been found so far.		Closed
OPS	RCS	Update event 06-410: CF report everything quiet att. CP cdr of SARAB still indicates to be fighting w/ OMF. FW reported to observe no OMF movements. Unit 0.5 (BG recce plt) will leave for SARAB at 07.30LT.		
Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: CP of cdr of SARAB reports to run out of ammo, req for help. Unit 05 will move towards his loc at 07.30.		Closed
Ops	RCS	RHR ROZ RHINO	HOT 0742 / 2155 COLD	Closed
Ops	RCS	Imminent Threat C/s LL10 S: unk A: Def Intell states: unit LL05 will be attacked ivo 42S TB 250.400. From AWI OMF, numbers unk, goes towards to	Update 06-410 RCS: Time is very limited on AH, we will use FW instead.	Closed

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		<p>CHORA to attack subjects in CHORA. Cdr GUHL asked for reinforcement to defend his ANP posts in SARAB, he said te be overrun by OMF, two of his ANP paxen are been headed.</p> <p>L: 42S TB 231.398 (Chora DC)</p> <p>T: 18.0755LT JUN 07</p> <p>A: LL05 (recee platoon) is going towards to SARAB to conduct an overwatch.</p> <p>REQ: AH's to [redacted]</p>	
Ops	RCS	<p>TIC SALTA C/s ANP</p> <p>S: unkn</p> <p>A: attacked by OMF with SAF and RPG</p> <p>L: ANP post at Sar Regin 41S QS 777.160</p> <p>T: 18.0745LT JUN 07</p> <p>A: ANP CP, ANP returning fire, no casualties, quiet ATT</p>	Closed
Ops	RCS	<p>Update SALTA Imminent threat: Def intell states, LL05 observed by OMF and will be</p>	Update 06-410 Closed


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			ambushed and LL24 grid 42S TB 2300.3584 will be engaged by 82mm mortars.		
Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410 TIC SALTA C/s LL24 S: unkn A: attacked by OMF with SAF/RPG POO 42S TB 217.371 L: loc LL24 42S TB 230.358 T: 18.0853JUN 07 A: LL24, mech inf platoon in overwatch, engaging OMF with direct firing and 81mm	09.15: Update SALTA 06-410: S: 20 pax OMF	Closed	
BG	Ops	BG req for airassets overhead iso TIC		ALO req RCS for support, FW att in support in Helmand.	Closed
Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: Surroundings SARI 42S TB 25 41 OMF are in fire-fight with ANP/LNs.			Closed
Ops	RCS	Update 06-410 :LL24 receives 82mm on loc, OMF assessed to fix LL24 in their			Closed

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			current position, based on Intell		
Ops	RCS		Cntct near CHORA DC, possible 1x WIA NLD mil. OMF eng NLD 81mm mors pos.		
Ops	RCS		Update CHORA DC: 2x NLD WIA Cat A/B due to OMF attack at our pos CHORA DC.		Closed
Ops	RCS		Update 06-410: RW needed att at Chora, got attacked by OMF, 2x casualty at own troops		Closed
Ops	RCS		9-LINER NLD TFU LL10E LINE 1: 42S TB 2313.3988 LINE 2: C/s LL10E / CAG 57.850 LINE 3: 4xA LINE 4: 2x US stretcher LINE 5: L 2x / 2x ambulatory LINE 6: P LINE 7:  LINE 8: gravel LINE 9: to follow VITAL SIGNS of pts own troops	MM(S) 06-18C 10:09 RC_S_SDO Reference TFU 9 line: need update line 9 and security at HLS (PAX/vehicles) 10:09 TFMEDTOC WHAT NATIONALITY ARE THE PTS 10:10 NLD_TFU_OPS> AH allowed to act ios TIC White compound ??? 10:10 NLD_TFU_OPS	Closed

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	Pt 1 PT2 PT 3 PT4	Nat pts NLD
A:		
B:		10:31] NLD_TFU_OPS
C:		Timings
D:		medevac????????????????
10:30	Update 9-liner MM(S) 0618C:	10:35 RC(S) SDO approves release
LINE 9:	42S TB 23243991, his secured by	of CORSAIR ISO of MM(S) 06-18C
inf and no direct fire	VITAL SIGNS of pts own troops	3 x CAT A Patients (ISAF
Pt 1	PT2 PT 3	Military/NLD) to TK NL R2.
PT4		CORSAIR, TFU, MedOps ack
A:free	free	10:37 NLD_TFU_OPS
B:14, deep	normal	ETD medevac
C:100	sufficient	10:37 CORSAIR-BTLCPT
D:alert	alert	Corsair will execute MM 06-16C out
Pt1: shrapnel in head, half liter loss of	blood, 1 infusion, spineboard, prio1	of TK, C/S Yankee 02, Stab 43
Pt2: burn wounds left underarm 1 or 2%,	burnshield	&Arrow 24, WU ATT, ETA Grid
		1050L

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		<p>Pt3: shrapnel wounds right shoulder and clavícula There was a 4th patient he died.</p>	<p>10:56 CORSAIR_BTLNCO MM(S)06-18C WU GRID 1055L ETA TO TK R2 7 MIN</p> <p>10:57 NLD_TFU_OPS All 4 wounded taken from grid to TK Role II NLD?</p> <p>10:58 RC_S_Med_Ops Ref MM(S)06-18C and 10:57 NLD_TFU_OPS CFM if 4 cas plus KIA or 3 cas plus KIA</p> <p>11:01 NLD_TFU_OPS Ref 06-18C: 3x WIA NLD, 1x KIA NLD.</p>	
<p>RCS Med Ops</p>		<p>Ref MM(S)06-18C: 10:03 NLD_TFU_OPS Recommend send patient to TK NL R2</p>		Closed

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		BLACK HOLE		1610 END of BLACK HOLE	Closed
Ops	RCS	REq AHs iso CHORA DC. HLS is not yet secured at CHORA DC, that is currently only HLS. We need AHs for securing HLS and act on approaches from the North (SARI 42S TB 25 41).		10:21 RC_S_SDO RC(S) SDO approves of ATF QRF ISO of TFU CHORA DC TIC. TFU, ATF ack	Closed
Ops	RCS	Update CHORA / event 06-410: ENGAGEMENT BOX is re-opened for IDF. (Grids box: 42S TB Horizontal 37 till 40, Vertical 42S TB 21 and 22)			Closed
Ops	RCS	Update CHORA 06-410: LL 24 ongoing fire-cntct, LL 05 moving to higher ground in East part of CHORA towards SARAB no cntct. CHORA DC not under fire att, no reportings of any firings over there. Militia commander [redacted] reports OMF activity at East part of CHORA 42S TB 26 40.			Closed
Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: LL24 receives sporadic fire, have engaged OMF at 42S TB 2170			Closed

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			<p>3715 with 1x GBU, resulting in 10x OMF KIA (Intel rep). LL05 hears SAF in their vic, investigating nature. Mil leader <u> </u> moves with 4-6 vehicles towards SARAB to spt SARAB ANP in SARAB village. OP NYAZI (W of CHORA) is under fire by OMF, CP fires back, but no ANSF overthere (so source unk).</p>	
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>10 LINER UXO / IED SPOT REPORT. C/S RTF42 LINE 1:18.0745LT June 07 LINE 2:RTF C/s 42 LINE 3:81mm mortar LINE 4:41S QS 69670.13974 footballfield TK boys school LINE 5:TK boys school LINE 6:Radio comms RTF CT COMD LINE 7:Local situation permissive, however reports of SVIED in the area</p>		<p>Closed</p>

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

		<p>LINE 8: NIL LINE 9: area secured by RTF 42 elements LINE 10: EOD have been deployed and 81mm mortar has been successfully blown in place</p>		
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>TIC SALTA C/s N40 S: 2x vehicle and 10 pax OMF with SA A: attacked by OMF with SAF / POO 41S QS 7365.2660 L: loc LL40 41S QS 712.275 T: 18.1218LT JUN 07 A: N40, [redacted] in overwatch, engaging OMF with direct firing and 81mm from PB POENTJAK</p>	<p>Eventnr: 06-470 1321 TIC CLOSED 13.27: Re-open TIC 06-470. S: unk A: Firing 82 mm L: C/s LL40 41S QS 712.275 T: 18.1324LT A: returning fire</p>	<p>Closed</p>
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>RHR: IMM ROZ /41S QS 730.227 5NM/10.000ft AMSL/ GTL 0 / C/S Windmill 63/CYAN 12/81MM pls [12:42] <NLD_TFU_OPS> Ack</p>	<p>12:34 NLD_TFU_OPS GTL must be 270 12:35 RC_S_ASCC NLD TFU: that position is already HOT: VANITY NORTH 12:38 RC_S_ASCC</p>	<p>Closed</p>

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 18-06-07)

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

				NLD TFU check HOT ROZ pls: all URUZGAN ROZs still correct for all parameters?	
Ops	RCS	Update 06-470: C/s N40/ N43 currently still fighting with OMF at 41S QS 7235 2650. Used 155mm iso event. Receiving SAF from 41S QS 70 27. Greenzone rather quiet. Current using [] for creating SA on compounds of interest.			Closed
Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: LL24 remains receiving sporadic fire and returning fire. OMF activity in this event dies down.			Closed
Ops	RCS	Event 06-410 SALT A C/s ANP SARAB S: Unk A: firing SAF/RPG L: from 42S TB 307.418 to 42S TB 310.413 T: 18.1645LT June 07 A: ANP post at SARAB village engaged			Closed

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 18-06-07)

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 18-06-07)

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			from SARAB HILL, trying to support by FW		
█	BG	Ops	1 pax detained at the gate of the White compound and has a cellphone with a lot of Pakistani numbers in it.	FST will handle this matter	Closed
█	Ops	RCS	Update 06-470: has been engaged by mortar fire and SAF, mortar engaged and destroyed by 155mm PzH. Own location still engaged by SAF from N and W direction and Balluchi.		Closed
█	Ops	RCS	Update 06-470: C/s N40/43 still receiving 82mm Mors fire on their loc. Returning fire from PB POENTJAK with 81mm Mors. Also retaliating with DF own means.		Closed
█	Ops	RCS	TFU - ROE authorised for Op TROY. G3 Ack.	1755: ack 1751	Closed
█	Ops	RCs	Update 06-470: C/s N40/43 engaged from several direction with mors, SAF, HMG, FW in support.		Closed

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 18-06-07)

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

PRT	Ops	From [redacted] SARAB Village under fire w mortar and rockets from 42S TB 292 410, mountain N of Sarab / ANP caught an OMF(TB) and Duska / half of SARAB village is in hand of ANP, OMF is on SARAB hill and firing at SV.	Also message at 1932 from [redacted] : short of CL5, helo spt as moralspt for ANP at Sarab Village, to be shure SARAB is the backdoor to CHORA think of that.	Closed
Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: TIC SALT A C/s LL24 S: Unk A: engaged with RPG/HMG/SAF, POO: unk L: own location 42S TB 231.357 T: 18.1820LT JUN 07 A: LL24, mech in platoon in overwatch, return fire with all their means FW in spt		Closed
Ops	RCS	9-LINER NLD TFU LL10 LINE 1: 42S TB 2313.3988 LINE 2: C/s WL68/ CAG 57.850 LINE 3: 1xA LINE 4: E, 3x stretcher LINE 5: 1xL	MM(S)06-18F ETD TK 1922 ETA CHR 1931 ETA TK NLD R2 1943	Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			Line 6: P LINE 7: [REDACTED] LINE 8: C (ANAP) LINE 9: Gravel, HLS secured by infplt, several MG VITAL SIGNS : injury, missing jaw. A: 12 p/m B: BP 100 over 60 / Puls 160 C: response		
	Ops	RCS	Update 06-410: TIC SALTA C/s LL26 S: Unk A: engaged with saf from 42S TB 200 320(ridgeline) L: own location 42S TB 2328 3173 T: 18.1901LT JUN 07 A: LL26, mechplt 360 overwatch, return fire w 81mm mortar		Pending
	Ops	RCS	update 06-470: N40 reorganize and will RTB, TIC 06-470 closed		TIC 06-470 closed Closed
	RCS	Ops	approves release of CORSAIR ISO		MM(S)06-18F, C/S YANKEE01, Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

	SDO	<p>patient transfer ref MM(S) 06-17F for 1 X Cat A Patient (Non ISAF military, ANAP) MEDEVAC from TK R2 (NLD) to R3 KAF on request of face-surgeon in R3 KAF in order to save face of patient. CORSAIR, MedOps, TFU ack.</p>	<p>AR24 KAF ETD 2120 W/D TK 2158 W/D KAF 2250, MC</p>	
<p>█</p> <p>RCS SDO</p>	Ops	<p>OOB SABRE will be open within the following coordinates: 41S QS 08000 85000 41S QS 08000 50000 42S QS 68000 50000 42S QS 68000 85000 Start Time 18 20:00L Jun 07 End Time 19 12:00L Jun 07 Please check and advise any conflicts ASAP. TF 71 is to deconflict directly with TF 42. TF 71, TF 42, TFU pl ackn.</p>	<p>[22:57] <RC_S_SDO> OOB SABRE is closed as of now.</p>	Closed

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 19-06-07)

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

Fm DTG 190000 Jun 07 till 192400 Jun 07

Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: Evreything quiet att. TFU is preparing for future ops. From 0200 till 0300 TFU will use FW to check possible OMF locs N of SARAB VILLAGE CP.		Closed
	Ops		the APC EW that's stocked at 41S QS:6978 1762 is still not recovered, try for more than 1hr. G3 options: 1) own security / not needed for OP TROY 2) RTF recovery vehicle / no vehicle available 3) NLD recovery tk is w QRF at the Desht, execute recovery after OP TROY	G3, RTF, BG. Informed / option 1 and 3 are to be executed	Closed
	Ops	RCS	Update event 06-410: everything quiet att. TFU is using FW att to recece all hotspots at CHORA and surroundings. Nothing spotted sofar.		Closed
	Jfires	RCS	ASR 19-SUG681CH1 isn't approved	G3 informed, Jfires	Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

					discussing w RCS SDO / JFires / 0630 approved	
S3 ATF Air TH	Ops	Imm re-supply PB PJ ETD KAF 0800 / ETA TK 0845			ETA PB PJ 0915-0930. ROLEX with 1hr	Closed
Ops	RCS	RHR RHINO HOT			0720 HOT / 2137 COLD	Closed
RCS	Ops	Imm ROZ SALSA COLD			SALSA COLD	Closed
RCS	Ops	OP TROY = EVENT NR 06-495			EVENT NR 06-495	
Ops	RCS	Imminent Threat C/s N40 S: Several motorcyclists A: Def Intell & Intreps state: Several suiciders are moving in the TK North area, vic KOWTWAL bridge/X-ing 41S QS 7209 1902. L: FF 41S QS 7206 1773 T: 19.0959LT JUN 07 A: C/s N40/43 are currently stuck with APC PATRIA at mentioned grid. Are preparing recovery, but also prepare for assessed suicide attack on their loc.				Closed
PHASE IV						
Ops	RCS	Update CHORA OP TROY: PzH engages targets				Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			as of 1025LT, guided type 3. Than BG assets / inf platoons start moving at 1030LT together with ANA over two routes of approach towards CP NYZAI/CEMETARY HILL 42S TB 1968 3898 and CP KALA KALA 42S TB 1965 3741.		
█	Ops	RCS	OP TROY: 42S TB Vertical 22. Two Inf mech platoons North approach, two south, ANA through green zone.	> \$@S TB = 42S TB	Closed
█	Ops	RCS	Update SALTA 1003LT: RTF moving in on █ C/s N40 for assistance with urgent recovery.		Closed
█	Ops	RCS	OP TROY update: Northern approach at 42S TB Vert 21. ANA at 42S TB Vert 215, Southern approach near 42S TB 225. No OMF cntct yet.		Closed
█	Ops	RCS	Update OP TROY: Southern approach is moving on 42S TB Vert 21. ANA are seeking EF cntct near CEMETARY HILL (distance 1.2 km). Northern approach 42S TB Vert 21, near CP NYAZI.		Closed
█	Ops	RCS	Update OP TROY: We, TFU, received approval yesterday for ROE delegation to COM-TFU		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			for this operation TROY. This not known within ISAF J3, they threaten to downscale FW assets asap, due to not being informed.		
█	Dep-Dir-ACE	Ops	This process requires tgt loc, CDE pattern of life and PiD to be passed through window for approval process for air.		Closed
█	NLD-TFU-NLO	Ops	Can you inform us, who from ISAF J3 reported that the FW will be downscaled?		Closed
█	NLD-F16-LNO	Ops	FYI, air assets are not being downscaled att time due to poor communication, trin and CJOC are actually working it now to make happen!	Dep-Dir-ACE: air has not been downscaled it is still available but the process is not complete for its use	Closed
█	RCS-CHOPS	OPS	TFU - be aware that you only have US air assets in support at the moment. This means that if you intend to engage targets under ROE when you are not in a TIC, then we have to get authority from Trinity for the aircraft to engage. This is due to US ROE		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			constraints. If you declare a TIC and are therefore engaging under self-defence ROE, there is no problem. Call me if you need to discuss.		
Ops	RCS		Reopen tic event 06-410 for Air, SALTA to follow	[11:52; NLD_TFU_OPS SORRY, neglect 1140. TIC EVENT 06-410 closed, OP TROY is ongoing in CHORA.	Closed
Ops	RCS		OP TROY: TIC SALTA C/s LL26 S: 9 pax, 2x OMF KIA A: Engaging C/s with SAF/RPG/HMG L: EF loc 42S TB 2040 3841 T: 19.1152LT JUN 07 A: C/s LL26 and LL 12 on Northern approach (Vert 42S TB 21) are engaging EF with direct		Closed
Ops	RCS		NLD TFU has ROE delegation for for OP TROY at CHORA	NLD_ATF_F16_S3> c	Closed
RCS- SIG- HI	OPS		ISAF EVENT NR 06-495 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO TFU / TROY / TIC	12:21; NLD_TFU_OPS 06-495:corr grid OMF: 42S TB 224 375, C/S	Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

OPS	RCS	Update 06-495 OP TROY:15 pax OMF with HMG at grid 42S TB 2060 3891 firing at LL26at grid 42S TB 20 39	LL24 not LL 26	Closed
OPS	RCS	Update 06-495 OP TROY: BDA 5 pax E KIA on grid 42S TB 2040 3841		Closed
OPS	RCS	9-LINER NLD TFU LL27 LINE 1: 41S QS 7300 2261 LINE 2: C/s LL20W/ CAG 57.850 LINE 3: 1xD LINE 4: A LINE 5: 1xA Line 6: P LINE 7:  LINE 8: 1xA LINE 9: Sandy and flat, HLS secured by infplit, 3x APC VITAL SIGNS : A: Free B: 16	MM(S) 06-19E RC_S_Med_Ops> Ref MM(S)06-19E: Recommend send patient to TK R2 NL. Can cas be moved by ground? 13:14; NLD_TFU_OPS Negative, due to Op Troy no groundvac possible 13:14; NLD_TFU_OPS Rgr Role 2 NLD 13:14; RC_S_Med_Ops	Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			C: 66 D: A Suspicion of appendicitis (severe abdominal pain)	RGR RC(S) SDO approves release of CORSAIR ISO of MM(S) 06-19E 1 x CAT D Patient	
█	RCS- SDO	OPS	(ISAF Military) to TK. CORSAIR will conduct mission as available this afternoon (before 1700L) CORSAIR, TFU , MedOps ack		Closed
█	OPS	RCS	Update OP TROY: Obj GOLD (CP KALA KALA 42S TB 1965 3741) taken by 2x Inf plt. Obj SILVER (CP NYZAI/CEMETARY HILL 42S TB 1968 3898) is not yet reached by other 2x Inf plt and ANA. Still def Intell states OMF are fleeing.		Closed
█	OPS	RCS	Extraction is after 1800LT ? Pls, assess how much later? Medical officer stated, it should be NLT 1700 before situation might deteriorate.		Closed
█	OPS	RCS	MM(S)06-19E: Line 6: Was P, via G2 TFU and G3 TFU: No current		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			threat assessed at PB POENTJAK. Not for last 24hrs, therefore Line 6 now status: N. CORSAIR, MEDOPS pls ack and thereby adjust timings.		
█	RCS- MED- OPS	OPS	Just so you don't think I'm ignoring you...Ref MM(S)06-19E, TX for the update on the ground. Be advised that in order to change the timings to launch the MEDEVAC, the condition of the patient has to deteriorate. Since he is declared as a Cat D, CORSAIR has until tomorrow early afternoon to extract. If the condition of the patient deteriorates to the point where it is medically deemed that a change in Cat is warranted, then we can reevaluate at that time.	14:53; NLD_TFU_OPS rgr, clear statement.	Closed
█	OPS	RCS	Update OP TROY: Obj SILVER-North (CP NYAZI) has been taken, Obj SILVER-South (CEMETARY HILL) still needs to be taken by ANA. No OMF cntct att.	15:16; RC_S_SDO is this an update to your 495 TIC? is I124 still in a TIC?	Closed
█	OPS	RCS	TIC 06-495 is still open, still sporadic fire SAF		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			reported.		
OPS	RCS		Update OP TROY: ANA occupy the CP KALA KALA and CP NYAZI, LL26 in overwatch by CP NYAZI, LL05 in overwach S, S/E, LL11 / LL20 / LL24 RON loc dessert(south of ZADEL) / LL35 in position ZADEL / LL12, LL13 and LL69 in White Compound		Closed
OPS	RCS		Update MMS 06-19E: line 7: IR strobes light HLS, and IR strobes light on vehicles		Closed
RCS	Ops		MM 06-19E Y02,AR26 WD TK 1818L MC--This mission is for MM 06-19E not 06-19F. Corsair is not executing MM 06-19F since it does not exist.		Closed
Ops	RCS		Imminent Threat C/s LL10E from WHITE CPD CHORA DC / C/s LL00 S: 15pax OMF, poss 2x TB Sub-cdr. A: Moving East-part CHORA L: EF 42S TB 269 383 T: 19.1847LT JUN 07 A: C/s LL10E at CHORA DC and LL00 at 42S TB 2476 3619 received Def Intell		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

		<p>on 15pax OMF moving towards CHORA, with 2x TB Cdr. Croos-bearing reveals loc, if PID will be engaged by FW.</p>		
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>Update OP TROY: ANA are moving towards CEMETARY HILL (42S TB 1960 3900), Def Intell states Unk number OMF with 7x RPG and PKM move towards ANA pos. ANA present at CP NYAZI and CP KALA KALA. As soon as ANA is settled, BG platoons are moving towards positions for immediate assistance to ANA in case of TIC. Reportings state between 50-100 or more TB KIA. Under whom several key-leaders TB in URUZGAN PROVINCE. SARAB CP is currently held by [redacted]</p>	<p>Closed</p>	
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>Reportings on TB KIA are from 15th Jun in the evening as a estimated total.</p>	<p>Closed</p>	
<p>Ops</p>	<p>RCS</p>	<p>Update imm threat ref 1851: grid more accurate now: 42S TB 26881 38660.</p>	<p>Closed</p>	

LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

		Number of possible leaders upgraded to 3.	
PHASE V			
Ops	RCS	Update imm threat ref 1851 (and ref 1933): BDA: dropped ordnance and direct hit the en loc. After delivery, no more definitive intell was received, or PAX movements were observed. (So possible 18 PAX OMF killed).	Closed
			Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

Fm DTG 200000 Jun 07 till 202400 Jun 07

Time	From	To	Message	Remarks/action	Pending/closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	RHR: IMM ROZ I42S TB 232.399/5NM/10.000ft AMSL/ GTL 270 / C/S LL10 /CAG 57.850 /81MM ILL	IMM ROZ known as SEAT HOT 0410 / 0437 closed	Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: ANA at cps NYAZI and KALA KALA reports movements in greenzone, TFU will support with 81mm ILL to get SA.		Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: dismounted patrol to the green zone didn't see anything in vicinity, quiet att.		Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: ANA contact on KALA KALA w/o		Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update last ANA contact: heard SAF in vicinity, dismounted patrol went out for getting SA		Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	Update CHORA: quiet ATT		Closed
[REDACTED]	Ops	RCS	OP TROY: TIC SALTA C/s LL0.5/ANA S: UNK A: Engaging C/s with SAF L: own loc 42S TB 202 370 T: 20.0655LT JUN 07	Event 06-526 Closed 0835	Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			A: C/s LL0.5 return fire.		
Ops	RCS		RHR: IMM ROZ /42S TB 232.399/5NM/10.000ft AMSL/ GTL 270 / C/S LL05 /CAG 57.850 /81MM	0719 IMM ROZ SILICA HOT / 2003 COLD	Closed
Ops	RCS		Update 06-526: LL05 reported noting happening att, TIC closed		Closed
Ops	RCS		RHR RHINO	0924 HOT / 2003 COLD	Closed
Ops	RCS		Update LL05: From grid 41S QS 7873 3738 LL05 observed 82mm mors several rnds fired at LL35 (42S TB 2297 3715). STABs escorting FRANKENSTEIN will also at same time spt LL05 to engage Mors pos OMF. LL35 receiving RPG fire from 1x OMF, OMF KIA 42S TB 225 377. AHs to spt LL35 and LL05 on both fires.		Closed
Ops	RCS		Req official approval for AHs spt, FRANKENSTEIN allready back on base TK		Closed
RCS SDO	Ops		Update 06-526: re-open TIC, ref 0946	event nr 06-526: CLOSED 1253.	Closed
RCS SDO	Ops		SDO approves request of TFU for ATF AH support (EVENT 526) c/s LL05. TFU, ATF ack		Closed
OPS	RCS		update 06-526: LL35 (42S TB 230 371) received		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

			RPG/PKM from 42S TB 215 375 return fire 25mm, HMG/ LL26 (42S TB 2008 3964) received SAF N from CP Nyazi, engage w 81mm.		
█	OPS	RCS	Update event nr 06-526: quiet in area tic now closed	event nr 06-526;CLOSED	Closed
█	RCR- INT	OPS	THREAT WARNING: Its been reported that 6x PAKISTANI suicide bombers in ANP uniforms and SUV pickup trucks intend to attack targets over the next 3 days. Targets along RING SOUTH West on KANDAHAR City to HELMAND BORDER. These attacks may take place in the towns of SENJRAY GR QR 408 014, HOWZ-E MADAD GR QQ 217 939, and KHISK-E- NAKHOUND (GR UNKNOWN). KHAKREZ district was also named as a possible target.		Pending
█	ATF_ AIR_AH	RCS	Stab 41F & Frankenstein w/u @ TK		Closed
█	ATF_ AIR_AH	RCS	Frankenstein 3/4 W/U TK inbnd CHR, VVIP		Closed
█	ATF_	RCS	Frankensteins @ TK ready for Chora VIP Pick Up		Closed

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LOGBOOK 1(NLD/AUS) Task Force URUZGAN

AIR_AH					
ATF_ AIR_AH	RCS	Frankenstein 3 departed TK for Chora VIP Pick Up. Stabs airborne in support			Closed
ATF_ AIR_AH	RCS	Frankenstein 3 w/d @ TK Stab 41/42 W/D @ TK			Closed
PRT	OPS	NDS stated that CF killed 30LNs during an AIR raid between 201000 and 201100LT.	TFU OPS made a report which proves otherwise. Sent to COS at 202130LT via TITAAN.		Closed

Supplement D (Logbook TF-U 20-06-07)

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

SUPPLEMENT E: JOINT FIRES

NR TIC: 06-410 /OP TROY 06-495

DTG: 281300LT JUN 07

References: Supplement E AAR JF report Artillery/FW/RW
Supplement E Appendix 1: JF Snapshots BDA locations
Supplement E Appendix 2: JF IDF report 160000Lt - 201200Ly June 07
Supplement E Appendix 3: JF FW/RW Report 160000Lt - 201200Lt June 07

1) INTRODUCTION

For over two months the OMF pressure on CHORA DC increased (See TFU INTSUMs). On Friday 15th of June a horrible SVBIED attack in Tarin Kowt introduced the occurring attack on CHORA DC. TFU decided to act pre-emptive and ordered the BG to reinforce CHORA. In the night of 15 to 16 June Fixed Wing area recce discovered OMF troop movements in the eastern entrance of the CHORA valley. This was the start of an aggressive OMF attack with the objective to seize CHORA DC. The effect to be achieved by the OMF was, and still is, IO exploitation for the new OMF commanders in URUZGAN able to defeat ISAF forces iot re-establish FOM on OMF LOCs from GIZAB to the southern part of AFGHANISTAN.

2) AREA OF OPERATION

See general AAR

3) COMPOSITION OF UNIT

Availability of Fire support assets to A-coy 42 AIBG (Low Land 1.0) in CHORA

a) 12 June - 20 June:

- i) One Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) existing of a Qualified Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC), a Laser Target Operator (LTO) and a driver (C/S Windmill 68). Windmill 68 is also a Qualified Forward Observer (Q-FO). TACP was co-located with HQ LL 1.0 in CHORA DC;
- ii) 81mm mortar group existing of 2 tubes deployed at the white compound in CHORA DC (morning 18 June – noon 19 June only one tube available);
- iii) GS of PzH2000 from FOB RIPLEY with DM 131 IHE ammunition;
- iv) ISAF/RC(S) air support:
 - (1) ISAF fixed wing support
 - (a) Planned CAS, to be re-tasked in support of a TIC;
 - (b) G-CAS (30min NTM) at Kandahar Air Field (KF).
 - (2) RC(S) attack Helo's at FOB RIPLEY or KAF

b) 16 June – 20 June:

Additional TACP/Q-FO (C/S Windmill 66) co-located with LL 2.4

c) 17 June – 25 June:

Additional TACP/ Q-FO (C/S Windmill 67) deployed at Southern entrance of CHORA valley (saddle) with LL 1.1. As of 20 June co-located at Coy HQ at the white compound in CHORA DC;

d) 19 June – 24 June:

Additional Q-FO deployed with LL 2.6.

4) MISSION/CONOPS OF UNIT

a) Task

Tasks for Fire support according ANNEX II (JOINT FIRES) to OORDER 03 (OP ARAMAY) of COM 1(NLD. AUS) TFU d.d. 01-05-2007

- i) Provide support to ground forces in a TIC IOT attain fire superiority;
- ii) Engage pre-planned targets that meet the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) criteria (all fires);
- iii) Provide harassing fire (primarily PzH det) IOT disrupt, deny FOM and demoralise OMF;
- iv) Provide Show of force or show of presence (all fires).
- v) Provide over watch for ground forces (primarily AHs or UAV cap)

b) Purpose

According to FRAGO 19 (OP LEONIDAS) to OORDER 03 (OP ARAMAY) of COM 1(NLD/AUS) TFU d.d. 08-06-2007.

TFU will support GoU and ANSF I their effort to maintain security and stability in the CHORA district and disrupt OMF IOT preserve the CHORA District Centre

c) End state

CHORA DC preserved from OMF influences.

5) EXECUTION

See SUPPLEMENT E APPENDIX 2: JF IDF report 160000Lt – 201200Lt June '07 and SUPPLEMENT E APPENDIX 3: JF FW/RW report 160000Lt – 201200Lt June '07

6) SITUATION OWN TROOPS (INCL. COALITION FORCES)

a) General

Saturday 16th of June:

After a restless night ANP posts where engaged by OMF troops in the early morning on the 16th of June. Whole night Fixed Wing (FW) assets controlled by WLS supported LL 1.0 with SA. They discovered large amount of men in fighting age marching up from east towards the SARAB checkpoint. No action was taken because there was no PID on OMF troops. When these men surrounded SARAB checkpoint it was clear that this was a hostile intent. That was the trigger to request additional air support. Around 0400Lt TFU requested RW support from RC(S) iot support the ANSF on the SARAB checkpoints (East of CHORA DC) with SOF from NLD AHs. Around 0500Lt also TFU troops and ANP at check-points NYAZI and KALA KALA (west of CHORA DC) were engaged with SAF and RPGs from compounds. NLD AHs were re-tasked to the TIC and they engaged several compounds in support to TFU troops in self defence situations. After the AHs left TFU troops were engaged several times by OMF indirect fire (IDF) (near misses!). There were no A/C available at that time. The effect to be achieved was destruction of these OMF mor positions. Own 81mm should not be sufficient so PID on a point of origin from the enemy mor fires led to engagements with PzH fires. Fires where very effective and the pressure from OMF IDF decreased. Fire Support filled the gap till new A/C came on station around 1000Lt. There was SAF contact with OMF for the whole day. Allocated A/C

gave enough relieve to hold CHORA DC and to push an additional mech inf platoon (incl add WL) to CHORA. At the end of the day OMF pressure on CHORA increased dramatically. TFU troops had to withdraw 3 km from the ANP checkpoint KALA KALA to CHORA DC and only 4kmsq was occupied by ISAF troops. Com TFU decided that we should hold CHORA as stated in the FRAGO's. FRAGO's. Therefore TFU decided to create an engagement area for a certain period west of vert 42S TB 21, with a last resistance engagement box close to CHORA DC (1x3km) this should be the last standing if OMF kept on pushing. ~~All fires shot west of vert 42S TB 21~~ and all bombs dropped there were in direct support to ISAF troops in self defence situation. Beside that TFU requested all available air assets from ISAF. After a gap of one and a half hour ISAF pushed an enormous amount of A/C to this TIC. TFU was also supported by several ISR assets, these where able to locate several C2 nodes and individuals of high importance which directly influenced the OMF attack on CHORA. COM TFU decided to engage also these targets as required. Dedicated FW support controlled by a JTAC in the TFU ops engaged several targets of high importance to the OMF ops in the wider CHORA area. FW engaged known enemy firing positions (See 6.c)iii: Air support) and PzH supported the TFU defensive ops with harassing fires west of vert 42S TB 21. It was not necessary to shoot fires in the engagement box (see 6.b)iv: GBFS).

Sunday 17th of June:

During the night WLs engaged OMF key leadership successfully with a Type III controlled mission based on definitive intell reports. There where severe fights continuing through the whole night. All air spt missions where executed by A/C under control of JTACs. The day was relatively calm but OMF held pressure on CHORA DC. Early morning of this day TFU decided to open a second front in the same operation (OP TROY) on the south entrance of the Balluchi valley [redacted] was ordered to disrupt the OMF in the northern DEH RASHAN area. [redacted] run into a severe TIC and was supported by a single ship A/C. The mission was controlled by a JTAC. After the mission [redacted] returned to FOB RIPLEY. In the evening of this day a PzH controlled by a Q-FO engaged a spotter on a mountain ridge near CHORA and supported AUS RTF with an ILL mission in the DEH RASHAN area. Late night, after 48hrs of battle, WLs requested to stop pushing CAS A/C to their locations. They stated this because they where exhausted and needed rest otherwise failures would be made. Due to the calmed down situation Joint Fires TFU decided to take over the night with Type III recce and SOF/SOP missions above the CHORA area controlled by JTACs from TFU ops.

Monday 18th of June

This day started with increased OMF pressure. LL2.4 on the south side of the valley was attacked by SAF, RPG and mor/rkts and fixed to his location. Also checkpoint SARAB (east of CHORA) was attacked again and militia leade [redacted] reported also severe fighting's on the northern routes. Especially the OMF engaging LL2.4 from compounds on the southern side of the green-zone was very persistent. A JTAC engaged these compounds with A/C. Early morning [redacted] and a plt of LL2.0 went up again to the Balluchi valley iot achieve the same effect as the day before. This supporting mission for OP TROY should be continued for at least 48 hrs. Again TFU achieved the desired effect because groups of OMF moved from the CHORA area down south through the Balluchi valley. Before noon WLs had to control several missions in support of TIC situations in the CHORA area but in the afternoon the (OMF) focus was fully on our disrupting ops in the DEH RASHAN area. There were severe fighting's going on. [redacted] run into an ambush and

had to withdraw after 2 hours full contact battle under cover of a PzH smokescreen. Beside that they were supported by FW, PzH and 81mm mor from patrol base POENJAK. Due to a lack of ammunition our troops from the DEH RASHAN area returned to Camp HOLLAND at the end of the day. Still ISAF troops occupy the environment of CHORA DC only!

Thursday 19th of June

The night remained calm and TFU Joint fires again took over some Type III controlled recce and SOF/SOP missions above CHORA like the night before. This was the day of the BG attack to seize three objectives. In a combined offensive operation ANSF (ANA) and ISAF troops should occupy the lost checkpoints west of CHORA DC. Joint Fires requested dedicated FW assets, AHs on _____ status on FOB RIPLEY and _____ overhead. Everything was approved. Because there were no TFU troops in the south entrance of the Balluchi valley TFU ops decided to shoot 15-30 minutes of harassing fires with the PzH on planned targets outside the green zone controlled by a Q-FO with predator feed in the TFU ops. Planning was executed. Everything remained relatively calm. AHs were not launched, FW supported with recce missions and PzH shot harassing fires in the wider DEH RASHAN area.

Wednesday 20 of June

Everything remained calm during the night. Late morning an F-16 was tasked to engage a compound from which OMF engaged TFU troops with SAF and RPG on the southern side of the green zone in west of CHORA. A JTAC controlled that mission. That was more or less the last mission in support for COM TFUs intent to preserve CHORA DC from OMF influence.

b) Ground based Fire Support (GBFS)

i) General

From the deployment of the PzH 2000 late 2006 on, the gun has only unguided ammunition available. This is still the case. First there was only the conventional ammunition available with maximum range of 19km. In February 2007 TFU received the first rounds of Insensitive High Explosives (IHE) ammunition. Due to our own operational experiences, TFU is very aware of the fact that PzH equipment and software is less reliable to shoot DM 131 IHE rounds on targets on a long distance. Till now TFU only used this type of ammunition for harassing fires on wide open areas. The distance from FOB RIPLEY to the CHORA valley is approximately 31 km. TFU used the previous months to get comfortable with the "behaviour" of the PzH in combination with this type of ammunition. Corrections from registration fires last weeks in the same environment were used to calculate the right aiming points. This is done in the PzH Fire Direction Cel (FDC) co-located in the BG ops. Own troops have reported that all fires fell within the probable error space of the requested targets.

ii) Fire mission control

(1) General

Because Windmill W/Ls had to control A/C a lot of fires were controlled by emergency fire controllers (EFC). The situation in this specific time period may be notified as an extremis situation. TFU SOPs states that FS to EFC is allowed in these situations. These EFCs were trained in fire mission procedures before this rotation.

(2) Steps in control

(a) After PID on enemy, EFC asked for support at coy HQ (White compound in CHORA DC).

- (b) WLs deconflicted all allocated air spt and GBFS and confirmed to coy HQ the use of own IDF asstes.
- (c) Coy HQ ordered a mission to own 81mm group or requested PzH spt to BG HQ.
- (d) PzH fire direction centre and BG ops are co-located to TFU ops, so this was the second step for deconfliction with other additional air space users.
- (e) After approval PzH engaged the requested target.

iii) Counter battery fires

Enemy engaged our troops and ANSF with 82mm mors. Time sensitivity and firepower in engagement were the biggest issues in the counter battery battle. To met these issues TFU decided to execute counter battery fires with the PzH. All fires iso counter battery fires were 2 rounds FFE. In this way proportionality, subsidiary and LOAC were taken into account. Formal CDE was not a factor because these fires where shot in a self defence situation.

iv) Fires in engagement area

The engagement area (west of vert 42S TB 21) is declared by COMTFU and was opened at 162015Lt by COM TFU and closed at 170900Lt by S3 BG. All harassing fires fired west of vert 42S TB 21 in this specific time, where in support of self defence of LL 1.0, ANSF and the Afhan people of CHORA DC. TFU troops had been observing this "confrontation line" over two weeks and TFU had several reports which state that LNs had left this area. Despite that, prior to the engagement on the night of the 16th of June, TFU PSE and PRT informed key leaders (and remaining LNs) on the fact that they had to leave the area asap. Fires shot west of vert 42S TB 21 where initiated and controlled by BG FSO from BG ops in Camp HOLLAND. A big factor of influence on this stand-off fires was the accuracy of the PzH fires shot in the morning under observation of own forces. The effect to be achieved was to disrupt the OMF with harassing fires iot prevent CHORA DC from being overrun. Single round fires were planned on known enemy hot spots and avenues of approach. By shooting one single round at the time proportionality, subsidiary and LOAC are taken into account in this self defence situation.

v) Fire support to battle group attack iso OP TROY

TFU decided not to engage pre-planned targets due to CDE regulations but only to act in case of self defence.

vi) Fire support in DEH RASHAN area

PzH shot rounds in the DEH RASHAN area. This is within the range of conventional HE ammunition. These fires were also in support of the ops TROY. Harassing fires were all shot on locations which met CDE regulations. Other fires were shot in support of TFU units, ordered to disrupt OMF, in self defence situations. Resistance in this OMF C2 node area was very fierce. Own forces observation state that the fires where very accurate.

c) Air support

i) Type of control

All air spt was controlled by qualified JTACs. Two JTACs where [redacted] capable. Almost all type III controlled missions where controlled by [redacted] capable JTACs, so the JTAC had eyes on target and the environment for proportionality, subsidiary or field CDE concerns. Some type III controls could not be controlled by [redacted] due to distance or lack of [redacted] equipment. In this case "normal" Type III controls were done.

ii) Fires in engagement area


The engagement area (west of vert 42S TB 21) is declared by COMTFU and was opened at 162015Lt by COM TFU and closed at 170900Lt by S3 BG. All air spt engagements executed in that time were under control of a JTAC.

iii) Outside line of sight target engagements

Several targets were engaged based on definitive intell reports. Field CDE concerns were taken in account by controlling JTAC and A/C pilot. Engagement is done because of targets imminent threat to the fights in CHORA DC (e.g. OMF C2 nodes).

iv) Predator control

The predator is a very useful asset for improvement of SA.



d) Deconfliction

i) General

TFU ops requested a Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ) around the CHORA area. This ROZ was 10nm wide and FL200 high. A JTAC was controlling the ROZ on WINE 07. He was responsible for all deconfliction measures in the ROZ. In some cases the JTAC requested supporting A/C to take care of airspace deconfliction, this worked out really well.

ii) Engagement box

The dedicated engagement box (east of vert 42S TB 21, west of vert 42S TB 22, north of vert 42S TB 37 and south of hor 42S TB 40) is not used for the assigned purpose (last stand for CHORA DC).

iii) GBFS – air spt

Because most JTACs were deployed east of vert 42S TB 21 they kept allocated A/C east of that grid line. Mortars were allowed to fire after approval of the controlling JTAC. PzH was allowed to fire west of vertical 42S TB 21 on demand or in the engagement area in a specified time bracket.

iv) Different air assets

Several times there were more air assets available at the same time (e.g. 2/3 sets FW spt, predator, RW). Due to the fact that there was no direct comms between TFU Joint fires desk (Windmill TOC) and WJs in CHORA one of the JTACs was assigned by WLTOC to be the controlling JTAC on scene. Joint fires desk TFU ordered all incoming A/C to stack from FL 200 up with 20000ft and to check in with the controlling JTAC on a check-in frequency (WINE 07), the controlling JTAC pushed the different A/C to other JTACs (when available) on a strike frequency (WINE 02/CYAN12).

e) KIA/WIA/BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

i) KIA/WIA

(1) OMF

OMF stated high numbers of OMF WIA and KIA after engagements with FS assets. These numbers are not confirmed yet.

(2) LNs

Till now there are no facts who prove that LNs died because of ISAF

engagements. There are LNs who state that OMF killed their families or forced them to support the OMF ops and that OMF occupied their houses.

ii) Infra structure

(1) GBFS

The observed impacts caused no collateral damage to other infra structures then the aimed target. Few collateral damage is seen by BG FSO observing UAV life feed movies from the engagement area on Sunday 17th of June. Not all impacts could be observed due to the leaves of the green zone. Last week several PRT specialists had been into that area with the intent to oversee collateral damage. In their reports they confirm that there's no collateral damage to infrastructure seen by them.

(2) Air support

(a) General

All ammunition dropped by air support assets caused no collateral damage to other infrastructures than the aimed target.

(b) Ammo problems

Four DUDs. Three exploded at a second impact with an add bomb at same location. One DUD (UXO) still missing: Tgt grid: 41s QS 76064036.

(c) Two bombs missed tgt.

(i) 100 mtrs northwest of 41s QS 76064036. No coll dam.

(ii) 150 mtrs south of 41s QS 76926446 in open field. No coll dam.

f) CONCLUSIONS

i) General

Fire support assets proved to be a big force multiplier on the battlefield. Because of these assets the enemy could be engaged on a stand off range. This is one of the reasons why there were no casualties according to the severe fights on our own troops.

ii) GBFS

(1) Ammunition

A further developed concept of shooting long range ammunition over the last months gave Joint fires the ability to advise COM TFU on the support with PzH in this extremis self defence situation. According to this concept TFU took in account the system fault and the Probable Error on this type of ammunition.

(2) Qualified Forward observers (Q-FO)

A Q-FO is the link to an enormous force multiplier. He is a high value asset for the OSC. Losing this valuable assets will significantly decrease firepower.

iii) Air support

(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a very useful system which gives the JTAC more capabilities to be used in the final guidance of A/C. Besides that it is improving the SA of [REDACTED] problem that now is the human factor. There is only one [REDACTED] available in day level, it is controlled by the JTAC. He has to [REDACTED] of PzH, PzH and UAVs. [REDACTED] in the middle of a [REDACTED] additional ROWER equipment for UAV ops controlled by a person next to the JTAC would improve the SA and creates more focus for the JTAC on his primary task.

(2) Communications

[REDACTED] has a low altitude satellite and a small bandwidth. This net is

[REDACTED]

(3) JTAC capacity
(a) Manning

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b) Equipment

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

iv) RECOMMADATIONS

(1) GBFS

(a) Ammunition

- (i) Upg rade software on muzzle velocity and MICMOS ASAP
- (ii) Look into the possibility to perform an buy of Precision guided ammunition. This ammunition will decrease the probable error iot reduce collateral damage and to improve the effects to be achieved.

(b) Qualified Forward Observer (Q-FO)

Q-FO has to be equiped with armoured vehicles to ensure their personal safety and to have the appropriate workspace to do their job properly.

(2) Air support

(a)

- (i) [REDACTED] for ground forces
- (ii) [REDACTED]

(b) Comnications

- (i) [REDACTED] and a good satellite for a workable TFU

(c) JTAC capacity

- (i) [REDACTED] for ground commanders
- (ii) [REDACTED] with armoured vehicles to ensure their personal safety and to have the appropriate workspace to do their job

CHIEF JOINT FIRES
1(NLD/AUS) TFU

Major

Supplement F (ANA-OMLT AAR report)

AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)

NR TIC: OP TROY

DTG: 150001LT JUN 07 until 212359LT JUN 07

1) AREA OF OPERATION

CHORA DC area

2) COMPOSITION OF UNIT

6x OMLT

87x ANA

6x ANP aprox

3) MISSION/CONOPS OF UNIT

a) Task

Clear the green zone from the road leading from Ali Shirzai to the river crossing up to the vertical 20.

b) Purpose

Advance from Ali Shirzai to the vertical 20, or so far as feasible. Clearing the area of OMF and regaining the area previously lost to OMF.

c) End state

ISAF/ANSF are in control of the ground lost to OMF in the beginning of the battle.

The Green zone is free of OMF and the CP's at Kalah Kalah and Nyazi are once again in control of ANSF.

4) EXECUTION

Timing DTG (LOCAL)	Action/Endstate
150001jun07	3x OMLT and 50x ANA in support of the BG in the Chora area. Operating from the brown compound. ANA is mainly defending Ali Shirzai from the outskirts to prevent OMF inserting in to the rural area.
170230jun07 aprox	The situation in Chora is assessed as critical. The decision was taken to insert the remaining OMLT and ANA from TK into Chora asap.
170900jun07	An additional 3x OMLT and 40x ANA were airlifted in to the Chora area. The initial mission was to land in to waves near the White compound to reinforce the ISAF forces at that location. If the LZ at the White compound would be unpermissive, the reinforcements would land five kilometres south of Ali Shirzai in the Desht and would perform a move to contact towards the white compound.
171500jun07	6x OMLT and 30x ANA patrolled towards the river crossing and secured it until aprox 172200jun07.
181100jun07	6x OMLT and 40x ANA secured the river crossing and performed patrol into the Green zone up to aprox 800 metres west of the MSR. Seven males were detained by the ANA, but were later released, when they were identified by the DC.
18 evening jun 07	Issue of orders concerning the attack on the terrain lost to OMF in the previous days.

Supplement F (ANA-OMLT AAR report)

190930jun07	Start of movement from the ANA/OMLT from the Brown compound to the starting line of the attack. ANA was organised in three platoons of 28 each, supported by two OMLT each. Furthermore about six ANP acted as guides through the green zone. The ANA would advance on three axis through the green zone with all three platoons deployed.
191012jun07	Start of the advance after some initial delay, caused by lack of air assets.
19 daytime jun 07	<p>Advance through the green zone. Some delay occurred when the road in the north proved to be blocked by OMF, and the Dutch coy in the north could temporarily not support the ANA coy. During the advance the following was especially remarkable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All civilians appeared to have left the battle field in good order. The cattle was placed outside to graze, the house were left tidy and all houses were locked when they where left. - OMF appeared to have left in panic. The houses they had occupied where not locked, large quantities of fresh bread where found, the tea was still moderately warm. Furthermore boxes of ICOM batteries where found half empty lying on the flour. Some marihuana, grenades and ammunition where found. - The Quala's OMF was using generally had a solid basement where they could shelter from the air raids and artillery fire as indicated by the few civilians still in the green zone. - Only about ten civilians where found still present in the green zone. They where either guarding their cattle or moving towards the bazaar of Ali Shirzai as ordered by PSE. - Civilians indicated that 60 to 100 OMF where present in the green zone at the start of the attack. They appeared to have fled in the western direction. Some where consequently killed by the supporting Dutch coys. Objectives of the attack where reached by aprox 1600 hrs.
191600jun07 aprox	1 st ANA plt was ordered to attack and conquer the CP at Kalah Kalah, 3th ANA plt was ordered to occupy the CP at Nyazi. 2 nd ANA plt would remain in place until both CP's would be in control of ANA.
191620jun07 aprox	2 nd platoon ANA was engaged by OMF in an attempt by OMF to encircle the platoon. The ANA was able to prevent the encirclement in a short but intense close range fire fight. Consequently the 2 nd platoon withdrew to the CP at Nyazi.
19 night time jun07	ANA coy was divided over the two CP's and remained there during the night.
200400jun07	ANA at CP Kalah Kalah discovered movement in the green zone. Mortars at Ali Shirzai fired illumination rounds but no OMF could be identified. Later that morning from both CP's ANA/OMLT patrols where organised back in to the green zone. Later that morning OMF started small and unorganised attacks on the CP's. These could be dealt with easily. Although the patrol from Nyazi encountered OMF during the search of some suspicious Quala's. There was an intensive close quarters fire fight after which the

Supplement F (ANA-OMLT AAR report)

	patrol could safely return to the CP.
201200jun07 aprox	Fighting in the Chora area came to a standstill and the situation appeared to have returned to normal.

5) SITUATION OWN TROOPS (INCL. COALITION FORCES)

a) Personnel

- i) KIA : 0 although one beheaded ANP was reported by the ANA.
- ii) WIA : 0
- iii) MIA : 0

b) Logistic

i) Equipment

ii) Ammunition used

5,56mm quantity unknown, 7,62mm quantity unknown, RPG 1x.

6) ENEMY

a) Intention of OMF

b) Action taken by OMF

see above

c) Possible future OMF COA

d) Detainees made by TFU

none

e) KIA/WIA/BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

NFDK but casualties by OMF are likely.

7) CIVILIANS

Involvement on infrastructure and population

Damage to Quala's was minimal. Damage to crops was minimal. No death livestock was found.

8) LOCAL AUTHORITIES/SECURITY FORCES

a) Involvement : see above

b) Impact : see above

c) KIA/WIA/MIA : see above

9) LEGAL AUTHORITIES

NFDK

10) MEDIA PRESENCE

None.

11) COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT

ANA performed excellent, especially basic infantry skills where above expectations. Total operation was a complete success!!!

Supplement F (ANA-OMLT AAR report)

COM OMLT

Supplement G (TPT rapport 19 juni 2007)

1 (NLD/AUS) TF URUZGAN

Commander

SOI PSE

Patrol report TPT



MISSION SECRET REL TO AUS / NATO / ISAF

Patrol Report PSE TPT in CHORA

Name: local people in the vicinity of Chora Coord: CHORA Date: 19-06-07

It was ~~19-06-07~~, it was 0930 in the morning. We moved to position sjerra grid TB 236 371. we moved further to position tango 2 grid TB 229 377. About 1000 hour 2 F-16 past by, a few seconds later we start to send out our message 4 times.

After we drove to the second location tango 1 grid TB 224 373 we send the message two times. We heard on the radio that several people went to the west because there was the road to the south. We also see that some people moved because we had a good view at the green zone. After sending our message at location tango 1 we moved back to our location tango 2 next to the vehicle of the bravo section of unit 3-5.

The message:

Attention, attention, this is ISAF

ANA and ANP supported by ISAF are going to destroy the Taliban.

Please leave your house and go south to a safe place.

Leave your house it will be safer for you and your children.

We are going to destroy the taliban, leave your house and go south, it is better for your safety.

Translated by interpreter _____

Attachment A Translation Pashun

Originator: _____

Date: 22-06-2007

Page 1 of 1

Supplement G (TPT rapport 19 juni 2007)

MISSION SECRET REL TO AUS / NATO / ISAF

PSyops TPT (Tactical Psyops team)

Luizgoreker bericht voor bevolking CHORA

AFH4aaLS6339

ATTENTION:

Attention, Attention, this message is not for the honorable people of Chora, but for the insurgents who are not confident enough to speak their thoughts openly. We send this message for them to receive.

SITUATION:

We know how you operate. We know that you want to pay innocent people to risk their lives for you, because you are self to scared to attack us. But we also know that the innocent people only want peace. And that they will only help you because you threaten them. The people know that ISAF and the GoA can provide them with long lasting safety and hope for the future. And if the people report to us that you threaten them, you know we will help them and find you and stop your violent acts.

CONSEQUENCE:

When you force innocent people to attack us, you know that we see them as a threat and we will have to defend ourselves. You also know that we are not here to harm people, because we want to help people instead. You say you are fighting a honorable war, but forcing other people to do the jobs you think are to dangerous, isn't honorable at all.

ACTION:

Stop using innocent people to work for you. Fight your own war. If you do not want to fight anymore, surrender to ISAF or ANP forces. We will treat you good. You can have a second chance. Everyone makes mistakes. Don't let those mistakes kill you.

REPETITION:

I repeat: We know how you operate. Stop using innocent people to work for you. You can surrender and be treated well. Choose a honorable and peaceful solution.

TIJDEN GEBED:

0430-0515 uur	Mensen mogen zelf bepalen wanneer ze bidden tussen deze tijden,
1300-1545 uur	BEHALVE als een moskee is! Dan bepaald de moskee de tijd.
1730-1830 uur	De tijden zijn op elke dag hetzelfde, ook op de vrijdag. De tijden
1910-1930 uur	veranderen wel, afhankelijk van de zonsopkomst en ondergang
2030-0300 uur	(eerder bidden of later).

Gespreksonderwerpen LS:

- We weten dat de mensen in Chora onschuldig zijn;
- We hebben dit bericht uitgezonden in de hoop dat de insurgents het ontvangen;
- Wat vond je van het bericht?
- Heb je last van insurgents en kunnen wij misschien helpen?
- Weet je iets over insurgents?
- Bijv. dat ze geld bieden om handgranaten te gooien?

Dere is ooh aan de bevolking gegeven!

Plaat + lijst ontbeld

Supplement H (SMO report CHORA)



ISITREP SMO/ Med Advisor TFU- ATF dd 240800 LT June 07

A. General

1. During the battle voor CHORA a NLD soldier [redacted] of his wounds and three NLD soldiers were lightly injured due to a mortarround exploding in a 81mm Mor tube (18th of June 2007). Casualties were MEDEVACed to the Role II NLD TK; lightly wounded returned to their unit the next day, after being treated for their wounds.
2. Two lightly wounded of the SVBIED attack in TK on the 15th of June were brought over to the Netherlands for further treatment. One of the wounded has been brought to the CMH in Utrecht for further observation and additional treatment.
3. During the raid on a IED facility in TK on the 22th of June, 13 detainees have been made. One detainee was shot in his both upperlegs, for which he had been surgically treated in the NLD Role II TK. Later that morning 4 more detainees have been made by [redacted] handed over to the NLD Detainee facility, for their involvement in the IED-production. On medical environment no further issues.
- 4.

B. Medical/ medical care issues

NSTR.

C. Medical care Afghanistan

1. Role 1
 1. General:
 1. Day-temperatures this week around 35-40 Degrees Celsius (Heat-stress index was BLACK entire period)
 2. Medical complaints mostly on skin disorders.
 2. KAF: NSTR
 3. TK: NSTR
 4. DR: NSTR
2. NLD Role 2 (enhanced) TK
 1. General: NSTR
 2. Hospitalizations: 26 in total, of which: 17 x ISAF (5 x WIA, 1 x NBI, 11 x Dis), 2 x ANSF (WIA), 6 x LN (2 x WIA, 3 x NBI, 1 x dis) and 1 x detainee (WIA).
 3. Average use of IC Beds: 24%
 4. Average use of Care Beds: 46%
 5. Evacuated to other facilities/ MTF's: 2
 6. Surgical operations: 7 in total: (2 x ISAF, 1 x ANSF, 3 x LN, 1 x detainee).
 7. Clinical consults: 6 in total, of which: 1 x ISAF (NBI), 3 x ANSF (WIA) en 2 x LN (NBI).
 8. Deceased: 2 in total, of which: (1 x ISAF, 1 x LN)
 9. Work placement SF-medics 1306-1107 on Role 2 TK, Role 1 DR, Role 3 KAF
3. Role 3 KAF:
NSTR
4. NLD bloodbanks:
 1. General: NSTR
 2. KAF: operational
 3. TK: operational
 4. Helmand: operational

D. Rotary Wing Medevac capacity

1. Medevac- requests by TFU:
 - 18 Juni: Chora- TK due to wounded of use of 81mm Mor.

Supplement H (SMO report CHORA)

Supplement H (SMO report CHORA)

- 18 Juni: Chora- TK due to ANP WIA
 - 19 Juni: Poentjak- TK due to NLD soldier with appendicitis.
 - 21 Juni: DR-TK due to 2 LNs with shotwounds involved in family related conflict.
 - 23 Juni: Chora/Sarab-TK due to NLD soldier with severe de-hydration.
2. Total amount of other MEDEVAC missions to Role II NLD TK : none

E. Assessment support to local national healthcare facilities and/or local national population.

1. Chora: Assessed due to fightings around Chora 61 local nationals were brought to CHC- Chora (comprehensive health center): 56 x shrapnel-/ bulletwounds, 5 x burning wounds. 11 wounded referred to TK Hospital, of whom one patient being treated by Role II TK NLD (child with gunshot wound to lower leg) and two patients being treated by US FST FOB RIPLEY. AT the end of this week all patients that were submitted were once again discharged. Originated shortages on immediate used medication (first direct aid) in CHC-CHORA (especially analgetics, antibiotics, intravenous fluids) on request of the AHDS by PRT TK being measured by delivering available MEDCAP-medication.
2. DR: Sick call Camp Tycz expired by Medical support platoon C-coy DR for use at CHORA (delivered by Role I DR one medical transport group).

F. HPG NSTR

G. REPATS / Specialistical research

- 21 June: 3 soldiers BG TFU arrive by shuttle at EINDHOVEN from KABUL.
1. 1 x relapsed kidney-stone.
 2. 2 x shrapnel-/ burns after IED attack of 15th of June.

Supplement I

Report AAR COM BG on the Battle of CHORA 15th-21st of June 07

AAR on the battle of Chora 15th – 21st of June 2007

During the period of 26th until 16th of June, the situation in and around Chora was tense but under control. Almost daily TICs occurred varying in intensity and duration, but always demanding full attention for the proper balance of use of power and used assets. Depending of the threat assessments, I decided from time to time to attach more force elements in Chora or withdraw some wherever possible. This also heavily depended on forces needed elsewhere in the AOR for operations, either being counter-insurgency, force protection operations, or combat operations.

The 16th of June at 0400, an attack was launched by the OMF from the west with a secondary attack in the east. At that moment two motorized platoons and 50 pax ANA were present in Chora. At first, it seems to be an attack as we already got used to, trying to harass our operations and demoralize the ANSF at the checkpoints. However, the intensity of mortar fire and the amount of forces deployed by OMF later that day showed that we were dealing with a different type of attack. At the end of the afternoon, the ANP checkpoints in the west were overrun and the pressure on Sarab hill was enormous. Even in the city center fights were going on. The present and available coalition forces were not able to control the situation and the district center was about to fall into enemy hands. The first displaced persons told stories of execution of civilians by OMF and use of force to fight alongside the OMF.

OSC asked me what to do, was ISAF about to extract or do we stand?

I discussed the situation with Com TFU and due to the strategic value of preserving Chora and not abandon the afghans and offer them to OMF' revenge, the decision was made to stand and hold. During this meeting also the difficulties of defending at night and the possible collateral damage that might occur, were discussed. All items were discussed in length and all possible measures to prevent collateral damage were taken, but also the threat on both afghan population and coalition forces were taken into account.

Although the chance of civilian casualties was identified, we decided that Chora was to be defended at all costs. We decided to engage the strong line (vertical 21 more or less) with artillery and attack point targets with FW under the control of JFACs. Due to the impossibility of direct observations, the artillery fire was led from within the HQ. before we started to engage OMF, we contacted the ANP, ANA and local leaders to inform the population to move to the east and inform us about the moment all that were able were east of the vertical 21.

I ordered some force elements to prepare to move with me to Chora ASAP, and I simultaneously started a fire support campaign for the besieged troops at Chora.

When I arrived at Chora early in the morning of the 17th, the pressure on the OMF (arty and fw) had forced the OMF to withdraw from the city center and to regroup/reorganize both in the east and west. We encountered 80-100 displaced persons leaving the city. They informed us about the killing of civilians by OMF, but also some caused by our fire support. They were thankful for our decision to stay and hoped they could return to their homes soon. We also visited the city hospital, and tried to identify the necessary help they needed. The first need was the transport of injured people. After intermediation this was executed by 12-15 vehicles the next day!

During the day I commanded the fights in the eastern sector, while the western sector regrouped. At 2000, after reinforcing my coy commander with two platoons, I moved back under protectic _____ K for planning future operations.

Supplement I

Report AAR COM BG on the Battle of CHORA 15th-21st of June 07

My staff presented me the COA with regard to a possible counterattack. I decided to attack robust and quick in order to solve the problem with OMF in Chora decisively. My ~~own battlegroup was reaching its culmination point soon, due to the operations in our AOR the last three weeks~~ (both personnel and material). Early morning on the 18th I presented my plan to Com TFU, who agreed to engage the OMF according to this plan.

I reorganized the battle group and I moved with a significant ~~extra force~~ (4 extra platoons and a coy staff) back to Chora. In Chora I did my orderbrief to my subordinated commanders (Com Acoy, Com B Coy and the Com ANA coy). I also coordinated with militia leaders that wanted to join us in order to liberate the DC.

Due to the available extra forces I changed my plan for the counterattack. I identified better communication and coordination measures; therefore the plan could be adapted to the new situation.

It was also clear that my subunits were at the end of their strength due to the heavy combat they had seen in both the Derafshan area and Chora. They were tired, but full of confidence with the plan and followed without any complaint!

19th of June, 1000 hrs, the attack was launched after TPT had informed the OMF to leave the area within 20 mins or lay down their weapons.

My BG attacked over 3 axes of advance in the west, a screening operation in the southeast and a simultaneous attack of militia at Sarab en the greenzone between Sarab and the DC.

All fire support was ~~to be approved by me personally~~ in order to coordinate with force movements and to discriminate possible collateral damage.

After 8 hours of severe fighting, we reached the western entrance of the Chora valley and was the eastern sector under control.

Directly after consolidating, ANSF (ANA) took over the former checkpoints Kala Kala and Niazi and started patrolling the greenzone in between. The BG forces were in overwatch and I withdrew the unneeded troops to the dasht south of Chora.

Not earlier than the 23rd of June all was quiet and could I return to a force presence equal to the presence of the period before June 16th.

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AFTER ACTION REVIEW OPERATION "AARDSCHOK" (EARTHQUAKE)

Today I received the message that I had to write an AAR on our operations in CHORA during the fighting.

In this letter I will outline the fights, focus in detail on a number of highlights and touch on our lessons learned as much as possible

The precise dates I have to check with the radio logbook that is being kept at the Bat OPS.

I will start my story with the night from 13 to 14 June 2007. 1 InfPlt was present in an opsbox 1,5km NE of ALI SHISAI when we received the message from the Bat OPS, during the night, that there were OMF-activities of approx 300 fighters in SARI (800m in front of 1 InfPlt)

According to the duty-officer this information was received from

Later on in the night we had air assets overhead to watch, among other locations, SARI and then a quala was found in which potentially a number of OMF were sleeping. We could see hi

the images were not completely clear and requested a recon flight by our AH's. It took a long time until finally the message came from TK that no flight would be carried out.

Lessons Learned: Determine possible targets by using, for instance, the AH-64D.

For days we had been asking for an extension of the ROE's. During the first fights around the post KALA KALA in CHORA we had ROE available. With the ending of OP RABENHAUPT these ROE's were no longer mandated to me. The BG was also working hard to get these ROE's for the troops in CHORA. It was a long time coming.

The situation in the rest of the area was, that there was occasional shooting near the posts on the W-boundary and there was reporting of a concentration of troops in the East, near SARAB.

At the White Compound it was a coming and going of policemen, tribal leaders, village elders and many others, who wanted to see the district chief or us for whatever reason.

During the night from 14 to 15 June the opsbox NE of the city had been taken over by 2 InfPlt. 2 InfPlt was informed about the imminent threat in SARI, the many possible fighters that were spotted by 1 InfPlt and they were actively observing the sector. The District Centre itself was closed off by ANA units.

Earlier in the night 2 InfPlt had observed a lot of activity in position. From "Deterrence" we went over to "Fight" when weapons became visible and confirmation was received that we were firing in the right direction with our guns.

On the day of the 15th June we checked a number of quala's together with ANA. This had no result.

Because my 1st and 2nd platoon had been active for a while in the opsboxes W and E of the town, I decided to pull back these platoons to the WC for the following night. Early in the morning of 16 June we received a message about the moving of troops from the East towards SARAB. Via group of approx 80 pax could be seen, who were moving in single column S around the SARAB valley. Fixed Wing was overhead and I reported to the Bat OPS, that I perceived the column as a threat, although no weapons could be seen. At that

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moment there was no senior present at the Bat OPS. The Fixed Wing had to leave in support of a TIC near a US FOB.

During this phase I really missed the mandate.

Lessons learned: Give the right mandate to a unit on time. An attack could not be avoided in these days and was just a matter of time.

Around 0500 hrs fire-fights started near the CP KALA KALA and NIASI with a large group of OMF. The DC is asleep and his phone is switched off. Also the battery has run empty when he does turn it on. The 2 platoons at the WHITE COMPOUND were woken up and immediately directed to the opsbox NE of the town. 3 InfPlt was in firing contact almost immediately at CP NIASY, receiving fire also from quala's at the vertical 21. AH-64D were in support near the Westboundary, engaging targets and flew to the East to observe the situation. However on the East side were no targets to be seen. I indicate OMF advancement in the East around the police posts in that area. At the perimeter of the town, groups of men were spotted advancing towards the centre. Because they could not be PID, shots were fired overhead from the opsbox NE and from the rooftop of the WHITE COMPOUND to keep them at bay.

3 InfPlt was combating targets by direct fire in the greenzone in the area of vertical 21 and around both police posts. TB-leader SADAM was killed in this fight.

It could be heard that there was heavy fighting going on in the East on and around the police posts. Smoke could be seen on SARAB hill. Targets could still not be identified from the air.

Around the CP KALA KALA and NIASI the situation around 09.30 hrs was that there was enormous firing from several directions both directed at the posts and at 3 InfPlt. During this turmoil a live hand grenade exploded inside a PATRIA APC. The vehicle could not move anymore at that time. Meanwhile the OMF had started to use 82mm mortars against the posts and the position of 3 InfPlt.

CAS engaged targets on the West boundary and I had to call back 3 InfPlt to my location in order to repair the PATRIA and to look after the PC, who broke a finger under one of the hatches.

When 3 InfPlt was gone from the opsbox, I sent 2 InfPlt to take over their positions, after a short recap. At 12.41 hrs MUTALIB, HEKMAT and SOLMAI (TB cdrs) started a new attack on the West boundary.

In the SARAB-valley [redacted] fallen into TALIBAN hands and his house was surrounded. TALIBAN had positions in several locations and when we had a PID we were able to engage these targets with our own means and with CAS. 12 and 24 conducted these operations on the West boundary.

At 16.26 hrs 24 supported 12 in advancing north towards the West boundary in support of post NIASI. 10 minutes later 12 was in a firing contact and 24 was under attack from mortars. Using the "sawing" method, 24 had to fight targets also at the edge of the village QUAL EH YE RAGH, square 2237 on the map. Enemy mortar positions were engaged by our own mortar group. Within 5 minutes we had destroyed 2 mortar positions, but especially mortar fire directed at the posts persisted. At 16.59 hrs the ANP abandoned the KALA KALA post. The posts had run out of ammunition and the police car sped East in a shower of bullets. 12 saw the body of a policeman that was killed in the crossfire falling from the back of the car. Another policeman that was following on a motorbike did not get far either. The retreat of the remaining handful of policemen was partly covered by 24 and by the AH-64D's that had arrived a bit later. At 18.32 hrs the platoons at the West boundary reported 50% Class 5 (ammunition). At dusk it was still turbulent in the Western part of the district and in the SARAB valley.

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After the post at NIASI had fallen, I called back 2 InfPlt partially to vertical 215 and vertical 225. The road from BALUCHI to ALI SHIRSAI is canalising with a capital C and the danger of being cut off was large.

Lessons learned:

1. A large PRT delegation is needed in high threat areas
2. A plan for humanitarian aid should be made as standard. We knew the clinic in the town was not more than a general practitioners practice. We knew that refugees could come to the town. We knew that fighting causes damage.
3. As the boss I say with hindsight: "If only I had known about the ABARKI-system from DW". This is the defence of areas organised and led by tribal elders and village elders. All you need is a strong leader in the district. Therefore impossible in CHORA. The arrival of _____ changed this and he managed to make it work.
4. During pauses in the fighting I called back units to re-supply and recuperate. The actual staring into the eyes of your men is important. I swapped 3 InfPlt for 2 InfPlt after this.

In the night from 16 to 17 June a number of targets were engaged by CAS. Among these were the objects 4022, 4074 and 4131.

On the 17 June it is quiet at 05.00hrs. At 05.45 hrs Cdr ANA reports that TALIBAN have taken positions in the village of QUAL EH YE RAGH.

Near 2 InfPlt's location and 24 large groups of people are moving from the West. These groups vary in size from 100, 75 and 60 pax, taking casualties with them in wheelbarrows and sometimes in the trailer of a tractor. 2 InfPlt also witnesses the burying of a large group of bodies in a large grave in the area of vertical 223.

ANA reports that TALIBAN have sent people away from their homes on the West side.

Local Police reports that the house of _____ (Chief of Police in SARAB) has been destroyed and that it is unknown where _____ (the cdr on SARAB-hill) is.

At 09.17 hrs I send the OMLT to the clinic to size up the situation. At that moment there are 11 wounded and 1 deceased persons. All shops are closed in the town. CH-47's arrive to reinforce ANA. We send 3R along to have his broken finger looked after.

Most of the day there is a lot of _____ about upcoming actions in SARAB and _____ on preparations and movement of the TALIBAN.

"Where is the ASP?" is a question many in CHORA ask at that time.

During the day there is sporadic SAF from the West and an occasional explosion can be heard. _____ reported that there is fighting between groups of TALIBAN.

_____ enough Class V (ammunition) for everyone and orders all to go back.

05 is hopeful when they leave for SARAB-valley to support, but gets into a firing contact in the "saddle" towards SARAB-valley. The saddle is controlled by TALIBAN. With CAS identified targets on the ridgeline are engaged.

At 17.20 hrs the recce-platoon is in a firing contact on the Southbank (252 381). The group of TALIBAN is growing stronger and possibly there are people coming from a nearby mosque (253 386)

_____ overheard:

- The post on SARAB is on fire
- The Saddle (292 388) is controlled by TALIBAN
- At MASAR GHAR has to be a TALIBAN C2 location.

With occasional firing contacts and active target engagements we enter the night.

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The morning of 18 June has an early start. There are approx 100 pax in front of the WHITE COMPOUND among which are a number of tribal leaders. _____ party wants to go to SARAB and we are asked not to fire in the triangle of BARAKZAI. They are going to take care of the situation themselves it is promised. _____ wants to keep his own area free of any enemy (village KARBALA). 24 runs into a firing contact and while the crowd receives directions, we support 24 with our mortar group.

In front of the WHITE COMPOUND people are shouting for ammunition and weapons. The DC is going around aimlessly nagging for ammunition. I take him aside and instruct him to have all friendly forces wear a red/white ribbon around their arm. The roll of ribbon disappears quickly into the crowd and again I take him apart for a quick talk. I give him 15 minutes to sort things out, otherwise the whole thing will be called off. With the use of a loudspeaker finally some structure can be out into the situation. The tape, thickly wrapped around heads and weapons, is put around the right arm. I take the DC and the CoP aside to ask them to use their supplies, which I know they have. _____ police chief leaves and returns with a vehicle full of ammunition. Together with the DC I walk to his residence on the WHITE COMPOUND. There is a lot there. A ridiculous amount actually for his own bodyguards. When in the office, an explosion causes pieces of the ceiling to fall down and shatters windows. An explosion in one of our mortar positions results in 1 KIA and 3 WIA of our own troops. A tragic accident.

It needs no further explanation that this has an enormous impact on a unit.

Meanwhile the gathered militia have been put into vehicles and moves in column, escorted by 05, on the south bank towards SARAB-valley.

Later on in the afternoon at 15.39 hrs 05 once again runs into a firing contact on the south bank. Use of .338 and .50 wins us the battle.

At the end of the afternoon an ANP casualty is announced to us, who was hit in the face. Everything below the nose is missing. Later on, at the end of the afternoon the wounded finally arrives, just as Cdr BG is present at the WHITE COMPOUND himself to plan the counterattack. A request for MEDEVAC is put forward and the casualty (still alive) is transported to TK.

Early in the evening there is again some 82 mm mortar fire. These targets are engaged by Windmill 68 and 66. Also a C2 node is pointed out by militia fighters and 05 is able to identify the object by insight into the terrain and the object can be engaged by Windmill 68. The rest of the evening was mainly taken up by commanding the troops, mostly via radio. In the morning of 19 June, unit 26 and its assets arrived on the base en also 12 came to our location. By using a large drawing and the commanders kit (box of building blocks) we repeated the planned move.

We were able to conduct the move according to plan. When moving forward 26 encountered a barrier made out of rocks of 500-1000 kgs. After conducting the search I moved the EOD up from the WHITE COMPOUND to clear the barrier, together with 26 and G.

All this time we had a ridgeline team in the mountains N of our location, consisting of 4 pax _____ from 2 InfPlt. As the operation progressed they played an important role. They were invaluable for marking targets for CAS and fighting TALIBAN by direct fire.

Eventually we could press on after the rocks were blown up. The outer line of ANA we coordinated on the batconet. The choice was made for the wadi N-S near vertical 20. ANA were tempted into running after a TALIB on vertical 20 and had become stuck with 1 platoon in the greenzone. Supported by FIXED WING they struggled their way back to NIASI. Following on both posts were occupied by ANA and our OMLT.

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In support (because ANA has no heavy weapons and no night vision capability) unit 26 and 05 remained active in the area near both posts.

Lessons learned:

1. **Deployment of a group on high ground has proved useful. They can observe, mark targets and fight targets.**
2. **Fire coordination during a contact is difficult when there are units fighting both North and South. Bullets fired from the south ricocheted and landed between the units in the north.**

So far this is my account on the fighting up to an including the counterattack.

Supplement K
REPORT Cdr B-Coy BG TFE-3 TFU ISAF

From: TK BG-CP01-B_COY
Sent: woensdag 27 juni 2007 10:19
To: TK BG-CP01-CMD
Subject: AAR 15-21 juni (UK)

What proceeded:

In the period proceeding the 15th of June tension rose in particular in CHORA. Out of several conversations in the area of operations it became clear that the OPPOSING MILITARY FORCES (OMF) would pick up their weapons again after the poppy harvest was finished. The poppy harvest in the DARAFSHAN area would end by the third week of May. To counter this threat the operation HUNTER FOX started in close cooperation with [redacted] (the commander's intent behind this operation was to get insight in the reported gathering of OMF in the entrance of the BALUCHI VALLEY/ north side of the DARAFSHAN area with specific focus on the C2 nodes. During the entire operation there were engagements with OMF on a daily basis. During the first 2 days we received mainly 82mm mortar fire and small arms fire (SAF). On day 3 there was a large scale attack on the observation post of 69 [redacted]. This engagement lasted over 2 hours, even the deployment of fixed wing and armoured artillery had no noticeable effect on the attacking OMF. Simultaneously the OMF seemed to have started a new campaign aimed at the CF and GoA LoC by placing IED's. Since [redacted] D-facilitators could not be more specified at that point in time it was decided to do a SOFT KNOCK TOCK SEARCH (SKTS) on two qualas that were suspected. The first one took place on the 9th of June on the quala 141, just north of the PB POENTJAK. The operation was executed with ANA, 24, 69 and 05. The result was 2 small arms, 2 hand grenades and the remains of some (Dutch) mortar grenades. The main effect of the operation was to send out the signal to OMF that the CF is actively searching for IED-facilitators. Due to the deteriorating situation I deployed with 24 en 69 to a staging area (SA) south of CHORA (a location better know as the saddle). We immediately received fire from the ridge on our Westside. This location was engaged with 25mm and 81mm MR. [redacted] a foreign military advisor got killed. The next day we linked up with 26 and 00R on our location. Since the tension in the area did not increase any further at that time, I moved back to TK with 26 and 00R. 24 stayed in the saddle and drew fire whenever moving further north. The following day (13th of June) we re-supplied the ANP post of MAZULLAH and the ANP posts in the CHORA district with ammunition. At the end of the day of the 14th I deployed 69 in a screening position around the village of SEYYEDAN, and specific the quala 329. The quala supposedly belonged to an IED facilitator.

15th of June 2007:

At daybreak on the 15th 24 joined the SA of 26, just south of the village of SEYYEDAN. At 0600 the inner and outer cordon were established. To our surprise only women and children were present in the quala. The ANA warned the inhabitants to come out of the quala. They entered the quala and secured it within minutes. This phase was direct followed by an intensive search executed by G (engineers) and 26. Result of the operation was 3 small arms, a few hand grenades, some fuses, stacks of documents, Pakistani money and passports. Due to the portraits on the wall ANA was convinced that they were at the right location. The operation was finished around 11.30 and all units returned to the staging area. Around midday we saw a huge explosion in the centre of TK. It turned out to be a SVBIED attack on the patrol of 25. The first armoured personnel carrier was heavily damaged and we suffered 1 KIA

and 3 WIA. Amongst the civilian casualties were a lot of children who were running alongside our vehicles at the time of the explosion. Immediately following the explosion with 25, the SA of the SKTS was attacked by 1x107mm rocket and SAF (probably PKM) from the direction of FEROSHA. After we returned fire with 25mm I moved out with 26 and 69 towards the KOWTWAL CROSSING. 24 was supposed to stay behind to monitor the effects of the SKTS in the area. Following the exchange of fire I decided to move 24 to SHAH MANSUR since I did not want to leave them engaged on the WESTBANK. Staying behind with 24 myself was not an option since it became clear that one of the soldiers of 25 was (almost certainly) KIA. While moving towards the KOWTWAL CROSSING, 26 were fired upon for the second time by SAF from unknown direction. 26 followed the riverbed of the RUD E DARAFSHAN southwards. On the crossing of the RUD E DARAFSHAN and the TERI RUD, they again drew SAF from the green zone. The ANA dismounted and tried to find the source of the SAF but were unsuccessful. 24 moved to a RON ivo SHAH MANSUR.

16th of June 2007:

Due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in CHORA, 24 was deployed north of the saddle, where they were engaged immediately. In the course of the day the situation deteriorated further, which led to the decision to bind OMF at the entrance of the BALUCHI VALLEY. The intent of that operation was to draw OMF assets away from CHORA and tie them at both ends of the BALUCHI VALLEY. Around 1700 26 and 69 were deployed in CROW 1

17th of June 2007:

26 deployed in CROW 2 at first light. 69 remained in CROW 1. Somewhere around 1000, 26 was engaged from the green zone and within minutes 26 also drew fire at CROW 2 with 82mm, RPG's and SAF. Despite of CAS by 2x A10, the OMF did not withdraw and the engagement sustained for more than 2 hours. During the engagement, 26 received that OMF were to be reinforced by 150 fighters coming from the CHORA area. Furthermore a number of OMF key-leaders were present in the DARAFSHAN area during the operation (MULLAH AMANULLAH and HAMDULLAH AKHUNZADA). Besides that the encounter was much more intense and fierce then on previous occasions and OMF deployed more weaponry. Before last light we moved out to SHAH MANSUR to do a dismounted patrol. The overwatch was engaged with a burst of PKM, but since we were not able to find a point of origin we did not return fire.

18th of June 2007:

26 and 69 went RTB at first light that morning. In the cause of the morning the situation deteriorated in such a way that it was decided to deploy 26 and 69 once again in the saddle. 35 and 11 joined us at that location at the end of the day. In the afternoon I went to the WHITE COMPOUND (WC) together with 00R to make the plans for the next day. Later that evening I briefed 26, 69, 35 and 11 on the current situation and the plans for the next day, knowing that the combat organisation was to be adjusted by first light the next day.

19th of June 2007:

26 and 69 reported to 10R on the WC to receive further orders. I myself started my issue of orders at 0600 that morning for the operation on the southern axle. At 1000

Supplement K
REPORT Cdr B-Coy BG TFE-3 TFU ISAF

we passed the SL and 35 were almost directly engaged from the green zone. 35 countered this with 25mm and 81mm. 24 advanced towards the police post KALA KALA and deployed on the southern mountain ridge followed by 11. At the point when 24 and 11 were in position on the South and 26 and 12 in the North the ANA advanced through the green zone. Especially this movement led to huge distress amongst OMF probably because they did not foresee this. During this advance OMF engaged ANA several times by SAF en RPG. With 25mm and CAS several groups of OMF were attacked. Around noon the ANP Post of KALA KALA and NIAZY were recaptured and occupied by ANA. After ANA started their patrol schedule through the green zone, 24 and 11 moved back to the SA. 35 stayed in position in the saddle.

20th of June 2007:

In the morning I went for re-supplies to the WC with 24. Afterwards 24 deployed again on the Southern ridge till 18.30 then moved back once again to the SA.

21st of June 2007:

At 07.00 moved back to TK.

OC Bcoy 42 BG ,

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST HEALTH

Brief summary visit Chora Health Centre (CHC) JUNE 220915 – JUNE 221115 2007

The objective of the visit was twofold: to assess the actual state of affairs concerning the wounded civilians within the CHC and to find leads from medical staff concerning persistent rumors on gross human rights violations (HRV) that were allegedly committed in the period June 16-19 in the vicinity of Chora. In summary the conclusion would be that the situation concerning the wounded civilians does not reflect the reports that were submitted during the days of the fighting and that relevant figures will have to be scaled down. As for the HRV, initial assessment would be that they were in fact committed, and that scale and ferocity need further investigation.

The exchange of views with the medical staff was conducted in one of the rooms on the compound of the CHC, the venue where the pharmacy and operating rooms are located. The following facts of relevance can be summarized as follows:

- The number of patients that entered into the CHC on the first day of fighting (JUNE 16) was confirmed as 42;
- The number of patients admitted during the following days concur with the figures as reported by FS-H over the last week;
- As of yesterday all patients have been discharged. Currently the CHC has no patients under treatment;
- The medical emergency supplies that were sent by pouch from TK(PRT) to CHC on JUNE 20 have in fact arrived (pictures available);
- From the lengthy discussion on nature of injuries treated and type of treatment it transpired that all but five patients had suffered battle injuries. The other five had suffered severe burns (see below);
- The medical staff has managed to record cell phone movie of approx 16 mins., all of which was shot on the first day of fighting.
- The tour we made through the medical facilities included a male inpatient room, female inpatient room, delivery room, bathrooms, laboratory, doctor's room and a pharmacy (pictures available). Remarkably, the trolley in the first aid room was covered with pinkish stains, that could later be identified as Gentian Blue (a fluid that is commonly used for treatment of burns);
- The overall impression would be that all primary health care facilities, including supplies are available; the state of facilities can be described as clean and well maintained. Staff was cooperative and appears professional. However, they feel unprotected and therefore cannot leave the medical compound for safety reasons. On top, they indicated to be fearful of Tabiban revenge any time.
- As for the patients that were brought in with severe burns, Dr. Matiullah (the pharmacist) indicated these were probably not injuries caused by battle. He specified that he had seen a woman that suffered from 3rd degree burns (100%), and two males (50%) and two children with similar injuries.
- As the discussion as to the cause of the injuries was inconclusive, the case should be further looked into, to more so as Dr. Matiullah indicated that there may be more cases that he is not aware of.

Supplement L

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST HEALTH

Brief summary of meetings held and places visited from JUNE 231900 – JUNE 251500

1) Following the meeting at the ANP station in SARAB JUNE 23, our interpreter [redacted] with us an observation based on conversations he had with locals over the last few days. More specifically, a number of locals have confirmed the story that:

- The first days of the fighting OMF have kept local inhabitants in a qala North West of SARAB. They were unable to leave their house as the qala was in the line of fire. OMF then either killed the locals, subsequently provoked CF aerial assault that proved accurate (destroying the evidence), or the locals were killed by a CF aerial attack that missed the OMF target and hit the qala instead. The number of locals killed allegedly does not exceed 10 pax.

Note: Firstly, either way the result is approx ten civilian casualties. Secondly, the security situation prevented us from visiting the site North West of SARAB. Thirdly, again the confirmation of the incident probably does not derive from eye witnesses.

2) JUNE 24 FS-H and FS-L accompanied a platoon that was to visit QAL'A-I-RAGH and AWI to conduct damage assessment. That would constitute an opportunity to assess rumours about IDP's in the vicinity of settlements mentioned. At the crossing near NYAZI, however, increased ICOM transmissions that OMF attack was imminent in combination with OMF observed near CEMETERY HILL (own eyes) made us stay put. An ANA/CF foot patrol was sent toward the green zone. No fire contact ensued. Further intrusion into the green zone was aborted.

At NYAZI, south of the crossing near ABDULLAHKHAN, we observed two qala's that had obviously been hit by aerial bombardment, each missing one side of the surrounding qala walls. The security situation prevented us from conducting inspections at close range. (Pictures from afar are available).

3) JUNE 24 FS-H and FS-L had a brief conversation with [redacted] CHORA who was willing to share his experience over the last week [redacted] who claims to be a medically trained professional, runs a pharmacy in CHORA and is married to a [redacted] wife. [redacted] contends he acted as a medical relief worker the first few days of hostilities in CHORA. For unknown reasons he was dismissed by the CHORA Health Centre (CHC), at which point he decided to act on his own. He asserts to have been medically active for three days, but was not able to present us with facts to substantiate this claim.

[redacted] however did confirm the number of admissions at the CHC on the first day of the fighting as 42. In addition, he indicated he had seen over 10 casualties being brought into the CHC that very day.

What raised our suspicion was his profound interest in the whereabouts of PRT employee [redacted] who until recently occupied the position of tribal advisor. Additionally, [redacted] was unable to present us with any substantial details on his medical relief activities during the first days of the hostilities. He could not elaborate on basic medical treatment and was not aware of commonly used medicine.

4) JUNE 25 at 0800 FS-H and FS-L revisited the CHC, meeting with pharmacist [redacted]. A pending issue of collecting the mobile phone film clip was speedily resolved, although [redacted] is hesitant to provide us with it. Upon reassurance that the film would be for strictly-limited ISAF use only (to be specific, transcription of audio fragments only to assess crucial details on number of casualties and wounded), [redacted] was persuaded to hand over his mobile phone. The film was retrieved at the OPS ROOM [redacted] and subsequently transported to TK. The mobile phone is currently in possession of [redacted] brought back to him in a second visit around 10H30.

Supplement L

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5) Initial summary of the audio fragments from the 16 minute mobile phone film clip that was shot t
1 the first day of hostilities IVO CHORA (JUNE 16).

- A number of patients injured IVO QAL'A-I-RAGH are being interviewed by medical staff while under medical treatment in CHC. While they exchange their experience and elaborate on their wounds, they indicate to have witnessed OMF assault first, followed by CF aerial attack. Three patients explicitly mention this sequence of events.
- They tell the interviewer about their relatives that survived the hostilities and at some instance the patients mention exact number of fatalities.
- Based on the account of five adult patients, the number of fatalities can be estimated at 25 civilians (on the first day IVO QAL'A-I-RAGH).

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST HEALTH

Brief summary visit SARAB JUNE 231230 – JUNE 231930 2007

The objective of the field trip was to pay a visit to the ANP station in Sarab, to make the first enquiries after the hostilities that took place JUNE 16 – JUNE 19 and to find further leads (positive or negative) on gross human rights violations (GHRV) that were allegedly committed in SARAB and the immediate vicinity.

In summary the conclusion would be that from a security perspective the situation in Sarab and vicinity is relatively stable, be it that north-west of SARAB one qala is said to be still occupied by OMF. Local ANP however contended that said qala does not pose any immediate threats. As for the humanitarian aspects some traces found in the CHORA Health Center (CHC) were confirmed as having derived from SARAB. In addition, a number of killings committed by OMF were confirmed by our ANP counterparts.

The exchange of views with the ANP was conducted in the main building on the ANP compound. The following facts of relevance can be summarized as follows:

- As for the general security situation it was observed that people were out on the streets, making contact with ISAF by waving and smiling.
- Upon arrival immediate contact was established with two youngsters who confirmed that at the onset of hostilities most of the civilian population had fled to the mountainous area north and south-west from SARAB. The number of civilians within SARAB (and its immediate vicinity) during the fighting had therefore been limited. Hence civilian casualties as a result of ISAF intervention are nil, be it that OMF revenge on civilians as a result of ISAF presence in the area has caused the death of at least 10 people.
- After the ISAF operations OMF had fled from SARAB, save for a small number of OMF that had retracted to a qala north-west of SARAB. Security concerns were limited, but still prevented us from traveling into that direction.
- As for the humanitarian aspects that came to the fore, the number of patients that have been treated in CHC originating from SARAB amounts to approx 15-20.
- The wife and brother of ANP commander [redacted] were confirmed as murdered by OMF and subsequently burnt. Note: these victims account for two of the five fatalities due to burns as registered in CHC.
- The rumor of OMF intruding into a qala, taking the occupant family as hostages and subsequently provoking ISAF aerial assault was confirmed by our ANP counterparts. Note: ISAF confirmation on the assault IVO SARAB is still required.
- On our way toward SARAB a woman mourning at a fresh grave near SARAB was observed. The number of fresh graves at the cemetery was estimated as no more than 5. (Note: the estimation was made while driving by, therefore no accurate counting was possible).
- The rumor concerning 10 people with their throats slit lying in the street that had allegedly been observed IVO SARAB, could not be confirmed by our counterparts. According to the latest, more accurate account said atrocity was committed IVO CHORA. Further details may be forthcoming following additional enquiries in CHORA.
- Similarly, to date no confirmation has been obtained concerning the rumor of an old man that was caught by OMF in CHORA, who was forced to put on a suicide belt containing explosives and subsequently detonated.
- Following the leads obtained over the last few days, and in line with the planning of 1.1, currently the intention is to accompany 1.1 today in their patrol to AWI. This will be done to follow-on information that a number of IDP's is said to still reside IVO AWI. Reports to follow.

**FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST HEALTH
SUMMARY REPORT FS-H AND FS-L ON FIELD VISIT JUNE 21-25 2007**

From JUNE 211200 until JUNE 251730 FS-H and FS-L were on mission IVO CHORA. The objective was to assess the actual state of affairs concerning the wounded civilians within the CHORA Comprehensive Health Centre (CHORA CHC) and to clarify persistent rumours on human rights violations (HRV) that were allegedly committed in the period JUNE 16-19 IVO CHORA.

During the five day mission FS-H and FS-L, accompanied by force protection, were able to visit CHORA, SARAB, QAL'A-I-RAGH, NYAZI and the immediate vicinities of the settlements mentioned. Over five days two HF radio message reports were sent out to TK HQ, a third report was drafted upon return. The three reports are annexed to this summary report.

In brief, the following preliminary conclusions can be presented:

- While the exact number of fatalities and wounded civilians is difficult to establish, interviews with local population combined with a visit to the CHORA CHC seem to confirm figures that were initially presented (30-40 fatalities and approx. 70 wounded civilians). By the time of visit to the CHORA CHC all patients had been discharged by JUNE 20.
- Taking into account the obvious caveats (limited mobility to conduct investigation, the likelihood that patients may not have reached medical facilities/treatment etc.) these figures are probably not precise but they give an estimation based on a visit of the main locations where CF activities were executed.
- Further enquiries at other, currently less-permissive locations may reveal additional information notably on OMF HRV.
- Rumours on human rights violations by OMF are persistent, notably IVO SARAB and QAL'A-I-RAGH. People assisting or cooperating with ISAF were likely victims, though personal or tribal rivalries may also have taken their toll. While facts are hard to establish, several interviewees claim that OMF have killed and subsequently burned at least three civilians. In addition, the case of OMF taking at least 10 civilians hostages IVO SARAB that led to their death was confirmed by several sources. Other accounts of HRV could not find confirmation by other sources.
- Eye witness accounts from QAL'A-I-RAGH persistently claim that it was OMF that opened hostilities first, that provoked CF counteraction. (Source: interviews with patients during their treatment JUNE 16, in CHORA CHC).
- Red Crescent TK claims of large amounts of Internally Displaced Persons wandering IVO CHORA and SARAB could not be substantiated.
- Witness accounts are evidently difficult to gather as people fear for their lives as soon as ISAF tries to contact people.
- Damage assessment conducted was very limited, mainly for security reasons.
- Patient Admission list of CHORA CHC, registered during the first four days of hostilities, are currently being translated.

Transcripts 16 minutes audio recorded JUNE 16 at CHORA Comprehensive Health Center

This transcript is the translation of a cell phone film of approx 16 minutes made by personnel of the medical staff on the first day of the fighting.

Questions posed by medical staff to patient:

"How is it going?"

"How many casualties you have at your house?"

"All are buried under the debris of our house"

"Who bombed your house?"

"The US"

Other medical staff: *"Do these need transport to TK?"*

Second patient indicates he is in pain while the medical doctor touches his injuries.

Question: *"Where is he?"*

"Is he a relative (of the first patient)?"

"Are there more casualties in his house?"

"He is not a relative."

"Yes, she is the daughter."

Question of medical staff: *"When did it happen?"*

"Just before sunset, in Qal'a-i-Ragh"

"Who shot first?"

"We don't know"

"Taliban opened fire from the one side, and then the aircraft came in."

"From the other side", the patient replies.

"And then he was hit."

Medical Staff: *"We have to act swiftly, otherwise we loose this one."*

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Appendix 1
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“... (unintelligible)... “

Images of Female Department.

Images of seriously injured patient lying on the ground. No audio.

Images of child.

Question to the child: *“Where are you hurt?”*

“She does not know” (Child does not respond, is in shock).

Image of Male Inpatient Department

“Chief of the CHORA CHC paid the District Chief as well as the Mayor a visit to confiscate cars.”

“I also asked the foreigners: why are you doing this to us?”

“If the driver does not co-operate, he will be arrested.”

Again images of a child – head in bandages.

“What’s your name?”

“Walimo”

“His father is from Qal’a-i-Ragh”

“His living room collapsed”

“His name is Mr Toj Mohammed”

“The five kids of my uncle died. They were bombed.”

END OF AUDIO – END OF FILM CLIP

ASSESSMENT:

- Patients reveal plausible data on number of fatalities and injuries (a number of them have also been confirmed via other sources).
- A number of patients indicate that it was OMF that started hostilities (though it remains unclear against whom in particular).

Supplement L

Appendix 1

FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST HEALTH

- What is striking in the film clip is that at two instances patients are directly asked how they feel about the treatment in CHORA CHC. The purpose of the question seems to be to possibly prevent allegations that medical treatment has not been provided to all parties involved.