




Kingdom of the Netherlands

Multi-Annual Strategic Plan

2014 - 2017

Mali

Mali Benin Ghana Ethiopia Horn of Africa South Sudan Kenya Rwanda Burundi Uganda Grote meren Mozambique Palestinian Territory Yemen Afghanistan Bangladesh



MULTI- ANNUAL STRATEGIC PLAN MALI
2014 -2017



Counting of votes during the parliamentary elections in December 2013

Photo: Klaas Tjoelker

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Bamako

January 2014

MASP 2014-2017, MALI

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Disclaimer

In this revised Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP), the principles of the policy paper "A world to gain: a new agenda for aid, trade and investments" have been elaborated. Besides, political events in 2012 (occupation of the north by rebels and terrorist groups and coup d'état) made a revision of the MASP 2012 – 2015 necessary, following the decision of Minister Ploumen to integrate the new theme Security and Rule of Law into the MASP. This MASP applies for a period of four years (2014-2017), but interim adjustments are possible: for example, in the case of major political or other changes, or to improve alignment of Dutch initiatives with the EU Joint Programming.

Chapter 1 Management summary

This revision of the MASP 2012-2015 is not as light as the title suggests. Due to the unforeseen and serious sequence of events since early 2012, the embassy saw itself confronted with the need for rapid adjustment of the development program, severe pressure on political reporting and intensive consular services. The understanding and support of headquarters in accompanying the embassy has been highly appreciated. Now Mali is quieting down, it becomes clear that a 'back to usual' is neither perceived nor desirable. In Chapter 2 lessons are drawn from the way this embassy responded to the evolving crisis. In Chapter 3, a more fundamental analysis of changes in the Malian society is presented and the context for each of the thematic priorities in the development program. Chapter 4 provides more clarity on each of the priority programs for Dutch development cooperation in Mali. Chapter 5 deals with other fields of activity (culture, consular affairs) and regional accreditation. The embassy foresees a practical approach to deal with new challenges coming up, like support to MINUSMA.

The last 18 months have been a learning experience. The speed at which the crisis unfolded has surprised all of us. However, the MASP 2012-2015 already indicated deep ruptures in the Malian society, strong phenomena of exclusion and lack of capacity and political will of the government to act. Resilience and countering exclusion were the main elements of the MASP 2012-2015, issues that are still important. The sudden collapse of government functions in the northern regions left the population on its own. Resilience was put to the test. At the same time, the state weakened and politics as well as society were highly fragmented around questions of military power, human rights, reconquering the North, fighting Islamic radicalization, democracy, rule of law and service delivery. The need for consensus, for respect for differences of interest and opinion, for inclusion and participation and for the restoration of confidence and pride became abundantly clear.

In terms of military force, political support and financial assistance, the support Mali received during this difficult period is unprecedented. Now Mali needs to show it can handle that support, avoid squandering the assistance and losing his political alliances. Mali is just on its way back and much still needs to settle. The embassy has been able to frame the start to its water program and to integrate food security in water management even further. An innovative program to work with agricultural value chains has been formulated to engage the private sector in sustainable water use for sustainable food production. A program for security and rule of law has been prepared. Even though many data are still lacking and the government has not yet formulated a clear theory of change how to reform the relevant sectors, the framework has been established, confidence has been built and already the Netherlands is seen as a privileged partner in the justice sector.

Chapter 2 A retrospective of 18 troublesome months and the lessons learned

The MASP 2012-2015 was written just prior to the attack of what was at that time a relatively new Tuareg group called the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) in the northeast of Mali. It was the prelude to a series of events running from lost battles by the Malian Defense Forces (MDF), angry protest by the 'women of Kati' protesting against the bad state of equipment and army organization that led their husband soldiers to serious defeats, a subsequent coup d'état by lower rank soldiers ousting president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), a molest on interim president Traore in May 2012, a removal by force of the then interim prime minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra in December that same year and finally the well planned attack by rebel and jihadist forces on Konna and the subsequent intervention by France to liberate the occupied zone in January 2013. In August 2013 a new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) was elected and a democratic government installed. After 18 months of transition from the coup d'état to the presidential elections, a new period of hope has started.

The transition period showed a remarkable commitment from regional partners in the context of ECOWAS, from the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). Of pivotal importance has been the French willingness to defend Mali and the large support provided mainly by the European Union (EU) and its member states, including the Netherlands.

At the moment of the coup in March 2012, the bilateral relationship between Mali and the Netherlands changed. An Accord Cadre between the committee of the military behind the coup d'état, the Conseil National pour le Redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l'État (CNRDRE), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) opened up the way to re-engage through non-governmental organizations and lower levels of decentralized government that still exercised democratically controlled supervision. With other partners like France, the EU, Canada, Switzerland and the US, the embassy advocated for a common framework of analysis to allow for a gradual resumption of bilateral cooperation. This framework proved to be very useful until the beginning of 2013, when individual decisions to resume aid relations overtook the existing coordination mechanism. Nevertheless, the strong coordination from the start has greatly helped development partners to understand the situation and harmonize their bilateral programs.

In the meantime, Dutch bilateral relations with Mali broadened. Political dialogue and specific interventions to promote interaction between different communities, north and south, wahhabist and soufi, military and civilian, women and men were undertaken. Support to civil dialogue, protection of human rights, religious tolerance and peace messages were some of the many interventions undertaken. Security briefings were continuously made and updated, based on intensive interactions with the major embassies represented in Bamako, including for instance Algeria, Morocco, US, EU, Canada, ECOWAS and neighbouring countries. Bilateral development cooperation changed radically in terms of focus and modalities. While keeping an eye on securing long-term development, the program took a pragmatic focus to facilitate at least a minimum level of health and educational services at local level during the transition period. A new aid modality was formulated, in which clusters of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and local governments worked together to support continued service delivery by health and education staff. This modality was recently evaluated with positive results. Early 2013, Canada, the Netherlands, UNDP and the Ministry of Finance established a National Socio-Economic Stabilization Fund (FNSES), allowing for basic services (agriculture, education, health) to continue during the very difficult budgetary situation. This funding mechanism, different from budget support, uses national procedures under close monitoring by the embassy, allowing to influence the implementation of national budget to the most urgent priorities. A modality, that may be of use in the period to come. Furthermore, the MDG 5 (Millennium Development Goal 5) program strengthening reproductive health aspects in the public system was continued through an ad hoc arrangement that allowed intensive monitoring. Finally, the rehabilitation of health infrastructures and the support to the Pharmacie Populaire du Mali was funded to strengthen health facilities in Mopti and Ségou, the most northern government controlled zone, and avoided stock rupture in SRHR (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights) material such as caesarian kits, transfusion materials and contra-conception.

An element of importance was the continuous presence of embassy staff in Bamako. It allowed for quick responses and close involvement in political processes. Not only embassy staff (and their families) stayed in Mali, almost all Dutch nationals with longer term engagements wanted to remain in the country. The embassy continued traveling to government-controlled areas to be personally informed of the actual security situation and thus became a source of information for other embassies in Bamako. The intensive communication with Dutch nationals, regular security briefings, services to the public and careful advice have been highly appreciated and have built excellent contacts within the Dutch community. The Bamako population and government officials have repeatedly expressed sincere gratitude for this sign of solidarity.

What are the lessons of 18 months transition period?

Firstly, Malian society has shown more resilience than often thought possible. Even though the number of critical security incidents was high, real crises have hardly occurred. Internally displaced persons were taken in by already poor families. Resources were shared. Basic institutions like municipalities, parliament and local councils remained operational – even in some cases in the north. The budget was rigorously managed to avoid heavy indebtedness during the crisis period.

Secondly, flexibility as a donor is of utmost importance. The delegated model of Dutch development cooperation has proven its value during the last 18 months in Mali. Quick changes towards supporting NGOs, local government and parastatal entities have been instrumental in reaching poor and vulnerable populations. The Dutch cooperation has shown a visible comparative advantage to other donors.

Thirdly, presence matters. The credibility of interventions, the reliability of support and the solidarity expressed are all examples of good development cooperation. Extensive communication proved to be important. Directness, addressing real issues like corruption and nepotism was well received and acknowledged by the population as being of fundamental importance. The engagement to work closely together with the population was recognized as addressing the gap between government and population that had grown far too wide.

Fourthly, the embassy's persistence to work on structural solutions and to refer to short term humanitarian interventions only if other means were no longer available, has been highly appreciated as a show of sensitivity to and awareness of political requirements. The contributions to human rights protection, availability of seeds and fertilizers, the protection of cultural heritage, support to macroeconomic and budgetary stability, and the facilitation of intra religious dialogue were testimony of that.

Fifthly, the embassy has successfully cooperated with ECOWAS, UN, AU and EU to talk with one voice, to seek synergy in interventions and to exchange information. That level of coordination will be maintained. The clear messages with respect to impunity, the need for the army to withdraw from the political scene, the need to develop a 'feuille de route' and the urgency to create capacity for reconciliation were important and well-coordinated messages.

Finally from the relationship between headquarters and the embassy some lessons can be drawn: first the necessity to have clear objective benchmarks in discussions on consular and security issues. Second, as Mali changed from a 'normal' development partner country to a country with intense political and security attention, headquarters needed rapid data flow to inform ministers and parliament. Setting up regular communication patterns (sitreps, security briefs, political briefs) made work manageable and these patterns will be defined again now the Netherlands has decided to support the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Principles of ownership, alignment and donor coordination demand an unequivocal respect of the delegated model also for the program on Security & Rule of Law (S&RoL).

And what are the lessons from our MASP 2012-2015?

The first important lesson is the relevance of the overall theme of that MASP: resilience and equity. Resilience is all the more important now state structures have shown to be able to disappear overnight. The population in north and central Mali had to cope with that situation for a long time. For

resilience, a strong government is necessary, but it is not enough. Within society, formal and informal institutions prove to be of great value in difficult times, such as those that Mali experienced. More than ever, the embassy is convinced that government, private sector and civil society each have their role to play. And in Mali, a lot can be gained by encouraging those three different actors in society work as closely together as possible.

The second important lesson is the relevance of countering exclusion. If anything, the Malian crisis has shown what deep ruptures in a society can lead to. How lack of perspective can facilitate criminal and terrorist groups to deeply settle in society. How inclusion has to be integrated in every action we plan.

Development cooperation is not only about technical and institutional improvements, it is intervening in a political context with political consequences. Thus, cooperation is subject to a political framework, based on a good understanding of society and of possible synergies and possible divergence of aid. It needs a broad societal network, with NGO's, private firms, government actors, political commentators, educational institutes etc.

Of high importance is that the population grasps the opportunities that exist now to speak a clear language: on corruption, on nepotism, on criminality, on malpractice and on lack of rigor and results. Technical expertise is important to decide on the appropriate level of dialogue, but political issues can be inserted. At the same time, efforts will be made to accentuate and build on inherent strengths of Malian society. The rescue of manuscripts from Tombouctou is a telling example. The openness of Malians to discuss their problems must be linked to an openness of donors to review their aid in a fundamental way. Donor aid is part of the system in crisis.

Criminality will remain an important issue in Mali. It has been the lifeline for terrorist activity; and has links to government and political parties. Private firms are confronted with criminal threats. The criminal networks go beyond Mali itself and fighting criminality requires regional cooperation. International criminality is such a huge problem that the embassy has to be modest in what it can do on its own; no efforts will be spared to stay informed of developments and to integrate the issue in the embassy's risk assessments. The relations of the embassy with other embassies, regional organizations and Dutch embassies in the region are necessary to be well informed and be able to seek synergy with regional and multilateral players.

Rule of law is more important than ever before. Whereas impunity allowed criminal networks to settle and expand, it made government even less relevant to the Malian society. A government that corrects illegal transactions, criminal behavior and clears itself from such actions may regain the confidence of its population. Values and societal norms need to be protected and promoted by government, thus taking initiative over others like radical jihadists or Islamists as saviors of common values.

The current regional institutional setting does not permit the implementation of a coherent regional strategy to combat jihadism and cross border crime. There are no organizations covering all countries implied, there are strong differences of interest and there are ancient rivalries that prevent common strategies. In such a reality, countries have opted to protect themselves from regional crime or jihadism by imposing national security arrangements that outrival by a narrow margin those of neighboring countries. This competition could de facto cause a positive ripple effect that may in the end result in considerably strengthened national security arrangements across the sub region.

Finally, the structural development goals that were set in the MASP 2012-2015 remain valid. Short term activities may have added value, when applied modestly and timely. The humanitarian community took a long time to establish itself when the crisis emerged, and it has a tendency to remain active even though more durable solutions have again become available. Timeliness is a major issue and not the strongest point of the humanitarian community. The short periods of deployment, the lack of respect for local institutions stemming from the humanitarian principle of impartiality and the service delivery focus may actually harm nascent recovery.

Chapter 3 Context Analysis of Mali

3.1 Political context – fundamentals and perspectives

Only now Mali starts to recover from what has probably been the most profound crisis in its history. The transition period has formally come to an end, with a new president elected and a government put in place. But how relevant can these political and governance institutions be in the period of reconciliation and rebuilding? What were the causes leading to the crisis and how will present conditions impact the post transition phase? In this paragraph the focus will be on the factors that explain the emergence of the crisis and their potential impact on rebuilding Mali.

Some causes of the crisis

Internally the crisis of the state is caused by the fact that Mali's governance has gradually lost relevance to many Malians, with exclusion based on cast, ethnic group, class, gender and age common all over Mali, and a practice of buying off interest groups, especially, but not only, in the North. Re-emerging rebellions and the aversion towards a strong army following the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré have since 1991 introduced a practice of buying off interest groups and minimizing military presence, allowing criminal groups to settle in more or less ungoverned territories and finally to nestle within government structures. This weakening of state structures and giving way to criminal interest has been sustained by a judicial system that rubberstamped established interests and reinforced impunity.

Economically Mali has done relatively well the last decade with percentages of growth of 6-7% annually, except for the crisis year 2012 (-0.4%). Purchasing power had improved slightly. Employment growth, however, lagged behind and was not able to cater for all newcomers on the labor market. The lack of employment growth is due to the very low level of industrialization in the country: some 6% of GDP, whereas comparable countries would achieve normally 15-20% industrial contribution to the GDP. Mali is a country of agricultural production and commerce. Its landlocked status and poor infrastructure, however, limit the trade perspective. The consequence of these two characteristics is that not much added value is created in Mali and hence economic growth has not really trickled down to the population.

The Malian society is under stress. High population growth, urbanization, confusion on loss of identity and scarce resources in difficult climatic circumstances has created a youth that is gradually losing its perspectives. Closed traditional hierarchies and traditional social patterns are no longer relevant for this youth and cannot assure security for the poor. Challenges regarding gender improvements, development perspectives and modernization presented new demands. Traditional arrangements with respect to conflict resolution, justice and social security got contested.

The introduction of a democratic system based on international values next to traditional systems did not fulfill the political, economic and social promises to the population in terms of inclusiveness. On the contrary, in the last ten years it became a source of exclusive redistribution. In the nineties, a decentralization process started, creating the actual municipalities with community participation. Local governance created new powerbases that sometimes undermined traditional arrangements even more. On the other hand, the transfer of competences was inadequate. Only in health, education and water, competences have been transferred, but not always with the necessary resources. Taxation opportunities remained limited, leaving the local governments without the sustainable mechanisms to assume their responsibilities.

The governance crisis, the stress in society, the gradual abandoning of traditional systems without necessarily being replaced by accepted alternatives, the insurgence of criminality and the history of repeated rebellions led to a serious loss of common values, societal norms and sense of direction. It gave space to religious factions that claimed protection of norms and values and attracted followers on a more radical Islamic agenda. Tolerance was no longer perceived as an asset, but as an excuse for lack of action and as acceptance of impunity. A gradual growth of salafist and wahhabist communities provided fertile ground for the entry of radical Islam.

Regionally Mali has been confronted with increasing instability, an increased availability of small arms, the Algerian pressure on Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist groups and the return of well-trained and heavily

armed Touareg rebels after the fall of Khadafy. The mix of jihadist and Azawad-independence fighters was a decisive factor in the crisis of the Malian state. Outside pressures could no longer be withstood and consequently the internal governance structure fell apart. A highly fragmented regional setting with opposing claims and shifting alliances constitutes an environment conducive to illicit trade, international drug trafficking and regional and international geostrategic interests.

A momentum for change

During the crisis Malians felt humiliated. They knew very well that the external threats were only a trigger. The causes of the crisis are much more profound and internal. An army that excelled only in escaping from rebel groups is seen as a national disgrace. The population knows that widespread corruption and nepotism has been tolerated far too long. They also know that too many Malians have benefitted from the system to allow for a cleaning from within. The great history of the country, the profile of tolerance and friendliness: it is no longer a comforting source of pride now the fallacy has become clear. The appropriateness of social relations as laid down in the many manuscripts from earlier centuries may provide a moral compass to redefine social relations.

In August 2013 the population made a choice. It opted for a democratic way out. It entrusted Ibrahim Boubacar Keita to lead the country out of the crisis. The social fragmentation however, still exists. The religious community is still divided. The economy is still unable to provide sufficient employment. The government capacity to deliver social services and help the population become more resilient is still weak. Alphabetization is still low and population growth high. Adverse climatic conditions remain. What can be built upon?

Most importantly, the sense of urgency provides a real opportunity. Ending impunity, reconciliation and fighting corruption are priorities for the new government that have been welcomed by the population. The struggle will be hard, but the political commitment to act provides an opportunity that did not exist during the last decade. At the same time this sense of urgency can also be a risk as people are impatient for change. Secondly, the president has received a broad mandate to lead the country out of the crisis that will allow him to confront, to resist, to push through whenever needed. Especially the broad support in the rank and file of the army provides space for necessary reforms. He also maintains good relations with religious leaders. Thirdly, the economic fall back during the transition has been relatively mild (-0.4% GDP in 2012) and a strong recovery is expected (5.1% in 2013, 7% in 2014). Infrastructure, energy, skill development are crucial to that end. Fourthly, the government has indicated it will build its policies on lessons learnt in the last decade with respect to decentralization, reconciliation and reforms thereby avoiding new experiments with uncertain results. Fifthly, an international security umbrella is provided for Mali to allow time to reform the security sector. Serval and later MINUSMA are counted on to prevent a new period of occupation. To conclude, the anger over impunity provides acceptance to law enforcement. Reinforcing the judicial system, strengthening the security sector and providing tangible services to the populations will meet urgent popular demands.

The country is hungry for peace, for development, for social cohesion and for justice. The population turned out in relatively high numbers at the presidential elections. This indicates an – at least temporary - end to a period in which population and central government stood back to back. The support by the international community should build on that fact. Partnerships are needed, active participation by Malian actors and sensitivity for Malian needs. This calls for a more political approach in the cooperation between Mali and its donors. Technical approaches may blind the eye for underlying developments. Whereas the political context in Mali has changed and provides new opportunities, the donor political context will also have to change. More harmonization within the international community, more 'accompagnement' of Malian institutions, better alignment with the policy priorities of the government and an active search to build on Malian initiatives are the characteristics of that changed donor context.

3.2 Context of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

The fundamentals for the health sector and the specific approaches towards sexual and reproductive health and rights have not changed during the crisis. The crisis necessitated an increased focus on access to basic health service. For the period to come, the embassy could return to the programming as perceived two years ago.

The human capital of Mali remains fragile given issues with education and health services, and expressed for instance in the high population growth rate of 3.6%; issues that have been affected but not fundamentally changed by the crisis last year. Available information shows that basic indicators on sexual and reproductive health rights have not changed much, besides the effects of the destruction of health services in the north, the decreased tolerance for reproductive rights –especially in the occupied Malian territory where women have suffered serious assault and sexual violence – and the more general impact of the deteriorated economy because of the crisis. Harmful traditional practices like child marriage leading to early pregnancy, female genital mutilation as well as nutritional prohibitions for (pregnant) women and children are widely spread and continue to play an important role in the low health status of the population. According to the MICS findings (Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey 2010), 14% of women were married before 15 years old, and 61% before 18 years old. According to the same source, 89% of women aged 15-49 years have undergone genital mutilation. The new Demographic and Health Service (DHS) shows a limited but important rise in use of modern family planning methods that had stagnated between 1995 and 2006.

Indicator DHS – some numbers		1995	2001	2006	2012 provisional
Fertility (women 15-49 years)		6.7	6.8	6.6	6.1
Use modern contraceptive methods (women 15-49 years in relation)		4.5	5.8	6.9	9.9
Use modern methods by residence (2012 provisional)	Urban	Rural	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou
	21.8	6.8	9.5	2.7	2006: 4.3*

*DHS 2012 included only non-occupied zone of Mali

At the same time the health sector of Mali remains relatively well organized, implementing health programs –inclusive of activities related to social development and women’s promotion– for over 15 years; and a planning, budgeting and reporting system from the local service level up. Human resources in the sector have increased in numbers and quality; facilities have been added and improved; and management is more and more placed at the local level with inclusion of all actors being more practical at that level as well. The Netherlands has supported the health sector program (including social development and women’s promotion) for many years, including specific funding for adequate obstetric services. During the crisis requests for investment in health infrastructure and procurement of medical material and drugs for reproductive health needs have been honored, including for instance blood transfusion, long term family planning methods and the like.

However, the development of the new health program that had already run into delays was completely halted during the crisis. This process of developing the next health program provides room for discussing improvements in the organizational set-up towards a result-focus and transparency at local levels in implementation; also with a view to reduce corruption and bureaucracy. Innovative modalities created during the crisis also provide lessons that can feed the political dialogue in the sector. The new government will be leading this process in which our political dialogue will address efficiency, results and transparency (among others).

Other opportunities include the existence of the national gender policy, adopted in 2011, that needs appropriation and implementation by actors in their diverse roles. The dissemination and public education on the 2002 Reproductive Health Law is another element that has not been taken forward sufficiently yet. The Persons and Family Law that was adopted in 2011 after heavy public debate, is considered a setback by most gender activists. At the same time, the crisis has revealed a certain power of resistance of the Malian people in general and particularly of Malian women. They have proven their capacity to take initiative and make proposals in the process of mediation. More importantly they have shown their force and solidarity as a united body, engaged in the defense of the rights of women by organizing urgent support to women that were victims of physical and sexual violence and filing legal claims for compensation for damage and injury. The issue of the Family Law will need appropriate action as developed by Malian gender activists, probably rather by focusing on

support to positive elements and use of other laws to support the rights of women and girls, while stimulating positive public debate, advocacy en policy dialogue on these very sensitive issues in the Malian society.

3.3 Context of a symbiotic relationship of water and food security

Mali has an enormous potential in the 437,000 km² of arable land within the country's borders. The Niger with its tributaries and sub-tributaries, is a real lifeline for the whole country and the region at large. Its watershed is home to 60% of the population and to the most viable economic activities, and stretches over 1,700 km in Mali, which is 40% of the total length of its basin. The various watersheds offer irrigation potential estimated at over 2.2 million ha. The groundwater resources are also considerable.

These water resources are used for various activities, such as drinking water supply in rural and (semi-)urban areas, energy, industries, fisheries, irrigation and livestock. In view of the fact that the agricultural sector contributes around 37% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs about 70% of the working population and that energy is one of the most critical sources for economic development, the sustainable use of water and land resources is a must for Mali and its neighbors. The increased scarcity of water resources particularly during the dry season leads to higher competition (and conflict) between water users (upstream/downstream, agriculturalists/ pastoralists, urban/rural etc.) and hampers the Government of Mali in its endeavor to attain the MDGs, especially MDG 1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger) and MDG 7 (ensuring environmental sustainability). Experiences show the need for a better distribution of water resources in space and time.


Unfortunately, analyses show that human and climate behavior adversely affect the availability of water and other natural resources. Climate change leads to high temperatures and inadequate and erratically distributed rainfall, resulting in disruptions in production systems (drought and flooding), erosion of soils, reduction of soil fertility, desertification, loss of biodiversity, bush fires, scarcity of width and increased silting up due to changes in the hydrologic rate of flows of the Niger. The use of inefficient irrigation techniques, the extension of irrigation onto marginal lands, the lack of attention paid to downstream water level effects of upstream water intakes, the occupation of the river banks, the excessive cutting of forests, the deterioration of the quality of surface and underground water resources due to industrial use, mining and increased domestic use as a result of high population growth and urbanization rates all aggravate the situation. This increased competition for resources calls for an evaluation of often rather extensive use of natural resources.

Food insecurity is a persistent problem for many households in various regions in Mali, both in terms of food intake and in terms of nutrition. In 2010, 22% of the Malian population was food insecure (< 2450 kcal p/p/p/d). In 2012, of the children under the age of 5, 20% was underweight, 8.9% suffered from acute malnutrition and 2.3% suffered from chronic malnutrition. The situation varies between regions, between households and in time. Regions differ in terms of economic activities (food production, cash crop production, mining etc.) and in terms of access to markets to sell or buy food at a reasonable price. For most of the population, the toughest period to secure sufficient access to food is the period just before harvest (bridging period), when food and financial resources have been almost completely depleted.

Irrigation is one of the strategies for resilience, to mitigate the risks and assure production in time. The main regions in which irrigated food production is possible are concentrated in the Ségou and Mopti regions as well as the Tombouctou plains. All those production areas are fed by the Niger and Bani river systems. These are all priority regions for Dutch development cooperation. Whereas in Ségou the 'Office du Niger' gravity irrigation scheme caters for large scale rice production and increasing crop variety (onions, potatoes), in Mopti the 'Office du Riz' and the Inner Delta are of crucial importance. The Office du Niger provides an institutional structure for farming, in which the embassy has invested since the 1970s to improve food production. The investments were successful in terms of increased food production, but less in terms of efficient water use. Since 2010, the embassy has intensified its involvement in family farming in the Inner Delta. In this region livelihoods activities

as cattle herding, fishery and agricultural production are competing for water resources without policy guidance to determine priorities.

The agricultural systems linked to water resources are currently of such a nature that uncontrolled use of water may deplete the resource, thus affecting the sustainability of the agricultural system, crops, fish and cattle alike. In order to strengthen resilience it is imperative to secure sustainability of the system. Water management frameworks are needed as well as water efficiency policies in the process of food production. Access to food production and monetary returns of their crops are elements of resilience for the rural population. This can only be secured through an integrated approach to water management and food security. In isolation neither support to water management, nor assistance to food security could be effective.



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3.4 Context of Security and Rule of Law challenges

Mali faces many challenges today in the field of security and rule of law. The first is the necessity to secure the territory, especially in the north. France and Chad have created basic conditions for the state to return to the north, but pockets of resistance continue to exist and the security situation remains fragile. The Malian armed forces need to be reformed to take up this responsibility. However, no reform will have any durable effect without a change in governance. The citizen will have to start playing his or her democratic role, putting political pressure on the government for change. Traditional inequalities will need to be confronted. A reinforcement of the decentralization process, meaning increased transfer of resources but also better oversight and accountability, will help bring government and governance closer to the citizen.

The continued presence of armed groups in the North is unacceptable in the long run, meaning that negotiations are inevitable. These should, however, be followed by a process of dialogue and reconciliation to restore the social fabric of society. In Malian society, there is a clamor for justice and an end to impunity; Justice then has an important role to play. However, access to justice has been very weak in Mali, for geographic reasons, but also because of the lack of credibility of the system. Here again, a change in governance is essential and needs external support to address the many reform needs.

¹ Marai El-Fassi, Aidenvironment

Because of the loss of faith in the state, religious (mainly Islamic) leaders have ventured into the political space. The combination of this with the expansionism of salafi Islam, poses a threat to the secular nature of the state. It also poses the threat of a breeding ground for jihadism, especially because of the financial benefits it may bring the poor.

Why the Netherlands ?

The embassy can capitalize on a positive perception of the Dutch bilateral cooperation in Mali, especially in the regions of Mopti and Ségou. The embassy has also developed very close working relationships with the new democratic government and with various sections of MINUSMA and its leadership. Lastly, the embassy has a longstanding partnership with the paralegal NGO Deme So, with the Association of Malian Municipalities on decentralization, and works closely with OXFAM NOVIB and its network of local NGOs and the Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMDID) concerning democratization.

The International Rule of Law profile of the Netherlands, as well as the Dutch experience with community policing, are great assets for the embassy as a partner on the Justice and Internal Security sector reforms, as well as in the area of reconciliation and transitional justice.

The presence of Serval and MINUSMA creates a minimum level of security needed for the government and donors to go back to the North, even if for the moment this is limited to larger population centers.

There is a general momentum for change; the population has become re-engaged, and the government will have to respond. From the exchanges with the new government, it can be concluded that Malian and Dutch visions of what should be priorities converge. The crisis has also seen the emergence of a new, less partisan and more independent civil society. The ranking of the Minister of Justice as number two of the government is a sign of commitment to that sector. The recent operation to regain complete control over the military camp in Kati, the home of the putchists, and the arrest of a number of residents of the camp, has shown the determination of the government to take control of the army. The final departure of general Sanogo from the camp is the ultimate symbol of restored government control over its army.

The large presence of donors that have been around for a long time does not only provide financial opportunities for the reform agenda's, it also brings with it functioning donor coordination. The government has shown intent to get actively involved in donor coordination. The arrival of MINUSMA, with its extensive mandate to accompany the government in creating peace, stability and development may challenge the local donor coordination. As a first step agreement was reached to add a seat for MINUSMA in the donor presidium. The broad mandate of MINUSMA may help to keep an international eye on the developments in Mali. Dutch participation in MINUSMA will strengthen the possibilities for coordination and cooperation between MINUSMA and the bilateral program, as well as between internal security sector and justice reform. The aim is to have Dutch Individual Police Officers (IPOs) be involved in internal security sector reform in Bamako as well as in the priority intervention zones (Mopti, Tombouctou and Gao) under the bilateral program.

3.5 Context of Economic Development and possibilities for investments and trade

Current structure of the economy and prospects after the crisis

Mali is a Low Developed Country (LDC) with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita estimated at USD 660 and a GDP of US \$10.3 bln in 2012 (World Bank report 2013). The GDP has regressed by 0.4% in 2012, as a result of the crisis, coming from previous growth percentages of 5-7%. The biggest parts of GDP were shared in 2012 between the primary sector (36%), secondary sector (18%), tertiary sector (35 %) and indirect taxes (10%). Agriculture was 23.9% of this GDP, with 5.5 % for rice production and 1% for cotton production. The weight of mining has been 6.4% of GDP while the industry represented only 6.4% of GDP. In 2013, traditional import/export trade had the biggest part of Services contribution on GDP with 15.3% and the financial services had the lowest contribution (0.7% of GDP).

The foreseen growth rates of GDP are 5.1 % by 2014 and 6.6% for 2015. Thus targets are back on Malian economic trends. It is estimated that donors' financial support to the PRED (Programme pour la Relance d'une Economie Durable) as announced in Brussels (€3 .285 billion for 2013/14) will be responsible for about 2% annual growth as from 2015 onwards.

Budgetary situation –space for investments

Mali's budget has a structural deficit for many years, usually financed by external assistance. The government learned from the crisis that an efficient management can be helpful to maintain this level of deficit. The severe budget cuts applied during the transition period have resulted in a budget which once more can support private investments through public works. The budget is funded for more than 70% by internal taxes and 30% by donors' aid. For public expenses in accordance with CSLP (Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté) 31% of the budget is allocated to stimulate economic growth, 35% to improve social services quality, 18% for institutional development and governance promotion, 6% for debt service and 10% for other expenditures. As a land-locked country Mali heavily depends on the performance of neighboring countries' ports for transit of international merchandises, especially Abidjan, Dakar, Lomé and Cotonou. Mali is a member of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) and ECOWAS, two free-trade areas with two different border taxes. The distance to ports and the different tax systems induce logistic costs at least 10 to 15% higher than the normal average, impacting negatively on the economy's competitiveness.

Role of private sector and government in the economy

The economic framework and the business environment are facilitated by the government with the aim to help the private sector actors to invest, produce and sell goods and services. Some recent reforms like the Mining Code, the Investment Code and Private Sector Orientation Law, should play an import role to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mali. For the north of Mali a dedicated ministry has been created to accelerate its development by allowing sufficient means and funds on the local level. Improvements in decentralization are badly needed to push more of the government funds to local government structures. As important players in the economy of Mali private actors need capacity building, finance and technological access and benchmarking with Dutch enterprises for fair and free trading. To do so the the embassy will use all available commercial and financial instruments: Senior Experts Programme (Programma Uitzending Managers, PUM), Match Making Facility (MMF), Private Sector Investment Program (PSI), Programme for Development related Export Transactions (Ontwikkelings Relevante Export Transacties, ORET), Facility for Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Food Security (Faciliteit voor Duurzaam Ondernemen en Voedselzekerheid, FDOV), etc.

3.6 Changing donor behavior and joint programming

Mali has a well-organized and structured donor community with regular moments of dialogue with the government and civil society. However, the dialogue appeared insufficient to anticipate the arrival of the crisis. The dialogue meetings did address corruption and nepotism, but not enough follow-up was given to ensure appropriate actions. Donors were part of the system and therefore part of the problem. During the crisis donors did work together in defining indicators for resuming aid and were sharing their analysis. The willingness among donors to take a critical look at their own performance grew.

Actually, the donor community is planning a thorough analysis of the crisis in Aid. Many of them are willing to change their practices. Donors would like to become less "technocratic" and are more in favor of customized action. The next step of joint programming is to review whether the daily practice of the development cooperation in Mali is consistent with the principles of Paris and Busan. The Heads of Cooperation (HoC) agreed with this review in principle but it is unclear whether all development partners will support the initiative. The HoC will work on a definition of a new partnership which aligns with thoughts about a 'refondation de l'état du Mali'. The joint programming for Mali is planned to be submitted to Brussels and HQs in March 2014. In the division of labor according to sectors it appears that education will become an orphan sector. The move of the Netherlands towards S&RoL has been positively received by the EU and Denmark, that were already active in these sectors, and Canada that is currently the lead donor in that sector. Other donors commended the embassy's flexibility as one of the main qualities of the delegated model of the Netherlands.

The Malian government wants donors to reorganize themselves in a Joint Strategy (Strategie Commune d'Aide au Pays, SCAP2). The embassy with the other EU members will join this exercise to redefine Aid in Mali in reaction to the willingness of Mali to rethink its development paradigm. The government of Mali will update its CSLP within the actual context and the new priorities of the government. The update of the CLSP will result in changed budget allocations, giving more financial resources to the justice and defense sector.

Implication for aid modalities

Important elements of a joint assistance strategy to reach efficiency and alignment in aid, are the use of budget support and the implementation of a division of labor. During SCAP1, the embassy was able to contribute to the overarching strategy and specific sectors and with the provision of General Budget Support (GBS) and Sectoral Budget Support (SBS). Due to political decision making in the Netherlands this will no longer be possible. The embassy has experimented during the crisis with more "hands-on" modalities working through NGOs with local municipalities in delivering social services, and creating the National Socio-Economic Stabilization Fund (Fonds National de Stabilisation Economique et Social (FNSES). FNSES allows the embassy to finance in an aligned way (financing budget lines of the approved national budget) and with strong control of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, supplemented by technical assistance and external audits. Even though this modality is aligned it doesn't have a programmatic approach towards coherent sector priorities. As a consequence in this Multi Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) we will try to work as coherent as possible through programmatic approaches in the health and justice sectors, aligned and harmonized but with extra quality and financial controls. The Netherlands may have lost its leading role in the modality debate, but by innovations, focus on results and supporting transparency in financial management, treasury and tender procedures, the institutional support to better governance can be maintained.

The embassy is actually leading a donor subgroup on the Office du Niger and is considering during the MASP period to lead the working group on Justice and the Fight against Corruption. This allows for space for intensive dialogue on complicated issues in these themes.

Chapter 4 Objectives, results and risks for each priority

Vision and values, the red line: inclusive resilience

In-depth context analysis, experience in the last two years, search for synergy and complementarity with other donors and NGO partners and our willingness to work in an aligned way will be guided by an overall ambition to help Mali to restore social cohesion and to engage in the developmental challenges as laid down in the MDGs and its future successors. That ambition gives direction to all our activities. The Malian population has suffered enough from poverty, insecurity and lack of justice. That is why the embassy has once more chosen for strengthening resilience and equity as the overall vision for this MASP, in every priority. Resilience of Malians, women, men, girls, boys, farmers, herders, fishers, resilience of institutions, of municipalities, of justice systems, of watershed management schemes, it is about reducing vulnerability and diminishing risks. This has to be done in an inclusive way. Therefore our partners will be from all parts of society, especially those who live in backward circumstances or those who can help improve the life of the less privileged.

There is no silver bullet through which vulnerability can be neutralized: neither the business community, nor the market, nor the state, nor the formal or informal economy, nor Civil Society can overcome the crisis alone. The Embassy will work together with different parties and on different interrelated themes. The aim is to increase resilience at all levels of the Malian society, especially at local level. Multi-actor approaches and public private partnerships can be used in the realization of this MASP.

Resilience in society leads to cohesion, to a sense of belonging that will end exclusion on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, caste, or class. Strengthening the position of women is a condition for sustainable development within the chosen priorities. This means that the interventions within all priorities will be checked on gender equality in planning, budgeting and monitoring. The Embassy will continue with the financing of the program on Gender-Based Violence with UN Women, with support to the dialogue on the Persons and Family Law through Civil Society, with the choice for

two value chains (onions and fish) in which women are the main beneficiaries, with access for women to irrigated land and will aim to strengthen women's participation in the more inclusive political processes.

Taking resilience as an overall vision means that all interventions will respect sustainability and will safeguard the intervention from increasing risks for the beneficiaries. Sustainability can be defined in three ways, economically, ecologically and socially. On all three accounts, interventions should score positively to be sustainable. This can be translated in each of the three priorities. For water and food security the ambition is to contribute to resilient sustainable development using effective and efficient water management. Resilience in Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, means strengthen the choice for and the quality of SRHR services for women, men, and youth. For S&RoL it means taking the Malian citizen as the point of departure to build a comprehensive decentralized Security and Rule of Law program.

4.1 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

The main objective of the development activities concerning SRHR will remain the improvement of the reproductive health of Malian men and women, boys and girls with increased autonomy in decision making.

Objectives and results

This will be achieved by supporting an adequate and diversified supply of quality (reproductive) health services that meets men's, women's, boys' and girls' needs and expectations. Also, action by Malian organizations and other local actors will be supported, that will enable the Malian population to become actors with regard to sexual and reproductive health; their own health, as well as at the community level. This will increase demand for quality services and public dialogue on (reproductive) health service provision. Traditional practices, harmful to the health of women, girls and children (Female genital mutilation (FGM) , early marriage etc.) and Gender-Based Violence in general will be reduced by support to targeted diverse activities towards changes at community, household and individual level, developed by Malians to fit the Malian context.

The embassy works towards the following outputs in the country:

- Greater availability of quality (reproductive) health services in the public sector and by private (for profit and non-profit) organizations, and reaching various target groups
- Specific target populations are reached with reproductive health services for a more equitable coverage
- Effective organizations fighting against forced and early marriages, female genital mutilation, and with regard to other rights for girls
- Increased communication towards young people (home, school, youth centers, media etc.) improves their autonomy and the equity between boys and girls in terms of sexual and reproductive health and rights
- A law against FGM is adopted
- Inclusion of FGM, early marriage and other relevant issues in the development programs of the decentralized bodies

Specific target populations include youth, specifically young girls, but this also refers for instance to bringing family planning services to underserved, hard to reach areas, like the Inner Delta. An active policy dialogue within the Malian health sector is an important part of getting to adequate service provision, based on monitoring implementation of policies from national to local level, and including experiences during the crisis period of activities that improved teamwork and transparency at local level.

The focus will be to support local initiatives through regional programs and at national level, looking for sustainable results through increasing the number of experienced organizations in this field using diverse, effective ways of communication and for instance village campaigns. Channels for communications to be used are multiple and include local radios, schools, youth centers and theatre as well as village debates. Results will be sought in decentralized elected councils that should take up action towards reducing Gender-Based Violence including harmful traditional practices in their communities. At national level, it seems to be time for Mali to adopt a law against female genital

mutilation like most surrounding countries, although embassy focus will be on support to using existing laws, including elements of the Persons and Family Law to seek protection for girls, including from genital mutilation, creating public debate with concrete stories and results.

Activities, approaches and modalities

A mix of approaches and modalities will be used towards these outputs. A general point is the consistent participation in the joint partner/government coordination and consultation framework for health, social development and gender – as well as supporting the current lead donor Canada. This also includes active participation in the “sous-groupe santé de la reproduction”, and other relevant coordination frameworks. Another element is the embassy’s availability to support other actors in the health sector in diverse roles. Since mid-2013, the embassy manages a delegated partnership in health infrastructure for the Canadian cooperation. Similarly, the EU delegation that has no capacity for the health sector, requested the embassy to represent the Delegation in health coordination fora and help when technical questions in the sector come up; which happened far more often than was expected before the 2012 crisis. Finally, given the continuing impact of the Global Fund (GF) debacle in the Malian health sector and the difficulties that have remained in working to re-establish working relations with the GF-secretariat, the embassy has decided to remain marginally engaged in the Malian GF Country Coordination Mechanism (as backstopping for the French embassy CCM member).

Service provision and demand

The focus will be on funding national public sector action, given the limited reach of the private for profit and non-profit sector. Most women have access only to the community health center with possible referral to a district hospital. It is important that these centers function well, attract families to have their women deliver there, and have qualified staff available to assist the delivery. A complete health package should be available, including family planning, pre- and postnatal care, but also vaccinations and curative care, referrals for all emergencies in order to strengthen the role the center will be able to play in the community in support of reproductive health. Effective referrals, including transportation, need to be routinely available to functioning hospitals with possibility to do C-sections, provide post-abortion care, deal with infertility and do sterilizations.

To be able to fund the public health sector in a coherent manner, the new health program needs to be developed, a process that is supported by a number of partners, including this embassy. During this process the embassy will put a focus on goals of autonomy of the client, equity, and for the program to be consistent with the existing Gender policy, the Reproductive Health and Youth/Adolescent Health strategies. In addition, planning and monitoring procedures that exist in the sector are heavy and bureaucratic, and are coupled with widespread management insufficiencies. This warrants frank discussions on changing procedures and habits within the health program. The sector needs to learn from the crisis and reduce the bureaucracy while increasing space for policy dialogue and transparency, for instance by encouraging local level public dialogue on health sector inputs and results. Depending on the outcome of this process during 2014, the modalities for support to the health sector will be developed in a way as harmonized and aligned as possible, through a programmatic approach. In the meantime support through the National Socio-Economic Stabilization Fund (FNSSES) will support specific budget lines that target the decentralized operational service level. Central level funding through the FNSSES will be for drugs and medical supplies, including family planning, kits for C-sections, etc.

A few service delivery activities will be funded directly, like the national association for family planning and International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)-affiliate, Association Malienne pour la Protection et la Promotion de la Famille (AMPPF), and possible other organizations including through the regional programs described below. The objective of these activities will focus on specific Reproductive Health results, like increasing outreach for family planning, introducing long term methods for instance; and diverse communication activities towards public dialogue and increased demand for quality services at all levels. This type of support allows a more direct role for the embassy in monitoring for sizable results.

Regional programme(s) for specific SRHR results

The development of a regional SRHR program in Mopti halted in March 2012 will be picked up with more vigor – starting in the region of Mopti, working to include Ségou and Tombouctou during the 4 years covered by this plan. These programs will aim for more popular knowledge and discussion on the dangers of harmful traditional practices and Gender-Based Violence in general, through public debate stimulated through diverse communication methods and actors, like radios, theatre, youth groups, village debates etc. Using local initiative and experience, sharing between regions, bringing in capacity from the national and international level where necessary, sustainability of the movement for women's and girls' rights will be supported. The program will probably include some funding of service provision to target groups and in support of outreach from community health centers, as well as initiatives to abandon harmful traditions, and support the rights of young married women – girls.

The program(s) will be set up with actors in the regions, starting possibly with a joint baseline analysis in the region on the specific difficulties, traditions, pressure groups, successes and failures to be able to build on the specificities of each region. The approaches to scaling up activities that have been successful, and of how to go beyond the regional capital and reach the more hard to reach Inner Delta areas, also need to be developed per region. An institutional anchor to the promotion of SRHR and the fight against harmful traditional practices will also be found in the local councils, the decentralized authorities. The actors involved in these institutions will be targeted to ensure ownership of the issues and sustainability of the interventions.

Some national actors will be supported that work in the field of women's rights, reproductive and girl's rights, strengthening women's leadership, building on the dynamic of the women's movement during the crisis, by reinforcing for instance involvement of professional women in the establishment of the judiciary at the local and national level. This will help increase capacity within Mali to support local actors, and for advocacy at all level in support of abandoning FGM, fighting gender based violence in general, including issues like early marriage and pregnancy. Also, the issue of the Family Law will need appropriate action, developed by Malian gender activists. This may be done rather by focusing on support to positive elements and use of other laws to support the rights of women and girls, while stimulating positive public debate, advocacy and policy dialogue on these very sensitive issues in the Malian society. Eventually this might include strengthening of public institutions and instruments that deal with these issues.

Synergies

The regional work offers many opportunities for synergies with the other (priority) themes of cooperation in Mali. Working with the justice sector in the same regions allows implication of gender-focused capacity to the justice sector with more (shared) results on effective rights for women and girls, including regarding their reproductive rights. The water/food security work in the Inner Delta offers a platform to help access to these difficultly accessible areas, while including relevant health and nutrition information in the work of the relevant NGOs.

The Netherlands Initiative for Capacity development in Higher Education (NICHE) by Nuffic includes programs at the university and professional training institutes, relevant to SRHR that the embassy can build on. This regards for instance accreditation of (private) nursing schools, some of which can also be supported at regional level. Support to restructuring of the university management, as part of NICHE program will also be very important to the quality of health personnel that is becoming more and more available in the country.

Risks

The fact that the field of SRHR is a vast field with a need for diverse, complementary actors is at the same time a risk for achieving results. It will be important to be clear about the appropriate role of each organization, at regional and national level. In addition, the crisis has brought to the foreground the risks that the current context of political and religious debates poses to achieve specific reproductive, sexual, women's and girls' rights results throughout the country. The recent context reinforces the general resistance in traditional Malian discourse towards equality amongst men and

women. This is coupled with a high illiteracy rate, specifically amongst (young) women, that do not know their rights in any context; religious, traditional or modern Malian law. At the same time, the fight against FGM has been going on for some decades now, and while some notable successes have been achieved, a certain fatigue can be seen in the men and women that over the years have taken personal risks, speaking out against this harmful practice. These elements show the huge challenge but also the urgent need to act.

Other risks include the traditional development cooperation pitfalls of fragmented, uncoordinated donor funding – the unmet need for family planning services, as expressed through the Demographic and Health Survey, should disappear with the number of donors focused on Reproductive health including family planning. Can we coordinate to significantly increase modern family planning use in the country, including the rural areas? Governance in the health sector and wider government as well as decentralized councils is an important aspect of the challenge for Malians to learn from the crisis, to which donors have to lend support to remain relevant.

4.2 Water and food security

Objectives and approaches

The specific objectives are:

- The performance of the agricultural sector in its volumes, diversification and added value increased in 2017 in such a way that the percentage of rural households living in poverty has diminished.²
- In 2017 integrated water resources management (IWRM) will be effective, inclusive³ and efficient at international, national and local level.

The results areas are:

- Integrated water resources management at different levels
- Efficient irrigation and other innovative water management infrastructures
- Increased sustainable food production
- More efficient markets and improved business climate

Three approaches are applied in conjunction: a river basin approach with a geographical focus, a value chain approach and a risk mitigation approach especially for women and youth. Activities will have three levels of implementation: internationally for IWRM with Guinea and Niger and complementary to the Autorité du Bassin du Niger (ABN), nationally with support to the public sector and business climate and locally investing in irrigation and water management schemes and improving the functioning of value chains of agricultural products. These strategies will be complemented by programs on vocational training and tertiary education (Formation Insertion dans le Bassin du Niger (FIBANI), NICHE, and the Netherlands Fellowship (NFP) Tailor-Made Training Program) and by the use of synergies with the programs on SRHR and S&RoL. It is foreseen that besides using the funds available through the bilateral channel, the embassy will make use of the other instruments available within the various ministries in the Netherlands to support innovative development (Fonds Duurzaam Water, ORIO, PSI). Activities funded by the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS), such as the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)/2Scale, Energy for all, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programme, the Convergence of Sciences: Strengthening agricultural innovation systems (CoS-SiS), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), from institutions and networks like Dutch universities, the Agrihub, Dutch NGOs (Terrafina, Oikokrediet, ICCO, SNV, Oxfam Novib) and activities from Dutch companies all create synergies with the program of the embassy. It will use private public partnerships and programs.

Integrated Water resource management at different levels

In 2017, water management institutions will plan in an integrated, inclusive, sustainable and coordinated manner, based on IWRM principles. This will be done at international, national and local level. At local level participation of producers and agricultural processors will be strengthened,

² Conform CLSP 2012-2015 and PNISA 2012-2015

³ Access and control over water between women and men, farmers and herders

innovations will be introduced and regional coordination in the Inner Delta will be strengthened. Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers will be reduced. At national level institutional support will be given to promote rational choices based on actual availability of water and the needs in various parts of the basin. For example the Commission Gestion des Eaux de la Retenue de Sélingué et du Barrage de Markala will be strengthened.

Efficient irrigation and other innovative water management infrastructures

In the Office du Niger, where the Embassy has invested over 35 years, the main discussion will be on rigorous management and transparent allocation mechanisms. Also water efficient irrigation and drainage will be promoted. Infrastructures and planning for irrigation, pastoralism, fisheries, biodiversity and access to markets in the zone of the Inner Delta will be financed.

Increased sustainable food production

During the period of 2014-2017 Mali will adopt the National Land Tenure Policy (Politique Foncière Agricole) and law. EKN foresees implementation of the National Agricultural Development Policy (Politique de Développement Agricole). Eventually, an additional intervention may be to support the development of reliable agricultural statistics. Through the contribution to the FNSSES in 2014 distribution of agricultural inputs in the crises-affected production areas of the north will continue. Technical assistance has been included to use the opportunity to improve the public tender procedures in order to procure high quality seeds and fertilizers.

More efficient markets and improved business climate

In 2014 two main programs will start: the program with International Financing Corporation (IFC) to improve the investment climate and the value chains program, of which the overall objective is to create functioning value chains of onions and fish that increase the availability and affordability of those products in place and time and increases the incomes of women and men involved in the chain, especially at the production level. The IFDC program on local economic development (DEB-PEA) will continue.

To support its activities and those of others, EKN will continue to be active in a number of donor coordination groups such as Groupe Technique Economie Agricole et Rural and its subgroups Elevage & Pêche and Office du Niger, the PTF (partenaires techniques et financières) Environnement, the PTF Secteur Privé and the PTF Education et Formation Professionnelle. It is foreseen that the subgroup PTF Office du Niger develops into a broader group of PTF to serve the irrigation sector or more comprehensively, GIRE (Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau), in Mali.

Risks

The risks at outcome level for this priority are the rapid increase in population, the ecological disasters as extreme drought or a plague of grasshoppers. At the output level the main risk is the resistance towards integrated water management because it means partly a loss of power.

4.3 Security and Rule of Law

Approach

The approach will be comprehensive and decentralized. The comprehensive approach has many angles, as the program:

- will address the roles and responsibilities of the various actors in the Justice sector, central and local government and civil society, with the aim of improving access to Justice in the broadest definition of the term (geographic access, quality of procedures and verdicts, cost – benefit etc.).
- will be rolled out in Mopti, Tombouctou and Gao, also intervention regions for the other priorities of the bilateral cooperation program. This way, the program can capitalize on the visibility and goodwill on other priorities to achieve possibly difficult reform objectives. Also, these regions are a good mix of north and south, permitting support to the return of the state to the north, without forgetting the south.

- will have synergies with the other priorities of the MASP as access to justice is pivotal for the non-violent resolution of conflicts concerning natural resources such as land and water, for the development of a stable investment climate, and for the respect of all rights, including sexual, reproductive and women's rights.
- will strengthen the link between Justice Sector and Interior Security Sector Reform through participation of Dutch Individual Police Officers (IPOs) in MINUSMA. MINUSMA has regional offices in the same regions that the bilateral S&RoL programme will be rolled out. Headquarters could equally consider Dutch participation in the EU civil mission that is being developed.
- will be made as concise as possible. The embassy will invest in close monitoring of outcomes and impact of the interventions in a fragile context, and for that reason limit the number of sectors and interventions, choosing mutually reinforcing activities.
- will actively link the S&RoL program to the Dutch diplomatic efforts and vice versa. As a result of the crisis, security and rule of law are now more than ever at the heart of diplomatic processes and political dialogue in Mali. The impact of the interventions and support by the international community will depend on the political will of the government to change the governance of Mali. A constant check is made of the pertinence of S&RoL interventions to the political processes going on in Mali. The Dutch interventions will therefore inversely also help feed the political dialogue. The embassy has been asked and is planning to take up the position of lead donor for the Justice sector during the term of this MASP.

The decentralized approach means that:

- decisions made at central level will be operationalized in the intervention zones of the embassy;
- experiences and results achieved at local level will inform the political dialogue at all levels, including the national, with the aim of developing tools to be rolled out by central level throughout the country;
- support will be given to build management, monitoring and evaluation capacities at central level to replicate lessons learned to the rest of the country.

Specific objectives

The general objective of the program is to work towards the restoration of Rule of Law in Mali, with a specific aim of reinforcing the legitimacy and capacity of the government. To achieve this, the embassy will develop interventions working towards three results at country level: a functioning justice sector, inclusive political processes and human security. Peace dividends, such as access to basic services and employment, are addressed through the other priorities in this MASP and by a plethora of other donors, although access to justice will be a direct peace dividend of the S&RoL program.

Functioning Justice sector

Nationally defined outcomes for the Justice sector are 1) to reduce corruption in the sector, 2) to improve access to justice for the citizen, 3) to improve the performance of the courts, and 4) to promote human rights. To this aim, the country is working towards i) justice reform focusing on independence, responsibility, credibility and performance of the sector, ii) an improvement of the quality of services rendered to the citizen and the business environment, iii) reinforcement of the technical, ethical and deontological capacities of sector personnel, iv) an improvement of the efficiency and administrative quality of the sector through improved management and monitoring capacities, and v) the training of mayors so they can play their role as investigative officers and vi) and improved knowledge and understanding by the citizen of his or her rights.

In the intervention zones (Bamako, Ségou, Mopti, Tombouctou and Gao), the embassy will focus on a) increased strategic guidance of the sector at national level (vision, management and monitoring and evaluation), b) improvement of the operational capacities of the courts and prosecutor's offices, c) improvement of the understanding by the citizen of his rights and the performance of the Justice sector, d) increased mastery by the citizen of the national instruments concerning the fight against corruption within the sector, and e) the human rights violations perpetrated against women during the crisis are brought to Justice.

Although the Justice sector has had a comprehensive development program (Programme du développement de la Justice, PRODEJ) for five years, a Justice policy has been lacking. Such a policy is necessary to help set out the (reform) priorities for the coming years. A *perception of justice* survey will help the formulation of this policy, as well as offer a baseline for indicators concerning access to justice.

At the same time, the embassy will support strengthening of the penal chain at the deconcentrated level. This strengthening will take place at the level of the regions and the cercles, and even at the level of the municipalities by strengthening the mayors' capacity to play their part. This will help the geographical and psychological axe of access to justice, as well as help strengthen the quality of procedures and verdicts.

Civil society, including women groups, has a crucial role to play in supporting civic access and control of the justice sector, by helping to increase knowledge of the law, publish and discuss verdicts, and orient the citizen towards the formal legal system.

Inclusive political processes

Until outcomes are defined at national level, the embassy proposes to work on the creation of a climate of peace and security. To this end, the embassy will 1) put in place an inclusive intercommunity dialogue aimed at restoring peace, 2) strengthen the capacity and visibility of pacifist and moderate Islamic associations and 3) improve the understanding of Malians of the functioning of their local government.

One of the main causes of the crisis in Mali has been the malfunctioning of democracy. Citizens did not understand their role in it, nor seize the opportunities that it offered. In 2013, the embassy has had a great experience working with OXFAM Novib and their national and international network of NGOs in the framework of the presidential and legislative elections. The activity consisted of election observation and civic education about democracy. It has become clear that activities anchoring democracy will continue to be necessary even after the elections.

The first level at which this democracy is lived is at the local level. It is for this reason that the embassy has not only chosen to work in the Justice sector at deconcentrated level, but to also strengthen decentralization through support of the Association of Malian Municipalities. This association will on the one hand lobby government on local government needs, while at the same time providing services to municipalities concerning security and rule of law, reconciliation, accountability, health and food security.

In the domain of reconciliation, Dutch strategic partners like Interpeace and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue are active. These organizations are linked up with the embassy's partners to create a maximum of synergy. For the moment it is impossible to predict anything about the composition, mandate and role of the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, other than that they will change. The embassy will keep the option open to support the Commission if there is a specific demand and an added value of such Dutch support.

As Islam is drawn more and more into the political space in Mali, it is important that a moderate and peaceful Islam that respects the secularity of the state becomes more visible in the public arena. This increased visibility will facilitate informed religious choices by the population, and offer them alternatives to the expansionist and financially attractive Salafi denomination. To this end, the embassy has decided to support a religious organization that aims to strengthen the capacity and visibility of pacifist Islamic associations and promote intra- and interreligious dialogue on Islam and Peace.

Human security

As for inclusive political processes, there are no nationally defined outcomes for Human Security yet. The embassy proposes to work towards an improved cooperation between the interior security forces and the justice sector in its intervention zones. To this end, the embassy supports 1) an improvement of the penal chain in the intervention zones, 2) a try-out in two municipalities of community policing and 3) the formulation of a government owned strategic framework for internal security sector reform.

There are two main players interested in becoming active in Internal Security Sector Reform, the EU and MINUSMA. At the moment, the plans of both are still in a developmental stage, but it is clear that with a bilateral program, the Netherlands would comparatively be of minimal importance in the sector. This said, the Netherlands will actively support donor coordination. Instead of taking the lead in the sector as a donor, the Dutch contribution to internal security sector reform will be its participation in MINUSMA with a number of IPOs. It has been the objective from the conception phase of the Dutch participation in MINUSMA, to create a complementarity and synergy between the Dutch participation in MINUSMA and the bilateral cooperation program, specifically where it concerns Security and Rule of Law. IPOs to be based in Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao and Bamako would help train the internal security services in these regions and at the police school in Bamako, among others in the areas of investigation (intelligence, tactics, forensics), human (including women's) rights, international crime, and curriculum reform. To facilitate the complementarity of the efforts of the EU and MINUSMA in the area of Internal Security Sector Reform (ISSR) and of the embassy in Justice Reform, the embassy will support the formulation of a government owned internal security sector reform framework. Support activities in ISSR will be considered on the basis of their capacity to increase the synergies between Justice and Internal Security Sector reform. Where possible, central funds like the Stability Fund will be actively solicited. The results of the community policing pilot will be shared with the EU and MINUSMA.

Although financed on the SRHR budget, it should be mentioned here that since 2012 the embassy is financing UNWomen in the training of armed and internal security forces on the prevention of gender based violence. This activity took off before the decision was made to set up the EU Training Mission (EUTM), and through coordination of the Chief of Staff, these efforts have become fully complementary.

Risks

The proposed changes in justice, security and democracy are actually taken forward in Mali in a context of willingness to change. But the honeymoon will soon be over and in each sector the vested interests will be resistant to change. Old political power networks are still in place and functioning. It remains to be seen how much change the president is able to achieve when he himself depends on those networks. They have put in place a system of managed incompetence, which will have to be reversed through a mix of political will, popular pressure, and competent human resources. There are still risks at all of these levels.

An issue at risk of being overlooked is the need for a common understanding of corruption and of nepotism, and agreement on how to address them. Corruption and nepotism have become so engrained in daily habits in Mali, that the fight against it will require a sacrifice from all Malians.

Although the presence of MINUSMA is an opportunity, the slow buildup of the organization is problematic. It still does not have half of the military capacity it is authorized to have, so it depends strongly on Serval. The civilian side of MINUSMA has to deal with a constant change in personnel, who come on three to six month contracts and then leave again. As MINUSMA hit the ground running in preparation of the elections and the related Ouagadougou accords, it has not yet been able to complete its strategic framework.

Impatience from citizens and from donors can be a threat.

Chapter 5 Other instruments of international cooperation; regional accreditations

Culture and sports - ways of canalizing energy of youth

Next to the central priorities the embassy seeks synergy with other elements of cooperation. Especially culture and sports are part of the responses we support in the priorities. Using radio, theater in SRHR or in peace-building programs are ways of canalizing energy and creativity of the youth. As there are strong budget cuts in culture the embassy opted to mainstream cultural elements in the priorities when they reinforce the approaches towards the population. Only the multiannual

programs with Acte Sept and the Festival sur le Niger will be continued. If additional funds become available, the embassy would also like to fund the Festival au Désert, for reasons of the symbolism of the Festival: it shows a positive side of the Tuareg community in times when that community is not perceived very well and fund the exploitation of the Tombouctou manuscripts.

The Netherlands participated in the protection of the manuscripts of Tombouctou during the war. Actually the embassy plays a broker role between the different donors (Switzerland, Luxemburg, UNESCO) and SAVAMA (association of families owning the manuscripts) supported by Prins Claus Fonds to come to a mid-term strategy of protection and exploitation of the manuscripts. The embassy is considering a program to preserve the technique of the traditional clay architecture in Mopti. This activity combines the professional training, the renovation of houses as well as training and conservation measures by introducing the use of residual plastics in making paving stones, to be used in reconstructing minor urban roads and market places. This activity stands in a tradition of Dutch involvement in clay architecture and is important for the preservation of ancient techniques as well as cultural heritage.

Exit of Education - ways of forging capacities

Capacity building of youth through education of quality and especially vocational training is a way of reinforcing the resilience of Malian girls and boys. In 2011 it was decided that the Netherlands would exit from education except for the integration of vocational training in each of the remaining thematic priorities. The NICHE window, and programs with NGOs such as Swiss Contact (FIBANI) are actively used to make the transition towards vocational training in agricultural, water management and health. Quality of basic education is being addressed through a program with the Institute d'Education Populaire, IEP. Finally, the remaining funds are used to support the FNSES through which government programs aimed at quality improvements in education are being directly financed. As laid down in the exit strategy, the expert for education left the embassy in May 2012. All remaining education activities are fully integrated in the other thematic priorities and catered for by the thematic experts for SRGR, Food Security & Water Management and Security & Rule of Law.

Regional accreditations

The embassy is planning to visit Burkina Faso and Niger twice a year to maintain political and economic relationships. There are actually a few ORIO projects in examination for Burkina Faso and some PSI projects. Trade facilitation is catered for as much as possible in close cooperation with the Consul in Ouagadougou.

Chapter 6 Financial implications

Financial ODA implications for the period 2014 – 2017 are described in the table below (budgetcode, description policy area and budget in €):

Budget 2014-2017		
1.3	Stronger private sector and better investment climate in developing countries	6.000.000
2.1	Improved food security	6.100.000
2.2	Improvements in water management, drinking water and sanitation	34.000.000
3.1	Sexual and reproductive health and rights for all; stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS	59.000.000
3.4	More professionals, institutions for higher and vocational education strengthened; promoting research with policy relevance	4.010.000
4.3	Developing the rule of law, reconstruction, peacebuilding, strengthening the legitimacy of democratic structures and combating corruption	28.000.000
Total		137.110.000

Abbreviations

AMPPF	Association Malienne pour la Protection et la Promotion de la Famille
ATT	Amadou Toumani Touré
AU	African Union
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CMDID	Centre for Multiparty Democracy
CNRDRE	Conseil National Pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat
CSLP	Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
DGIS	Directorate General for International Cooperation
DHS	Demographic and health Service
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EKN	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
EU	European Union
EUTM	EU Training Mission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDOV	Faciliteit voor Duurzaam Ondernemen en Voedselzekerheid
FGM	Female Genitale Mutilation
FIBANI	Formation Insertion dans le Bassin du Niger
FNSES	National Socio-Economic Stabilization Fund
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GF	Global Fund
GIRE	Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau
GNI	Gross National Income
HoC	Head of Cooperation
IBK	Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
IFC	International Financing Corporation
IFDC	International Fertilizer Development Center
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPO	Individual Police Officer
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
LDC	Low Developed Country
MASP	Multi-Annual Strategic Plan
MDF	Malian Defense Forces
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICS	Multi-Indicator Cluster survey
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MMF	Match Making Facility
NFP	Netherlands Fellowship Programme
NICHE	Netherlands Initiative for Capacity development in Higher Education
ORET	Programme for Development Related Export Transactions
PRED	Programme pour la Relance d'une Economie Durable
PSI	Private Sector Investment Program
PTF	Partenaires Techniques et Financiers
PUM	Programma Uitzending Managers
S&RoL	Security and Rule of Law
SBS	Sectoral Budget Support
SCAP	Stratégie Commune d'Aide au Pays (Joint Strategy)
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SSR	Sector Security Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States

WAMU
WASH

West African Monetary Union
Water Sanitation and Health